THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC OF SIBERIA

HENRY NORTON

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

ALEXANDER MICHAELOVITCH KRASNOSCHEKOFF, PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC, WITH HIS TWO CHILDREN

THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC *of* SIBERIA

By HENRY KITTREDGE NORTON

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

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TO

MY MOTHER

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PART I

THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST

CHAPTER I

THE LAND OF SIBERIA

BETWEEN the Ural Mountains, which form the eastern boundary of the continent of Europe, and the Straits of Behring, whose narrow waters divide Asia from America, lies the land of Siberia. For 5,000 miles and more it follows the shores of the Arctic Sea, turning its face to the north and sending its rivers towards the pole. This is the Siberia of wide repute, the Siberia of ice and snow, the Siberia of exiles and prisons.

But down in the south-eastern corner of the geographical Siberia is a country, comparatively small, yet of no mean significance when it is realized that its area is greater than that of any European State except Russia, which is quite different in many respects from the remainder of Siberia. Draw a straight line on the map of old Siberia from the northern end of Lake Baikal to the westernmost point of the Okhotsk Sea, and this line will correspond fairly closely to the watershed line of the Yablonoi Range.

South of this line is a territory composed of the old Russian provinces of Trans-Baikal, Amur, Saghalin, and the Maritime Province. It is the most favoured by Nature of all the land of Siberia. Its winters are cold, as the winters of the northern United States and southern Canada are cold, but the summers, while shorter, become at times unquestionably hot. At the western end of this territory, the annual rainfall is not great; sometimes being insufficient to mature a

wheat crop. Along the shores of the Sea of Japan, however, the summer precipitation becomes so great as sometimes to hinder rather than help the processes of agriculture.

On the western border of this territory, now known as the Far Eastern Republic, is Lake Baikal, the largest body of fresh water in the whole world. It is also one of the most beautiful. It is about 400 miles long, and 20 to 50 broad, its main axis running from south-west to north-east. The greater part of its area is now included in Soviet Russia, but more than one-fourth of it lies within the territory of the new Republic.

East of this is the great province of Trans-Baikalia or Za-Baikal. Its area is over 200,000 square miles, most of it a hilly, even mountainous, country, covered with forests, and drained by a network of streams. It is both the most populous and the most densely populated province of the Russian Far East. On this account the new Republic has divided it into two provinces, the western portion constituting the new province of Pri-Baikal, or "Along the Baikal."

At the eastern end of Trans-Baikalia, two great rivers, the Shilka and the Argun, both having their sources far to the south in Mongolia, flow together to form the Amur, the great waterway of Eastern Siberia. From this point it flows to the south-east for about 600 miles and then north-east for nearly 700 more, until it flows into the Sea of Okhotsk, below Nikolaievsk. South of the river, as far as its junction with the Ussuri, lies the Chinese province of Manchuria. North of this river lies the old province of Amuria. Its area was 154,795 square miles, and it included both the agricultural country to the south and the mining country to the north-east.

South from the mouth of the Amur for over 500 miles stretches the long narrow island of Saghalin. It is crossed almost in the exact centre by the 50th parallel of latitude. The part of the island south of this line is the territory of Japan. The northern half,

and much of the adjoining mainland, constituted the old Russian province of Saghalin. Its area was but 14,668 square miles, but it included not only the valuable mineral deposits of the island itself, but some of the most productive fishing grounds in the world.

About 200 miles beyond the point where the Amur turns to the north-east it is joined by the Ussuri. This river has its source in Lake Khanka, 250 miles or more to the south, though some of its tributaries rise from far beyond the lake, in Manchuria. The main stream forms the boundary line between China on the west and Siberia on the east. This part of Siberia is an arm which stretches southward along the coast of the Japan Sea almost to the 42nd parallel where it reaches the boundary of Korea. It formerly constituted the Maritime Province, or, as the Russians call it, the Primorsk ("Along the Sea"). The area of the old province was 266,486 square miles. The Far Eastern Republic has erected a new province, called Pri-Amuria, out of the greater part of the old Primorsk, all of Saghalin, and a small section of Amuria, leaving the present Primorsk to include only the southern end of the old province and the sea-coast.

In this smallest of the six provinces of the new Republic is Peter the Great Gulf. An arm of this gulf, Golden Horn Bay, is one of the finest harbours in the world, and upon its shores stands the city of Vladivostok. This is the only port worthy of the name in the whole Russian Far East, Okhotsk, Ayan, Petropavlovsk and Nikolaievsk being hardly more than fishing harbours. Vladivostok is not only the port; it is the largest city, the terminus of the railways, and the centre of the commercial life of Eastern Siberia. It is to this territory what Montreal and Quebec, Toronto and Ontario, and the port of Vancouver all put together are to Canada. As there is neither tide nor current, the bay is frozen over for about five months each year.

The whole territory of the new Republic has an area

of nearly 675,000 square miles.[1] This is about one-fifth of the area of continental United States and three times the size of France. If Vladivostok were at Boston (in the same latitude), Nikolaievsk would fall near Cartwright in Labrador and Verkhne-Udinsk, the westernmost city of the territory, would lie close to Winnipeg in Manitoba. Habarovsk would be at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, Blagoveshhensk would be some 400 miles north of Quebec, and Chita, the capital of the new Republic, would be not far from the northern shore of Lake Superior.

For the most part the territory in Asia resembles this American counterpart. The country is mountainous over a great part of its area without any great elevations. The pine, the fir and the birch are the common trees. The grassy meadows of Trans-Baikal are breaks in a vast timberland. The plains of the northern side of the Amur valley are much like the fields of Manchuria to the south. The damp lowlands of the Ussuri are reputed to be among the most fertile in the world. Everywhere in summer there is a profusion of wild flowers, which break the vivid green with their thousand colours.

Economically, there are three items of the highest importance. First among these is timber. From Lake Baikal clear across Pri-Baikal and Trans-Baikal Provinces is one vast forest area, ready to supply the world with an almost unlimited quantity of timber for years to come. Not all of it is readily accessible in the present stage of development of the country's transportation system, but all of it can be reached, and undoubtedly will be, when the country is exploited.

Another item is the fisheries. Lake Baikal, all of the rivers, and all the coastal waters are fairly teeming with fish of all kinds. The lake and river catches are largely for home consumption, but the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk produce annually tons of fish,

[1] No surveys have been made since the new boundaries were fixed so that exact figures are not available.

much of the catch being canned and shipped to various parts of the world. The annual value of this product runs into millions of dollars.

The third natural factor is the mineral wealth of the country. Gold is the product of greatest value, though silver, lead, copper, iron, coal, and various other deposits are found in large quantities. Emerald and topaz are found at Nertchinsk, and lapis lazuli near the Baikal. Mica is found on the banks of the Vitim River.

In addition to these natural riches, the country offers opportunity for cattle-raising on a large scale, the hills and meadows of Trans-Baikal affording pasture for millions of animals. The valleys of the Amur and the Ussuri are rich granaries. It is estimated that the valley of the Ussuri alone would sustain a population of 5,000,000 people.

During the Neolithic period this magnificent stretch of country was more densely populated than at present. The first inhabitants were the Yeneseians, a primitive people, of whom there are to-day a few survivors. After them came the bronze-working Ugro-Samoyeds, a people with a somewhat advanced civilization. They irrigated the fields and produced art of a high type in bronze. They were destroyed by the Turko-Tatars, a people with an iron culture, who adopted the bronze-working art of their predecessors and developed it to a higher degree. In their turn, they were driven out and their civilization destroyed by the Mongols under Jenghis Khan in the thirteenth century. With the downfall of the Mongol power, the country became the home of a number of nomadic tribes, who were little more than savages for the most part, although some of them had made the beginnings of a civilization.

Among the latter were the Daurians, who lived along the banks of the Amur and its tributaries. Some of them were farmers, and some possessed herds of cattle. They grew barley, millet, oats, buckwheat, peas, and hemp. They lived in stone houses, and used

paper windows, the latter in all probability an importation from China.

Another people were the Buriats, a Mongolian race, one tribe of whom, living on an island in Lake Baikal, are the only Mongols who preserve their old racial religion, the primitive usages, and the archaic beliefs and philosophy of the people from amongst whom arose such world-conquerors as Jenghis Khan and Tamerlane.

One hundred years ago, however, the country was practically an uninhabited wilderness much as America was before the coming of Columbus. Here and there were settlements of nomad tribes, shifting about to meet the economic exigencies of the time. To-day there are in the land some two million Russians and the beginnings of a civilization modelled after that of Europe and the West.

CHAPTER II

THE COMING OF THE RUSSIANS

THE story of the settlement of this great Russian population five thousand miles away from the mother-land in Europe, begins in the sixteenth century. At that time the vast wilderness of northern Asia meant to the Russians what America did to the Spaniards—great and quick riches. But while the American lure was gold, the Asiatic attraction was furs. As early as 1555 we find Moscow receiving a yearly tribute of 1,000 sables from some of the tribes east of the Urals.

The Russian advance into Asia, however, began in 1580. In that year, Yermak, an outlawed Cossack chieftain, crossed the Urals with less than 2,000 men, and conquered the land of the Tatar prince, Kutshum Khan, including his capital, Sibir. Yermak offered the conquered territory, nearly as large as Russia itself at that time, to the Czar in return for his pardon. The Czar accepted, and the new territory acquired its present name, from its old capital.

Once in the country, the Russians advanced from river valley to river valley, founding towns as they went. Tobolsk was founded in 1587, Yakutsk in 1632, and Irkutsk in 1651. In the Baikal region the Russian advance met with a stiff resistance from the Buriat tribes. They were finally conquered, however, and submitted to Russian rule in 1655. During this contest, an ostrog, or fort, was built at Verkhne-Udinsk on the Selenga River. This new establishment became the base for the settlement of all Trans-Baikalia.

Farther to the north the Cossacks had made even more rapid progress. They worked their way across the frozen plains to the Sea of Okhotsk, which they reached in 1636. They met with little resistance from the native wanderers, and a wide territory was added to the Russian domains. Never had such a country been acquired so easily. It took the Americans two hundred years to cross America, and the English nearly a century to cross Australia.

This rapid advance was confined to the high northern plateau, however, and did not include the Amur country. In 1649, the Governor at Yakutsk granted the petition of Erothei Pavlov Habarov to raise a body of 150 men to discover a short route to the Amur. The permission was granted on condition that he refrain from violence to the natives, and use firearms only when necessary. Habarov started at once with about seventy men. The instructions of the Governor were little heeded, for Habarov was a villain of the deepest dye, and he burned and tortured and raped his way through the country.

The resistance of the outraged natives stiffened as he advanced, and he was forced to return to Yakutsk for reinforcements. On his return he met and defeated the Daurians at Albazin, which he then fortified and made the base of future Russian action on the Amur. He spent the winter exploring, fighting, and making reports to the Governor. His ambitions grew with his success, and he asked for an army to conquer not only this land, but Manchuria as well.

He found living along the river nine different tribes, all of whom paid tribute to the Governor of Manchuria as the representative of the Emperor of China. The Russians sent an embassy to this Chinese Governor, demanding tribute "as great as he could give." The presumptuous demand never reached him, as the embassy was massacred by the Daurians. Nothing daunted, Habarov slaughtered and plundered his way to the mouth of the Sungari, finding many evidences

of the collection of tribute by the Chinese, but no evidence of Chinese occupation. In search of winter quarters, he went on to the mouth of the Ussuri, where he encamped on the site of the city which now bears his name.

Here he was attacked by a Chinese army of 2,000 men with eight guns and thirty gingals. The Russians repulsed the attack, but Habarov decided to retire, and, by the greatest good fortune, slipped past a Manchu army of 6,000 men, which had been sent to the mouth of the Sungari to intercept him. He stopped at the mouth of the Zeya, the site of the present Blagoveschensk, where his good fortune deserted him. His men became discontented, and many of them left to become roving bandits. The authorities at Yakutsk turned against him, and at last sent out a new commander for his troops.

Habarov was arrested and sent to Moscow for trial on a charge of concealing treasure. He was acquitted, his honours restored, and large rewards were given him. But he never went back to the Amur. He died on the Lena in 1655, and his descendants are still to be found in Siberia. He was the most conspicuous of the Cossacks after Yermak, and has the distinction of having chosen the sites of two of Siberia's largest cities.

The Manchus were determined to drive out the Cossacks, and in March of 1655 attacked them with 10,000 men. They bombarded the camp for three weeks, but were repulsed. The Russians retired, however, for lack of provisions. The Chinese had ordered all the natives not to cultivate the neighbouring land but to retire southwards. The Russians retaliated by making a raid into the heart of Manchuria, to Ningut, after which they pursued their way down to the mouth of the Amur. Each year the Chinese renewed the attack, determined to rid the country of the Cossacks. At last, in 1658, they were successful. They dispersed the Cossack force and destroyed Albazin.

This success was but temporary, however, for seven years later the Russians were back again, and Albazin was re-established, this time by a murderer as a refuge for criminals. As in the case of Yermak, services to the Czar won pardon for crime, and by 1674 Albazin was a respectable place, with Government office, guard-house, and barracks. Again the Russians were advancing into what the Chinese insisted was their territory because they had levied tribute upon the natives.

Kang Hsi, the greatest of the Manchus, was aroused, and determined to expel the intruders. He began his campaign in 1684, and easily wiped out the lower posts. The following year a force of 15,000 Chinese attacked the Russian garrison of 450 men at Albazin. The Cossacks resisted until their ammunition was exhausted, and then capitulated on condition that they be allowed to retire to Nertchinsk with their arms. The Chinese destroyed the fort a second time. But no sooner had they left, than the Russians returned with 600 men and began its reconstruction. The Chinese returned to the attack the next year, but were repulsed. They tried again in 1687, but were again driven off, though the Russian garrison had been reduced to 66 men.

The Cossacks were splendid fighters, but the Russian weakness lay in the lack of support by the Government. Just as the work of Habarov and other leaders had been hindered by hostility at home, so in the present instance was Albazin lost after this heroic defence by a treaty which its defenders did not even know was being negotiated. This was the treaty of Nertchinsk, China's first treaty with a foreign power, which was signed in 1689. It provided that Albazin should be demolished, and that the Russians should withdraw from the Amur. The River Gorbitza was fixed upon as the boundary between the two peoples. Thus did China's first contact with a European power result in a conspicuous success for her and an inglorious defeat for the Russians.

Peter the Great and Catherine II both saw the advantages of further progress on the Amur, but neither of them took any steps to carry on the work begun by the Cossacks. In 1725 Vitus Bering left St. Petersburg on his first voyage of exploration. His work resulted in 1741 in the exploration and acquisition for the Czar of Alaska.

It was not until 1835 that Moscow again took up the dream of Peter and Catherine for the recovery of the Amur. Nicholas I was Czar, and his Prime Minister was Count Nesselrode, a humble follower of Metternich. Nesselrode had a wholesale fear of the power of China, and thought Siberia useful only as a place to which political opponents might be banished. In spite of his persuasions, however, the Czar, in 1846, dispatched an expedition to explore the mouth of the Amur. Under Nesselrode's influence, the report of this expedition was very unfavourable. The Amur was stated to be inaccessible for sea-going vessels, and Saghalin was described as a peninsula.

The Czar was more alive to the needs of the time than his Minister. He saw with some dismay that Great Britain was threatening Russia's monopoly of relations with China, and he refused to be satisfied with such a report. The following year he summoned Nicolai Nicolaievitch Muraviev, Governor of Tula, and informed him that he had been appointed Governor-General of Siberia. Muraviev was then only thirty-eight years of age, but he had served with distinction in the Turkish war and in the Caucasus. He was firm, energetic, rapid in the dispatch of business ; in short, excellently qualified for the task which had been assigned to him.

Muraviev's new territory stretched from the Yenesei to Bering Strait, and he was quick to see that the Treaty of Nertchinsk alone deprived him of the only ready means of communication between Baikal and Kamchatka. He realized at once that Russia must control the Amur. He therefore, as the first step in

the assumption of his new office, arranged for the dispatch of a second expedition to the mouth of the river. This was commanded by Nevelskoy, a friend of Muraviev and an ardent convert to his views.

A year at his capital in Irkutsk strengthened Muraviev's convictions in the matter. He saw Russia's trade with China through Khiakta declining, while that of England was growing apace. He saw Russia's influence in Asia decreasing as that of England was enhanced. He went to Petropavlovsk, and, misled by the beauty of the place at the time of his summer visit, decided to make it Russia's naval base upon the Pacific. He planned for its fortification, and left a temporary armament when he departed. Upon his return to Ayan he met Nevelskoy, and learned that Saghalin was an island, and that the estuary of the Amur was navigable for ocean-going ships of 15-foot draught. Ships from the Amur could thus reach the Gulf of Tartary and the Sea of Japan, which is never frozen.

Muraviev's plans for the control of the Amur, like those of his predecessors, met with more obstacles in Moscow than on the ground. Nesselrode, by his incompetence and ignorance, made Muraviev's task doubly difficult. The Governor-General, however, was able to secure the imperial approval for the transfer of the military port from Okhotsk to Petropavlovsk, the creation of a Siberian flotilla, and the establishment of winter quarters at the Bay of Shtchastia. Nevelskoy found this situation as ice-bound as the others, and therefore, in 1850, without orders, sailed up the Amur about 15 miles, and established a post, which, in honour of the Emperor, he named Nikolaievsk.

This exploit gave Nesselrode an excuse for the persecution of both Nevelskoy and Muraviev upon their return to St. Petersburg. Muraviev, however, won the sympathy of the Czar, who ordered the post to be

maintained as a station of the Russian-American Trading Co. The Chinese Government was to be informed of the proceedings.

Muraviev had won his first battle and a footing upon the Amur. He now resolved to push his operations further, and demanded a large army for the project. Nesselrode protested on account of lack of funds and the danger of arousing China. Muraviev presented a plan for the raising of an army of 12,000 men in Siberia itself. The Emperor approved, and in 1851 Muraviev returned to Irkutsk. The following year De Castries Bay, which commanded the lower Amur, was occupied, and a year later, Alexandrovsk was established.

Meantime Muraviev had greatly strengthened his position. He had organized an army of twelve battalions at Nertchinsk. He had received definite information that the Chinese did not claim the occupation of the territory at the mouth of the Amur. He had won over the natives by kind treatment, which was the more appreciated because of its contrast with that previously meted out to them by the Cossacks. Thus strengthened, he returned to Moscow, only to find his enemies there still at work. They had even sent a note to Peking, which was intended to warn the Chinese Government in time to allow them to forestall the plans of Muraviev.

Once more the Czar saved the situation, and ordered the occupation of Saghalin, which was immediately accomplished by Nevelskoy. The Russian occupation on the mainland was at the same time extended. No sooner had this been done than the Crimean War began. This struggle, which temporarily wrecked the power of Russia in Europe, Muraviev turned to her advantage on the Pacific. When he returned to Irkutsk, he had the authorization of the Czar to handle all questions regarding frontiers in the Far East directly with China. Thus was Nesselrode eliminated, and Muraviev at once set about making

arrangements for the navigation of the Amur with or without the consent of China.

In the summer of 1854 he went down the river with one steamship and seventy-five barges. He passed the Chinese fortified town of Aigun without trouble because the Governor had no orders to stop him. He sailed to the mouth of the river and across to Petropavlovsk, whose garrison he increased from his own forces. This was done not a moment too soon, for in August the port was attacked by the English and French under Admiral Price. Two Russian ships assisted in the defence, and after seven days of fierce fighting the Allies sailed away. They planned, however, to renew the attack the following year, and Muraviev, realizing that reinforcements could not arrive in time, ordered the evacuation of Petropavlovsk.

The ships and garrison escaped to Nikolaievsk, which, guarded by a second and larger Amur expedition, was too strong for the Allies, and the year passed with no change in the situation.

In September of 1855 the Chinese plenipotentiaries arrived at Narinsk to settle the boundary question. Muraviev proposed the Amur, but the Chinese brought forth Nesselrode's letter of two years before, and claimed that Russia had abandoned the lower Amur. Muraviev assured them that Russia's greatest desire was for peace, but that he was going to bring down another expedition the following year and establish a string of forts on the left bank of the river.

Meanwhile, Alexander II had succeeded Nicholas as Czar, and Muraviev was forced to return to St. Petersburg to assure his position there. He secured the Czar's appointment as plenipotentiary for a new treaty with China, and, reporting the establishment of four posts on the Amur, secured its recognition as Russian territory by the formation of a new Coast Province. Muraviev returned and arranged for the transport to the new territory of settlers, who might make of it something more than a string of forts.

Meanwhile the centre of interest was shifting to Peking. The English and French were planning their expedition to the capital of China, and Russia determined to participate. Admiral Putiatin was appointed to represent Russia. He arrived at Kiakhta, and was coolly informed by the Chinese that they had nothing to discuss with Russia of sufficient importance to warrant a personage of his exalted rank making the fatiguing journey to Peking, and therefore they would not let him make it. He was forced, therefore, to go down the Amur to Nikolaievsk, and there take ship for the mouth of the Peiho. He was again refused permission to go to Peking, and proceeded to Shanghai.

In 1858 Muraviev was organizing another expedition down the Amur to strengthen his garrisons and his settlements when he received a request from the Chinese for negotiations. The expedition was postponed, and Muraviev went to Aigun to meet the Chinese plenipotentiary. Here they agreed, May 16, 1858, upon the Convention of Aigun. This provided that the Amur was to be the boundary between the two empires as far as the Ussuri. Beyond that the boundary was to be fixed by later agreement. Navigation on the river was open only to Russian and Chinese vessels. Trade was to be free across these boundaries. Chinese subjects on the left bank of the river were to remain under Chinese jurisdiction.

There was great rejoicing among the Russians over this consummation. One of Muraviev's settlements on the river held a celebration over the news, and changed its name to Blagoveschensk—the Annunciation. Muraviev was made a Count, with the title "Amurski." He had succeeded in wiping out without bloodshed China's vague claim to tribute over the territory north of the Amur, and converted the country into an actual Russian settlement.

Muraviev did not stop work with the acquisition of a title. Putiatin had negotiated a treaty of commerce at Tientsin shortly after the Aigun Convention

was signed. General Ignatiev had been sent to Peking with instructions to settle the Ussuri boundary question. Muraviev surveyed the coast of the Japan Sea as far south as the Korean boundary. He named Peter the Great Bay, and fixed the site of Vladivostok as that of a future Russian settlement. This port succeeded Petropavlovsk and Nikolaievsk in his mind as the Russian naval base on the Pacific. He occupied both Peter the Great and Possiet Bays in July of 1860, and in November of that year the occupation received the sanction of the Treaty of Peking which fixed upon Muraviev's frontier, and Manchuria lost all access to the sea on the east.

While Muraviev was working his way towards the coast, the country behind him was filling up with his countrymen. The stream of exiles had flowed unceasingly since the beginning of the seventeenth century. These included political offenders, those who had escaped massacres, rebellious serfs, leaders of Moscow mobs, mutinous militiamen, leaders of the Little Russians in their fight for autonomy, unsubmissive Poles, and criminals of the most villainous character.

The story of the transport of these exiles is a hideous one. For over 3,000 miles they were forced to travel on foot. On the march each convict wore a chain from both ankles to the waist, their hands were bound, and six or eight of them were chained together. Behind these came those who were condemned to settle in the new country. Over all these was a guard made up of men whose natural brutality was enhanced by the life they led. Struggling along behind the carts of supplies came the wives and children of the condemned. All of them were in rags, with naked bleeding feet, and shivering in the freezing wind. Thus they strung along the road, four or five hundred in a party. At night they sought shelter in the stations. These were built to accommodate 150 persons. There was no room for all. The strongest got the best places, and the weakest were gradually dropped behind.

Arrived in Siberia their lot was no better. They were set to work in subterranean mines in darkness and in poisonous gases and under the whips of overseers. Some were flogged to death. Others were killed by overwork. Their food money was stolen by rapacious officials, and they were only allowed starvation rations. If they escaped, as many did, they became hunted fugitives in a desolate and frozen land.

For the most part this sort of colonization did not give Siberia a good population. It filled her borders with a horde of broken and unable men, with all too large a sprinkling of criminals. In 1825, however, after the revolt against Nicholas I, many prominent members of the Russian aristocracy, the Decembrists, were exiled to Siberia, and remained there with their families until the death of Nicholas thirty years later. These exiles were the founders of the city of Chita. They gave a distinctly higher tone to the life of Trans-Baikal, and when the survivors returned to Russia they spread a new knowledge of Siberia among the Russian people. Some even returned to assist in the colonization of the Amur.

No exact figures are available as to the number of persons sent to Siberia. Between 1823 and 1887 no less than 700,000 crossed the Urals. In the last decade of this period at least 165,000 were sent to Siberia, over half of them by administrative order, without even a semblance of a trial. This system continued until 1900, by which time over a million men and women had been exiled to Siberia. Then imprisonment was substituted for exile except for political offenders. A hundred thousand of these were sent after the revolt of 1905, and they continued to arrive until 1914, when the exile system was abolished. Not, however, until it had filled the wilder places of Siberia with thousands of runaways—escaped convicts trying to make their way back to Russia. The number of these in 1910 was estimated at from 20,000 to 40,000.

This sort of colonization was not the kind to successfully build up the country. Immediately after the signing of the treaties in 1858 and 1860, efforts were made to induce migration from Russia to Siberia. So successful was this work that 2,000,000 settlers moved into the country within three years. Between 1870 and 1890 over 500,000 more came. By 1904 the Russian population had increased to about 6,500,000. Government efforts continued. In 1906, over $1,300,000 was devoted to assisting immigrants. This brought in 66,000 people. Two years later the appropriation had reached $10,000,000, and the immigration half a million.

One sort of colonization deserves special mention, because of later developments. Muraviev's plan for the organization of a Siberian army had included a scheme for the liberation of the serfs working in the Imperial mines, and their organization into Cossack regiments. These were known as the Za-Baikal Cossacks. Later some of them settled on the Amur and Ussuri rivers, forming the Amur and the Ussuri Cossacks.

The political events of this time were of slight importance. In 1867 an agreement was made with Japan for the joint occupation by the nationals of each Power of unoccupied places all over the Island of Saghalin. Such a scheme was of course unworkable, and in 1872 Russia exchanged the Kurile Islands for Japan's claims on Saghalin, all Saghalin thus becoming Russian. In 1872 Vladivostok was made the chief Russian naval station on the Pacific. In 1891 the Czarevitch, Nicholas, visited Siberia, and was received everywhere with great enthusiasm. One sees to-day monuments erected to commemorate his visit, and plates to mark the places where he slept.

Vladivostok realized in a measure Peter's dream of an open port for Russia. But it soon became apparent that it was necessary to have a more direct means of access than boats down the Amur. Rivers had

served as the first and most primitive means of communication for the Russians as they made their way across Asia. Then had come post roads. During the eighteenth century it required half a year for news to travel from Kamchatka to Moscow. One of these post roads was constructed along the Amur and the Ussuri to supplement the boat communication. Steamers began to ply after the middle of the last century, and in 1870 a private company began to transport mail and passengers.

In 1858 came the first suggestion of a railway from Moscow to the Pacific. Ten years later all Siberia was talking of the project, and by 1875 the Government decided to build a line from Perm through Ekaterinburg to Tiumen. This was completed in 1884. In 1890 the Trans-Siberian project was revived, and the Trans-Ural line was extended to Cheliabinsk. This was to be the first section of the Siberian road. In 1891 the construction of the Trans-Siberian was authorized by an Imperial rescript, which was promulgated by the Czarevitch on his visit to Vladivostok. The line was divided into sections, and the most difficult, those around Baikal and along the Amur, were left to the last, as boats could be used there. In 1898 the first train reached Irkutsk, and in the same year the line from Vladivostok to Habarovsk was opened.

By this time, however, the dreams of Peter the Great had grown in the minds of the Russian bureaucracy until they had become a vision of a great Asiatic empire under Russian sway. Vladivostok was good, but there were other ports nearby which were much better. One of these was at the foot of the Korean peninsula, and another was Talienwan on the Liaotung peninsula. Russian intrigue was busy at the Korean Court, and in 1895, when Japan had defeated China and was demanding the Liaotung peninsula as part of the prize of victory, Russia, first securing the co-operation of Germany and France, stepped in and forced Japan to relinquish her claims.

As a reward for this service to China, Russia was given the right in the following year to build a railroad across Manchuria to Vladivostok, with a branch from Harbin to Port Arthur. She followed this up with another bit of friendship and secured from China two years later a lease for twenty-five years on the Liaotung peninsula, including the ice-free harbour of Port Arthur. The new line, which was known as the Chinese Eastern Railway, was not opened until 1903, when at last Russia came into possession of an ice-free port.

Without this railroad, Russia's position in Asia was not an important one. She was enclosed in ice-bound Siberia, with no naval or commercial outlet during four or five months of the year. With it she became the dominant power in northern Asia, and the money- and power-mad bureaucrats at St. Petersburg did not hesitate to make the most of their opportunities. They determined upon the extension of their visionary empire to the shores of the Yellow Sea. Only thus could they justify the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars to build a railroad which cost millions of dollars more every year to keep it running.

The clause of the agreement with China, which allowed Russia to send guards into the railroad zone, was used to bring in troops far beyond any requirements of the road itself, and in 1900, when the Boxer revolt paralysed the power of China, Russia took advantage of the opportunity to occupy the whole of Manchuria, sending in six army corps from various bases. She forced an agreement upon the Manchurian authorities, which put the military and civil control of the province almost entirely in her hands. While this agreement was never ratified, Russia, by subtle intrigue at Peking during the negotiations between China and the Allies, secured the right to remain in Manchuria for nearly two years longer. Before that time had expired she presented other demands upon China, which showed very clearly that it was to

be a long time before Russia retired voluntarily from Manchuria.

At the same time Russia was making every effort to strengthen her position in Korea. When she went so far as to send troops into the country in civilian dress, in violation of all agreements, the Japanese called a halt. Very brief negotiations were unsuccessful, and in February of 1904 war began between the two nations. It continued for nearly two years, and when the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed Russia's dream of an Asiatic empire had faded into a more distant future. Liaotung, or South Manchuria, with the railroad south of Changchun, was gone; Japan had the same rights in North Manchuria as Russia; the Russian influence in Korea was for ever broken; and the Island of Saghalin, as far north as the 50th parallel, passed to Japan.

But Russian ambitions were not crushed. No sooner was the war ended than surveys were commenced for the construction of the Amur line, whose building had seemed unnecessary after the Chinese Eastern was acquired. With the Japanese within less than a hundred miles of that line, however, it could no longer be depended upon in case of another war, and an all-Russian line was demanded. Also plans were made for double-tracking the existing line and eliminating the troublesome ferry trip across the Baikal by building around the end of the lake.

Vladivostok, which had been intentionally subordinated to the advancement of Port Arthur, again came into its own. It was heavily fortified. Russian Island became a citadel in itself. There were 76 forts in all, mounting 580 guns of different calibres. It had a garrison of 80,000 men, and at other posts in Eastern Siberia were 120,000 more. As has already been seen, the population was greatly increased by assisted immigration. Every effort was made to enhance the industrial development of the country. Rice- and flour-mills, saw-mills, tanneries, soap,

brick, cement, candle and match factories were erected. Railway shops were constructed. A large shipping plant was established at Vladivostok.

These preparations, made with a view to an early renewal of the struggle with Japan, were rendered unnecessary for that purpose by the development of the international political situation. The talk of the open door in China, and equal opportunities for the people of all nations, the insistence upon the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China by the United States, soon made it clear to the bureaucrats of St. Petersburg and Tokyo that there was more to be made for each of them in Manchuria if they worked in harmony instead of as enemies. By 1907, co-operation had replaced any feeling of enmity left by the late war, and Russia and Japan proceeded under cover of professions of adherence to their international obligations, to divide the wealth of Manchuria between themselves.

This brought its measure of development to the Russian Far East, and it grew in population and in wealth accordingly. Ninety per cent. of the exports of Vladivostok were the products of Manchuria and China, not of Siberia. Nevertheless, Siberia itself was developing also, and its people, the shadow of war apparently lifted, were busying themselves in the building up of its mining, its agriculture, its industry, and its commerce. Thus were the Russians converting an almost uninhabited wilderness into a country with a modern civilization.

CHAPTER III

THE RUSSIANS OF THE FAR EAST

THE Russians to-day constitute more than ninety per cent. of the population of Eastern Siberia. In spite of the presence of Buriat-Mongols in their ancient haunts, in spite of the numerous Chinese and Koreans, in spite of the less noticeable remnants of primitive peoples, Eastern Siberia is distinctly Russian in atmosphere. One senses the civilization of Europe even at Harbin in the centre of the North Manchurian plain, but at Vladivostok, at Blagoveschensk, at Chita it is very marked. The streets are European, the public buildings are European, the homes are European. Siberia is geographically a part of Asia, but in no other sense is it Asiatic. Culturally it is a part of Europe.

Yet there is a perceptible difference between the Siberians and the Russians of European Russia. This is to be expected, for the process by which Siberia has been colonized has been one of selective immigration. Those who came as exiles did so because they had exhibited a certain amount of initiative and a measure of ability to see things as they were, rather than as the authorities chose to have them seen. The colonists in their turn were men who had sufficient force of character to break away from the old accustomed things of Russia and the courage to face the long journey across Asia in quest of something better for themselves and their families.

The life of the new country has tended to accentuate this difference. The Siberian is better off economically

than his European brother. He is less bound by ancient custom. He has had some contact with other civilizations. He is more liberal in his views, more ready to accept a new idea, to consider it carefully, to weigh it judiciously, and to make up his mind upon it intelligently, than the Russian of Europe.

The Siberians are quite conscious of their superiority. They resent being called "Russians" in much the same way that an American, even though of English descent, resents being called an Englishman. Many parallels have been noted by different observers between the Russo-Siberian and the Anglo-American relationships. Siberia has often been called the Russian "Wild East."

The analogy is useful for many purposes, but it must not be carried too far. With all his advance over the Russian of Europe, the Siberian is still a Russian. He is not an American, nor is he at all like an American. His whole background, tradition, and method of thought are Russian. It has been his lot to share the heavy burden of the Czarist autocracy. He and his wife and his children have been kept in the tutelage of the Established Church. While education is more widespread and illiteracy less common in Siberia than in European Russia, still there is too little of the one and too much of the other. The superiority of the Siberian consists for the most part in having begun to look upward rather than in having made any appreciable ascent.

The most noticeable Russian characteristic, that of slowness, is prevalent in Siberia. The entire mental process seems to be slower than it is with Anglo-Saxons. The Russians absorb an idea more slowly, they revolve it more deliberately, and they arrive at a conclusion more cautiously than we do. Having taken so much time on the thought side of the matter, action follows the same course. There appears to be no need of hurry; nay, even promptness is hardly within their ken.

At times this slowness degenerates into laziness. During the farming season the Russians will work, and work hard, almost fiercely. But after that he would much rather take things as they are than make any very strenuous effort to improve them. Repeatedly I have heard Americans say, "Wouldn't you think they would do this or that, when it would be so much better?" You would think so, if you were an American, but you would not if you were a Russian. And there is the difference. The American is for ever pottering around improving things, while the Russian is quite content to leave them as they are.

This slowness and caution gives the people a general appearance of stupidity, which is misleading. They are not stupid. They simply must take their own time to carry out their mental processes. There is certainly nothing of the alertness that characterizes some other races. There is nothing of the quick comprehension and instant response that is typical of other peoples of Europe.

Undoubtedly one contributing cause of this deliberation is the lack of education. Compared with the average American, the ignorance of the average Russian is appalling. Many of them never have seen a map of the world. They have no idea whatever of the shape or size of Russia, or its relations with other countries. The great European countries, and especially America, are elaborate legends rather than objects of knowledge.

Their civilization in Siberia is too raw, too new, to have established standards for their social and economic life. A day's work may mean an entirely different thing for one man from what it means for another. A given task may be performed by different men, and the results be as far apart as the poles. Any complaint upon the score of quality or lack of it is met by the inevitable "Nichevo"—"It's nothing."

In sanitary matters there is the same lack. Fresh

air is proverbially not a Russian desideratum. Flies are all but unbearable in every hotel, boat, railway car, and home in Siberia. In a stay of months, I saw one screened window. Dishes, knives and forks, are frequently but half washed, and food is handled in a way calculated to disinterest the fastidious. The chief abomination, however, is the Russian toilet. The equipment is, or may have been, good. But, no matter what the facilities, the Russian toilet is the home of foulness unspeakable.

The picture is by no means all unattractive, however. Pioneer life east of Baikal is, as Professor Ross describes it, "fresh and sweet." About the neat square log-houses and their out-buildings there are to be seen horses and cattle, pigs and sheep, chickens and geese. Well-kept gardens lie between the houses and the broad fields. When the farmer goes to town, he may do so on horseback or more likely in his little springless cart.

The Russian nature is sympathetic. The people are kindly when directly approached. There is nothing about them which would suggest the brutal or even the cruel. That there have been atrocities committed in the late wars is an undeniable fact. That both sides have been guilty is equally undeniable. This is due much more to the childishness of the Russian, to his extreme excitement under the influence of incitement and vodka, than to any native cruelty. Their kindness to animals and children is proverbial, and they have little or none of the aggressiveness, the pugnaciousness, of many of the other nations of Europe. Their outbursts during the recent fighting have been the expression of a long-confined impulse of revenge for wrongs done them. That it has been frequently misdirected does not alter the essential fact.

There is apparently little of the pride of race in the Russian. He associates with and assimilates all kinds and descriptions of men. This may be due to long practice, for the Russian Empire was a *mélange*

of many ingredients, or it may be due to a deep-seated confidence that the prolific Slav can smother out any other people. In any event, the Russian intermarries with the Chinese, the Korean, the Buriat, the Mongol, without the slightest suggestion of inappropriateness. Such mixed marriages seem to be accepted by both peoples in every case without marked social disapproval.

The Russian woman ranks high as a housewife. In fact the Russian woman ranks high on any scale. She is a hard and constant worker, and no task seems beyond her strength. She will pick up two huge buckets of water from a river, hang them on the ends of the shoulder-yoke, and carry them up the bank to her home, with hardly a sign of effort. In most instances she is not overly handsome according to our standards, and she ages early. But she is a fit mate for the Russian man, and carries her full share of the burdens of life.

Another characteristic of the Russian people, which has been modified to some extent in Siberia, is the tendency to an excessive birthrate. European Russia ranks with Japan and China as a producer of its kind. In Siberia the rate of increase does not exceed seven or eight per thousand per year. Much of this decrease is due to a high rate of infant mortality, but the birth-rate itself is actually smaller.

Nevertheless, children are plentiful. Their manner of play suggests the American boy and girl more than their parents suggest the American adult. They are more alert, full of fun, quick to respond to friendly approach, and, in the main, lacking in meanness and natural devilment. They are treated with kindness, even spoiled, yet the reins are drawn tighter than with the Japanese child, for example. The boys love playing soldier and swimming and the girls love their dolls, just as they do in better known parts of the world.

These people have laid the foundations of a civiliza-

tion out here in this Asiatic wilderness. They have done more than merely reproduce their old Russian civilization. They have made the beginnings of a newer and better Russian civilization. There were classical gymnasiums for boys and pro-gymnasiums for girls in the chief town of every province. While the primary schools were not too plentiful, still there were many of them. Amur Province had 42 urban and 268 rural schools. The grade of work was not of the highest, but it filled the need of the time.

The centre of every town is the church, and the centre of every city is the cathedral. Some of these latter are magnificent buildings, of which any city might be proud. Besides the cathedral every city is well provided with churches. The great majority of these are of course Greek Catholic, the established Russian Church. In every city of any size, however, are to be found, sometimes in prominent locations, a Jewish synagogue, a Roman Catholic church, and a Mohammedan mosque. The religious life of the people under the old regime was a strange mixture of devoutness and acquiescence in the wishes of a despotic government.

This government in the Far East was represented by provincial governors. Eastern Siberia was divided into six provinces, Yakutsk, Kamchatka, Trans-Baikal, Amur, Saghalin, and the Maritime Province. All but Yakutsk and Kamchatka are included in the present boundaries of the Far Eastern Republic. The governor-general of a province was the direct representative of the Czar, and had supreme control and direction of all civil and military affairs. He was assisted by a council which had a deliberative voice and some direct connection with the Department of Control in St. Petersburg, but the real power remained in the hands of the governor. The provinces were divided into districts for the purpose of local administration, and municipal institutions with limited authority were established in the larger cities.

The "mir" or community system of landholding never became established in Siberia. Such property as was in private hands at all was in small individual holdings. The State was the largest landowner, ninety-six per cent. of all the land in Siberia being State property. The thing that rankled upon the people, however, was the private holdings of the Czar. These were known as "cabinet lands," and consisted of the choice properties of the whole country. The total area of these holdings was over 1,000,000 square miles. Not only were lands so held, but also the richest mines and the best of the forests.

Government forests were exploited in three ways. The applicant for timber rights was assigned a large area, over which he could cut trees of a specified size only; he was assigned a small area over which he could cut all trees; or, the territory was divided into strips, alternate strips being cut and left untouched to permit reseeding. No effort was made anywhere in the country to secure permanency of forest production by scientific reafforestation. To the rulers of Russia Siberia was merely a vast and inexhaustible storehouse of wealth.

Beside the regular troops which were stationed in Siberia, there were various colonies of Cossacks. These constituted a special division of the population. The word "Cossack" is the Tartar word "Kazak," meaning "warrior." The Cossacks were a military-farming organization. They were assigned certain areas where the lands were divided among them, and where they were allowed some measure of self-government and freedom from taxes. There was complete equality among them. They elected their own commanders, or "atamans," who commanded 50 to 100 men, and all important matters were settled by a general council of the whole community.

In return for these special privileges, they were to hold themselves at all times ready for military service at the call of the Czar. Each furnished his

own horse and equipment, and a certain amount of training time was required.

It may be superficially correct to style a Cossack "just a farmer lad who cannot read, and has been trained to be a soldier in return for a farm." This characterization is too mild, however, to fit in with the history of the Cossacks. From the early days in Russia they have enjoyed a reputation not only for bravery but for ferocity and cruelty. When they crossed the Urals under Yermak and went down the Amur under Habarov, they were jealous of this reputation, and did nothing to detract from it. The Russian saying, "God is too high, and the Czar is too far," attained a terrible significance during their progress across Siberia. Yermak's record, bad as it was, paled beside the story of the progress of Habarov down the Amur.

The Cossacks of the Far East of the present time inherit this tradition rather than the ferocious fighting spirit of the older Cossacks. They were organized by Muraviev in the middle of the last century, and have never had the wide experience in warfare that the Cossacks of Russia have had. The characterization of "farmer lad" is much more nearly correct of the Siberian Cossacks. Nonetheless, the Siberian groups enjoyed the same privileges as their European confrères, and the tradition of unswerving loyalty to the Czar was carefully fostered amongst them.

PART II

THE PASSING OF THE OLD ORDER

CHAPTER IV

WAR AND REVOLUTION

To these people of Eastern Siberia the Russo-Japanese War was merely an adventure of the Romanovs. It inspired no enthusiasm among them, and the disorganization of their life and the breaking up of their families was only meagrely compensated by the increased business and higher prices which it brought them. They had no interest in territorial expansion or Korean control, and when the war ended it was no matter of concern to them that the world thought Russia the loser.

After the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, however, Eastern Siberia experienced a new growth and development. The Japanese penetration into Manchuria necessitated the immediate construction of the Amur Railway as an all-Russian line to the Pacific. This work, beside the money which it distributed among the local population, brought in new settlers and new business. The immigration from Russia was encouraged by the Russian Government as a means of strengthening the country for the renewal of the struggle with Japan, which it was generally believed would come in a short time.

The city of Vladivostok in particular was benefited by the Russo-Japanese War and its outcome. After the opening of the Chinese Eastern Railway with its southern extension to Port Arthur, Vladivostok was deliberately sacrificed to the development of the new port. Freight rates were so fixed as to work a

discrimination against Vladivostok, and Government activity was all turned toward the southern port. Vladivostok's business and then its population fell off rapidly, until it looked like a doomed city. With the victory of the Japanese, however, all this was changed. Port Arthur passed into their hands, and St. Petersburg at once became as much interested in the upbuilding of Vladivostok as it had formerly been in that of the South Manchurian port. The harbour was strongly fortified. Barracks and other buildings were constructed. New offices were established. The stillness of municipal death gave place to the hustle and bustle of a great civil and military headquarters.

This was not wholly due to Government activity. The transfer of Port Arthur to the Japanese resulted in the removal of many Russian, German, and other firms to Vladivostok, because they did not care to continue business at the former place under the changed conditions. These contributed their share to the new and almost too rapid growth of the older Russian port.

All in all the eight years following the Treaty of Portsmouth brought Eastern Siberia to the point of its highest development and prosperity. Everything pointed to the continued increase of industry and commerce, and, after many years of struggle, the Siberians were beginning to believe that they had arrived. Their farms and their forests were yielding a new wealth, their cities were flourishing. Over all the land there spread an unwonted atmosphere of contentment, which was almost sufficient to reconcile the people to a postponement of the always longed-for revolution.

Then came the news of the German War. Once more the Siberians must forgo the labours of peace to assume the burdens of war. They did so reluctantly. The quarrels of emperors in Europe were far-away things to the Russians in Eastern Asia. They responded but feebly to the efforts of the Government

to arouse a war spirit. They did not want war, and they could not be induced to think they did. Nevertheless, they saw in the possibility of German defeat a means of hastening their own revolution. The revolutionary workers in particular emphasized this phase of the matter, and such response as the Government was able to arouse was due to this feeling that the war might mean the end of that Government.

The effects of the war were disastrous to the new-found prosperity of the Siberians. First, all of the regular troops stationed in the Far East were sent to the European front. Then came the mobilization of every able-bodied man for training and service. The Trans-Baikal, Amur and Ussuri Cossacks had to leave their farms. The peasants were mobilized. The industrial workers in the towns were called out. Farms lay idle and factories were shut down for lack of labour. Only the activities which were considered necessary to the conduct of the war were left with men to continue them.

Production fell off. Food and manufactured articles became scarce. Prices soared. Speculation was rife. Capitalists who had been engaged in industry transferred their money and energies to the field of trade and speculation where great fortunes could be more rapidly made. Increasing issues of paper money aggravated the situation for the mass of the people. The concurrent inflation of prices and falling off in the value of money created a situation which was rapidly becoming unbearable for them, and discontent became ominous.

Vladivostok alone seemed to benefit. The city became feverishly busy. As the entrepôt for war supplies and other traffic from America its business increased beyond anything it had known heretofore. As a port its receipts surpassed all previous figures. Its trade taxed the capacity of its facilities for handling it. Its railroad to the west was using every loco-

motive to haul overloaded trains. There was work and plenty for every one. Here were congregated those who were reaping the harvest of the country's disorder. Here were "bourgeois" of long standing, and here were the newly-rich who owed their fortunes to the war. The "proletariat" had little representation here, for every one had money, and the socialistic distinctions became less distinct.

The merchants of the other towns and the villages would gladly have followed the example of their metropolitan brethren, but they had to deal with peasants who had little or no share in the artificial prosperity of the country. Rising prices and falling money values made it imperative that the peasants should find a way to relieve their distress. The means which they hit upon was the co-operative society. The co-operative movement had made some progress in Europe, and it had been introduced in Siberia before the opening of the war. But its great impulse there came from the necessity which the peasants were under to find some means to counteract the efforts of the local merchants to reap sudden wealth out of the conditions attending the Great War.

The co-operatives began their work by purchasing necessities for their peasant members on joint account. But their activities soon spread into other fields. Co-operative purchasing led to co-operative marketing, and soon the co-operative society became the clearing-house for all of the economic transactions of the peasants. More than that, it became a social and educational centre. In this new association the Siberians found an instrumentality by which they could not only better their economic conditions but make their lives richer in other ways. Also the co-operative became a new instrument of revolution. It brought out the ability of the people for common action. It enhanced the idea of democracy and social, as opposed to individual, effort. It pointed out more clearly than ever the opposition between the people and the merchant class.

Most of the small towns had but one merchant. His efforts to acquire sudden wealth at the expense of his customers were not even tempered by competition. He was usually the sole representative of the "bourgeoisie" present. And the co-operative society emphasized both the isolation of his position and his character as a predatory member of society. All of the contentions of socialistic teaching seemed to be pointed by the growth of the co-operative society.

Thus the ground was well prepared for the news of the revolution in March of 1917. The people went wild over the tidings. At last the hated autocracy was no more. The work of nearly a century had finally achieved its aim. News filtered through slowly as to the extent and character of the revolution, but it was enough that the long-awaited event had occurred. Russia was to be free. The Russians were no longer to be slaves.

The Zemstvos of the various cities and the Dumas of the provinces took over the functions of Government. But these had been elected or appointed under the old regime, and the people were not ready to trust them altogether. Committees of Public Safety were formed to safeguard the revolution. All efforts to bring about a reaction were carefully guarded against. This work became the special duty of the "soviets" or "councils" of workers, of peasants, of soldiers, which were formed in every centre. They directly represented the people, and they were the children of the revolution.

It was not as simple as this, however, for, although the desire for revolution had been almost unanimous among the masses of the people, the programme of construction which should follow the revolution had never engaged any large share of their attention. The active revolutionaries all had their plans, or at least their ideas, but there was a striking lack of unanimity, even of any majority sentiment, on this matter. Every group of politicians thought the coming of the

revolution meant the triumph of its own ideals, and proceeded to act accordingly.

The resulting disturbances in the political atmosphere were greatly enhanced by another factor which made its appearance at this time. The news of the success of the Russian revolution and the overthrow of the old Government had reached thousands of revolutionary exiles in foreign countries. They received it exultingly. Their day had come, and they took ship forthwith to be on the ground and enjoy the first fruits of their labours. The new Government showed its favour by assisting these with money for their passages. Thousands came back through Vladivostok alone. It was inevitable that among these there should be many impostors touring the country at Government expense. The coming of the sincere revolutionists alone would have sufficiently aggravated the situation, but the arrival of this utterly irresponsible element increased the difficulties beyond calculation. It was only the sincerity and earnestness of purpose of the *bona fide* workers that ultimately saved the day.

Even the best of these were hopelessly divided in their efforts. The one bond of union among them had been their determination to abolish the autocracy. This had been done, but the more radical groups declared that this was but the beginning; that the Russian revolution must be more than a political revolution with the substitution of a capitalist-controlled government. It must be a social revolution, with the workers in full control, if the Russian people were to enjoy the benefits of their long struggle. They pointed to the fact that the reactionary elements, or rather those who might have been expected to be reactionary, were making no trouble, and were apparently entirely satisfied with the new order.

At first these contentions received but little attention. The months wore on, however, and the workers were not receiving the blessings which had been promised them as the result of the revolution.

Disappointment was beginning to be manifest. More than that, the economic system was showing signs of breakdown. It is estimated that a million tons of freight were lying at Vladivostok for lack of facilities to move it. Along the line of the Trans-Siberian road four million pounds of Siberian meat were spoiling because there were no cars to take it to Russia.

That much of this disorganization was due to the deliberate efforts of the old bureaucracy to wreck the country's distributing system, the people of Siberia were not aware at that time. They naturally ascribed the difficulties to the new Government, and condemned it accordingly. Not even the announcement in September that Russia had become a republic could arouse the waning enthusiasm. The news of the Bolshevik revolution two months later, however, opened up new possibilities and created far more interest.

CHAPTER V

THE TIDE OF BOLSHEVISM

BOLSHEVISM made its way more slowly in Asiatic Russia than it did in European Russia. The peasants of Siberia were not Communists by conviction, and seemed to recognize instinctively that communistic principles were not suited to the conditions of Asiatic Russia. They called a parliament at Omsk early in 1918, and formed a Liberal Government there, which refused to recognize the Soviet power. We shall see later to what purposes this Government was turned.

In the Far East things were in confusion. The well-informed minority of the people were probably in favour of the second revolution, but events had moved with too great rapidity for the majority. They were more or less dazed. They certainly had no particular desire for Communism, for they hardly knew the name. It was a time when strong and determined leadership would carry the day.

Among the revolutionaries who had returned to Russia immediately after the March revolution was Alexander Krasnoschekoff. He had lived twelve years in America, where he had been a radical leader of some note. While there he had availed himself of the opportunity to study in the American institutions of learning, and this training, together with his native ability and intelligence, enabled him to step into a position of prominence almost immediately after his arrival in Vladivostok.

Krasnoschekoff was a Communist by deep conviction and sincere belief. He was no ranting orator, but

a man who won his way rather by force of logic and sincerity of purpose than by loud-mouthed aggressiveness. He believed with all the intensity of his nature that Communism was the great ideal towards which the overburdened world was struggling, and that any success of Communism anywhere and under any circumstances, was a step toward that desirable consummation.

To him Eastern Siberia was as favourable a place as any in which to put into operation the principles which he so strongly advocated. He threw himself into the struggle immediately upon his arrival, and soon became the leader of the more radical reformers. But even among the Communists unanimity was lacking, and Krasnoschekoff found himself strongly opposed by a group under the leadership of Nikiferov and others, who maintained that although Communism might be immediately possible in Russia, was highly desirable in other parts of the world, and was the ultimate goal of the whole world's endeavours, nevertheless it was unsuited to the present stage of industrial development in Eastern Siberia. "The Russian Far East is an economic desert," said they, "and it needs the waters of Capitalism to make it blossom before it will be a fitting home for Communism." So they argued, and refused to fall in with Krasnoschekoff's plans for the early establishment of Communism.

These men, however, were second to none in their championship of the rights of labour and the common man. Their tendencies were "socialistic," but they would not go the whole way to Communism. They joined in the first convention of the workers' organizations of the Far East, which was held in Vladivostok, beginning Oct. 28, 1917. It was during this convention that the news of the Bolshevik revolution in Petrograd arrived. It furnished the occasion for a trial of strength between the two groups. The convention split, the differences could not be reconciled, and adjournment followed.

Krasnoschekoff returned to Nikolsk-Ussuriski, from which city he had been elected to the convention, and called a conference there. In the absence of his powerful opponents, he had no difficulty in winning his point, and the conference resolved upon the immediate establishment of Communism in Eastern Siberia. They called a conference of all the Far Eastern Soviets to meet at Habarovsk December 11th.

The Zemstvo party, which advocated the retention of the existing form of government, and refused to join in the Bolshevik cry of "All power to the Soviets!" had also called a conference at Habarovsk for December 10th. Krasnoschekoff was elected a delegate to both conventions. The Nikolsk-Ussuriski Soviet elected him as their representative at the Soviet conference, and the Municipal Council of the same city sent him as their delegate to the Zemstvo conference.

At Habarovsk, Krasnoschekoff endeavoured to effect a compromise between the two groups, and to secure a Coalition Government. While he was working to this end, an intercepted telegram was brought to him which showed plainly that the commander of the Russian troops was negotiating with the Japanese. This meant two things, both detested of the Siberians, counter-revolution and foreign intervention. Krasnoschekoff demanded of the Zemstvos that they arrest the commander and form a coalition with the Soviets to resist foreign aggression. The demand for arrest was complied with, but the Zemstvo representatives refused to share their power. Thereupon the Soviet convention, in the name of the revolution, declared the Zemstvo conference dissolved, and, as the people were strongly behind them in this step, actually effected the dissolution of the Zemstvo meeting.

The move which had as its object the resistance to intervention led to immediate action on the part of the Japanese. On December 30, a Japanese warship arrived in the harbour of Vladivostok without having previously notified the Russian authorities. The

Japanese Consul at once sent a note to Medvediev, President of the Zemstvo of the Maritime Province, and to Agariev, the Mayor of Vladivostok, attempting to explain this unprecedented breach of international custom. He professed friendship for the Russians, and hoped for "normal development," and that no necessity would arise for interference. He said the warship had been sent to protect the Japanese residents who were frightened by the recent events.

Up to that time there had been no disturbance of any kind in Vladivostok, in spite of the lurid reports in the Japanese Press referring to violence and riot. Medvediev at once sent a protest against the unwarranted action of the Japanese. To this protest the Japanese sent no answer, but two weeks later the British and American Consuls sent a note to the Zemstvo agreeing that no disturbance had taken place, but stating that many foreigners were afraid of what might happen and that they could appreciate the efforts of the Japanese to be prepared for eventualities. Two days after this another Japanese cruiser arrived, accompanied by a British cruiser and an American vessel. Both of the latter sent the usual notification to the authorities.

On the night of January 21 (1918), the Hotel Versailles, one of the largest and best of Vladivostok's hostelries, was entered by about fifteen men wearing Czarist military overcoats, and many of the guests were robbed. The Russians contend without reservation that these men were bribed to do this by the Japanese to furnish a pretext for further interference, but as the men escaped and remain to this day unidentified, there is no direct evidence to support the theory. About the same time, several foreigners, including two Japanese and one Britisher, were assaulted in the streets.

The Consular Corps, under the leadership of the Japanese "doyen," sent a note of protest to the Zemstvo saying that the local militia was not sufficient in numbers and not properly trained to cope with the

criminal element, and adding that the Government was not taking adequate measures to suppress crime.

The Soviet of Workers, which had been organized immediately after the March revolution, encouraged by the success at Habarovsk, were now insisting upon workers' control, and were sending their commissars to the banks and other business houses to supervise the transaction of their business. This gave rise to much resentment. The Chamber of Commerce protested, and some of its members were arrested. On February 27, the Consular Corps sent another note to the Zemstvo stating that conditions were very bad ; that they had no intention to interfere in local affairs, but that they had the right to expect that their nationals would not be interfered with by " certain organizations " (the Soviets), and that they reserved the right in future to act according to circumstances.

In spite of their assertion that they had no intention to interfere in local affairs, the Consular Corps, acting through the Chinese Consul, brought pressure to bear upon the Russians in a very effective way. Vladivostok and its neighbourhood normally draws a large portion of its food supply from Manchuria. The Consular Corps prevailed upon the Chinese Consul to close the border to traffic. This brought a vigorous protest from the Zemstvo, and the Chinese offered to allow food to come through for the civilian population only, if the Consular Corps could control its distribution. The Zemstvo authorities pointed out, however, that this would be interference with local affairs in a most intolerable manner, and the condition was withdrawn.

On March 6, the Consular Corps again threatened to cut off the food supply unless conditions were changed to their liking. They asked what measures were being taken to organize a police force to protect the life and property of foreigners. They objected to the dismissal and in some cases arrest of the old customs officers, stating that the new appointees were not properly prepared to perform their duties. They

protested against the newly organized "Red Guards," because they were not authorized by a recognized government. In other words, they insisted that all the features of the new regime which did not meet with their approval should be discontinued, and the old forms and the old administrators restored. There might be revolution but its character must be satisfactory to the Consular Corps.

The course of events in Siberia gave rise to the discussion in Japan of the desirability of intervention. As early as December, 1917, when the Russian front gave way, the more chauvinistic of the Japanese had felt that Japan's hour had arrived. Their trend of thought was expressed by Dr. Terao Toru in an article in one of the Japanese reviews. He recommended the extension of "the Japanese Monroe Doctrine" to include Russia, and proposed two conditions on which the Japanese would restore the eastern front. These were that the Allies should recognize Japan's paramountcy in Oriental affairs, "entirely obeying Japan's wishes" there, and the cession to Japan of Russia's north-east coast facing the Okhotsk Sea. Dr. Toru pointed out that Japan would achieve these ends in time anyway, and that there was no real reason for delay.

By March of 1918 the reasons advanced for intervention had changed character. The "German menace" was now insisted upon. It was stated that the German and Austrian prisoners of war who had been liberated by the Bolsheviks were organizing the Russians and commanding them in attacks upon the Allied troops and their friends. The *Osaka Mainichi,* one of the great Japanese journals, suggested drawing a line at Baikal and holding that with Japanese troops.

Along with these expressions of concern for the Allied cause, however, ran an undertone which somewhat reflected upon their sincerity. The *Nichi-Nichi,* one of Tokyo's greatest and most influential dailies,

suggested that America might block Japan's efforts in Siberia, and pointed out various "indications" of the American ambition to occupy Vladivostok and control the Trans-Siberian Railway. The *Niroku* thought the German menace threatening enough, but that the spread of American influence in Siberia was equally so. The *Manchuria Daily News,* a Japanese paper published in English, outdid them all. It pictured vividly the dangers to Japan of American domination in Siberia and North Manchuria, which would, according to the excitable imagination of its editor, mean a "subterranean" railway from Alaska to Siberia, and various other consequences terrible to contemplate.

Official Japan expressed itself as opposed to intervention. Baron Uchida said, "Intervention by Japan or any other Government in Siberia would have a disastrous effect upon the Russian people." The Seiyukai, the party in control of the Government, passed a resolution against sending troops to Siberia "at this time." The Genro, too, were apparently of the opinion that the time was not ripe for intervention.

Nonetheless, the talk of sending Japanese troops to Siberia aroused considerable suspicion of Japan's motives in other countries. Such interference was the last thing the Siberians wanted. The revolution had left them somewhat confused politically. They did not feel that they wanted Bolshevism. They were not sure as to Communism. They were not certain as to a democracy. They were fairly sure they did not want a monarchy. But one thing they were absolutely certain of, and this almost unanimously, they did not want the Japanese in Siberia. They had watched the encroachments of Japan upon the continent of Asia too long not to have a very definite feeling that if Japan ever set foot in their country it would be a difficult matter to get her out.

In America the position of the Government was well known. It was in exact accord with Uchida's statement that intervention would be disastrous for the

Russian people. It was felt that the danger of German influence in Siberia was being greatly exaggerated for the purpose of bringing about intervention. Among the people opinion was divided. Some urged that Japan be trusted to do the right and necessary thing. In many quarters long-continued suspicion of Japan's motives was not allayed by the existing circumstances in Siberia.

China was firmly opposed to intervention. She felt that such action and its necessary consequences would increase Japan's influence upon the mainland, and give her further control of China's destiny. She also opposed the abortive attempt of General Horvath to set up a reactionary Russia Government at Harbin. Horvath had been governor of the Railway zone, and very much of an autocrat within his limited sphere. The revolution left him without support from Russia, and he proposed to make of himself the dictator of the Russian Far East. China objected to having a foreign Goverment established upon her soil, particularly when its chief object was to make war against adjoining territory.

Meanwhile the tide of Bolshevism had risen higher in the valley of the Amur. When the Soviet conference in Habarovsk disbanded the Zemstvo convention, it proceeded in its own way to organize a "Coalition Government." It organized an administration, leaving forty per cent. of the places for the appointees of the Zemstvos. All of the valley Zemstvos joined in this Government except that at Blagoveschensk. There the Soviets drove out the old Zemstvo, and a new one was elected which would join in the coalition. Every effort was made to secure the co-operation of the Maritime Province, but the movement met with no success there.

In spite of the "coalition" form of this Government, it was but a few weeks before the Zemstvo influence had practically disappeared, and by the end of February the new administration was frankly Soviet. It was known as the Far Eastern Council of People's

Commissars. Krasnoschekoff was elected president, and remained in that office through three elections. The entire course of action of this Government was quite different from that usually ascribed to Bolshevik rule. Order was well preserved without terrorism of any kind. The Press was free, and business was conducted in the same channels as before the revolution. Trade with China along the Amur and the Sungari continued without interruption.

Only one serious disturbance occurred during its existence. When the Soviet supremacy was proclaimed in Blagoveschensk, the Japanese and Chinese sent troops across the Amur from Aigun "to protect their citizens." The reactionaries took advantage of their presence to form a City Guard of about 5,000 men, drawn from all the neighbouring country. About 2,000 Cossacks joined them. At the same time the remnants of the Kerensky troops cast in their lot with the Soviet. On March 1 the clash came. The Soviet troops seized seven wagons of rifles, and arrested the Japanese and White Guards in charge of them. That evening the Japanese surrounded the Government House and demanded of Krasnoschekoff, who had come up from Habarovsk to attend a conference, the surrender of the Japanese. While he was talking with the Japanese commander, the Japanese troops fired a volley at the building. The Soviet guard replied, but Krasnoschekoff stopped them at once. Learning that the building was surrounded by hostile forces, he consented to go to a conference with the various commanders. There he was arrested, and the next morning the upper part of the city was in the hands of the White Guards. Krasnoschekoff was kept in jail for two days without any information as to the course of events. Then he was approached by a delegation, who asked him to sign an order for the disbandment of the Red troops. He refused unless he could see them first. The next morning firing began. Within four days over 15,000 peasants had joined the Reds. Most of them

were armed with shot-guns, and many merely with scythes. But their temper was in no mood to stand foreign interference, and they came to expel the invader. Troops came up from Habarovsk with extra arms, and in three days more the town was again in the hands of the Reds.

Krasnoschekoff was freed, and found himself again at the head of the Government. Serious problems were before him. When the White Guards fled they freed the criminals in the jails. These were already playing havoc in the city and had first to be rounded up. His peasant army was no less a task. After the excitement of the fight and the capture of a wealthy city, their predatory instincts got the better of them, and they began breaking and looting. This, too, was soon stopped, and they were returned to their homes. The city escaped from its triple change of Government almost unscathed. Nevertheless it was somewhat barren, for upon the approach of the peasant army, the bankers and merchants had fled across the river taking whatever they could carry, including 45,000,000 gold roubles of bank reserve, with them. In spite of the disturbance, Blagoveschensk soon became quiet, and the summer passed without further disturbance.

By May, Vladivostok had become a part of the new Government. The agitation for Soviet control had continued there in spite of, or perhaps because of, the protests of the Consular Corps, and about the end of April the Soviets by armed demonstration dissolved the Zemstvo and the Municipal Council. The executive committee of the Soviet constituted itself the local Government. It was composed of men from all the Socialist parties, the majority being Communists. Nevertheless Vladivostok was not ready for Communism. Economic affairs were in the hands of an Economic and Financial Council, of which Leonov was the head. The Soviet ordered Leonov to nationalize all the industries in the city. Leonov refused, and a

conference was called to decide the dispute. This conference decided against nationalization, and its decision prevailed.

While Vladivostok and the Amur valley were thus establishing Soviet rule only mildly communistic in its attitude, the Trans-Baikal was also organizing its Soviets, and came under the same type of Government. By the first of June all Eastern Siberia had recovered from the effects of the revolution, had organized a type of Government which was satisfactory to its people, had established order and restored commerce, and was well on the way toward a normal life. There had been little bloodshed, no widespread confiscation, and few executions, and these only after court trial. The Government, except in the imagination of its avowed enemies, had none of the characteristics which the world was being taught were inherent in the Bolshevik doctrine. Left to themselves, the people of Far Eastern Siberia would soon have re-established themselves and taken their normal place in the economic life of the world. They were doomed, however, to be caught in the whirlwind of world politics, and sadly tossed about before this happy consummation could be achieved.

CHAPTER VI

THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ANABASIS

AMONG the troops which Austria-Hungary mobilized to fight the armies of the Czar, were thousands of Czechs. These people were natives of Bohemia, and hated with a bitter hatred their Magyar rulers and all the bonds which held them against their will in the Hapsburg Empire. On this account the military authorities thought best not to form them into separate units but to mix them well with German and Austrian soldiers who were more amenable to the control of the authorities.

In spite of this precaution many of the Czechs took advantage of the first opportunity to surrender to the Russians. When the March revolution came there were over 50,000 such prisoners scattered over Russia, most of them in the south-central portion of Russia in Europe. At the urgent request of the French, the Kerensky Government equipped these men and allowed them to organize to fight the Germans. Many of them were in the last Russian advance in July, 1917, and they made almost the only substantial gains at that time.

On January 6, 1918, a great meeting at Prague, the Bohemian capital, declared in favour of complete independence for Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia in a unified Czecho-Slovak nation. This fired the Czech units in Russia with a new zeal, and they chafed under the inaction forced upon them by the breakdown of the Russian Army.

When the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed by the Bolsheviks, all possibility of fighting the Germans from the Eastern front disappeared. The main Czech force was then near Kiev. Emperor Charles offered them amnesty if they would lay down their arms and return to Austria. The Czechs, however, refused to deal with him, and decided to go across Siberia and America to France, there to fight for the independence of their country.

The Germans, who had by this time penetrated far into the Ukraine, endeavoured to prevent their departure. Four days the battle raged near Bachmac. The Czechs lost 600 dead and wounded, and buried 2,000 Germans in the last day of the fight. They drove the Germans off, and captured an immense amount of stores which the fleeing Russians had formerly abandoned to the advancing Germans.

The relations between the Czechs and the Bolsheviks were still of the best. The Czechs had no desire to interfere in Russian affairs. Their original intentions, as later stated by a member of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, were to fight Germany and Austria and to free the Czecho-Slovak nation. They therefore proposed to the Soviet Government that they be allowed to cross Asiatic Russia. This was readily agreed to, for at that time the Russian forces were so disorganized that a single Czech regiment could probably have taken Moscow without difficulty, and then and there ended the Bolshevik regime. The Czechs desired to leave Russia friendly, however, and therefore complied with the Russian terms. They turned over to the Russian Government all of the supplies and stores which they had captured from the Germans, valued at over a billion roubles, and they delivered all the arms with which they had been equipped except one rifle for each ten men. These arrangements were completed by the middle of April, 1918.

Although the Bolsheviks had pledged an unmolested

passage through Siberia, they did not consider that precluded their attempting to convert the Czech troops to their way of thinking. They made every effort to persuade the men to join the Red Guards which were then being organized. The Czechs, however, although most of them were Socialists, steadily refused all such offers. The Communist propaganda seemed to make no headway amongst them.

Eighty trains were lined up for them and, well filled, started on the long journey to the Pacific. From the very start it became apparent that their progress was not to be expedited if the Bolsheviks could help it. There were delays and interferences at every opportunity. The trains were strung out so that they were separated by distances of over fifty miles. Often they were threatened. The first train finally got through to Vladivostok after fifty-seven days on the road.

The others were not so fortunate, however. Late in May came the announcement that the Czechs were not to be allowed to leave the country. This order has been ascribed, with what truth it is now impossible to say, to the increasing German influence at Petrograd. Whoever was responsible, the Red Guards along the line of the Trans-Siberian made an effort to carry out the instructions. At Irkutsk a train carrying 400 Czechs was pulled in between two lines of cars filled with several thousand Red troops under German leaders. They opened fire with rifles and machine guns on the unarmed Czechs. But they had reckoned without their hosts. The Czechs sprang from their cars, rushed the Bolsheviks, and in half an hour they had armed themselves, routed the Red troops, driven out the Soviet authorities, and were complete masters of the situation.

Many other trains were attacked in the same way, and everywhere it was the same story. In order to protect themselves, the Czechs disarmed the raw Soviet levies, re-armed themselves, and held their trains by

main force. The Czechs were trained soldiers, most of them men of education, and they understood just what they wanted to do and just how to do it. The Red Guards were untrained, without organization, and for the most part consisted of hungry refugees who were loath to work and enlisted for the 30 or 40 roubles a day which they received as pay. There were few workers among them, and the administration was honeycombed with graft and corruption. In spite of the discrepancy in numbers they were everywhere helpless in the hands of the Czechs.

Having saved themselves from further local attacks, the Czech command endeavoured to negotiate with the Government. Lenin and Trotsky, however, incensed at the persistent refusal of the Czechs to become either converts or prisoners, branded them "murderers," and refused to deal with them.

This attitude on the part of the Russian authorities had a strange result. A little army numbering in the neighbourhood of 50,000 men, captured a country thousands of miles in extent and inhabited by millions of people, a territory as large as the United States. Ekaterinburg, Cheliabinsk, Omsk, Novo-Nikolaievsk, Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk were soon in their hands. In European Russia they took Samara and Simbirsk, within 600 miles of Moscow. The Trans-Siberian railroad was theirs as far as Lake Baikal.

In the Far East, the Czechs had met with little or no interference. Over 10,000 of them had passed through the territory of the Far Eastern Council, that is, along the Amur railway to Vladivostok. No untoward incident had occurred. Relations were friendly, and in May President Krasnoschekoff had addressed the Czechs in Vladivostok at their invitation. East of Baikal there was no necessity for such action as had been forced upon the Czechs farther west.

Once started, however, they were not to be stopped. They seized two small steamers on Lake Baikal, repaired them, mounted guns, and started across the

lake to attack the Soviet troops 20,000 strong on the other side. The Bolsheviks opposed the landing and sank one of the steamers, but the Czechs finally routed them, killing, according to reports, 6,000 of them, and taking 2,000 prisoners. This defeat demoralized the Soviet forces farther east, and the Czechs advanced upon Chita almost without opposition.

At Vladivostok the situation changed with startling rapidity. As late as June 26, there was no sign of trouble or of disaffection on the part of the Czechs. On June 28, however, the Czechs, without warning or provocation of any kind, seized the city, disarmed the Red Guards, and drove out the Soviet Government. In its place they set up a Government consisting of the remaining members of the old Municipal Council, which assumed authority without calling a new election.

On the River Volga, a few thousand Czechs of the rear-guard were holding a thin line against the gathering strength of the Soviet forces. This line suddenly became the objective of the Czechs. Their desire to cross America and fight the Germans in France was suddenly lost in the new determination to go back across Siberia and fight the Bolsheviks in Russia. They gave as their explanation of their seizure of Vladivostok retaliation for the Bolshevik attacks on their brothers farther west. And the desire to take them assistance was the expressed reason for the entire change of purpose and the westward movement which began on July 12.

The real motive for this change of front on the part of the Czechs has been the subject of some debate. The stated reason was hardly sufficient to cover all the circumstances. It did not explain the capture of Yakutsk, far from the line of the railroad, where there were, and had been, no Czechs. It did not explain the advance of the Czechs against the Russian forces in the Ussuri Valley, with whom they had been on the best of terms, immediately after the seizure of Vladivostok. It did not explain the attacks along the

Amur railway from the west. It did not explain the determination to hold the Volga line, and even to advance in Russia itself. In short, it did not explain the fact that the Czechs, whom their President Masaryk had spoken of as the "guests of our brothers in Russia," with whose internal affairs he disclaimed all intention to interfere, had renounced their ambition to fight the Germans in France and had turned to fight the Russians in Russia.

The efforts of the Bolsheviks to detain them were hardly sufficient to warrant the change of front, for those efforts had been wholly futile, and the losses of the Czechs in resisting them had been negligible. The Czechs themselves had apparently considered this only playing at war so far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, for they merely disarmed the Red Guards and sent them home, while to armed German and Magyar ex-prisoners they gave no quarter, killing them immediately. Even when they turned westward, the Czechs had no quarrel with the Bolsheviks which could be compared for a moment with the task which awaited them in Europe.

The other explanation offered, and this is universally believed by the Siberians, is that the Czechs were prevailed upon by the Allies under the urgence of France, to attack the Russians from the rear in return for recognition and assistance. This hypothesis covers all the circumstances already mentioned, and receives additional support from the later action of the Allies. France recognized the Czecho-Slovak Republic on June 30. Great Britain followed on August 13. The United States granted recognition on September 2, and Japan on September 9. At any rate, the Czechs were now making war on the Soviet Government, and it can hardly be doubted that their action was due to Allied influence.

The effect of their activities in Siberia was disastrous in the extreme. Everywhere the Czechs disarmed the Soviet forces. They did not profess, and

probably did not intend, to interfere with the local political situation. But the disarming of the Red forces at once placed the reactionaries in control of the situation, and they were not slow to make the most of the unexpected assistance.

Throughout Siberia the Czechs were looked upon as a nucleus for organization against Bolshevism in Russia. In every city where they appeared the Soviet authorities were driven out and a new local Government established. These new Governments varied in character. In Vladivostok, the old Municipal Council was fairly liberal. In the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, Horvath had taken advantage of the situation to proclaim himself Premier of the Temporary Siberian Government. This was, of course, a movement of extreme reaction. West of Horvath's territory was Semenov, straddling the railroad from Manchuria to Chita. He was neither liberal nor reactionary, but plain bandit and drew his income from holding up trains and forcing payments, no matter what the nature of the load nor for whose benefit it was being shipped.

The Czech Army, starting without arms from a friendly Russia, and making its way to the Pacific, five thousand miles away, had returned in full war panoply to fight a hostile Russia. In an utterly disorganized country they had had no difficulty in enforcing their will upon the people, and the result of their activities, however far from their intentions at the time, had been to increase the disorder and render almost inevitable a long civil struggle, which would wreck the social and economic structure of the country.

CHAPTER VII

INTERVENTION

ALTHOUGH the Czecho-Slovaks had demonstrated their ability to take care of themselves and to handle without difficulty any situation which might arise, nevertheless their warfare against seemingly overwhelming numbers of the Bolsheviks in Siberia gave a new impulse to talk of the necessity for Allied intervention in Siberia. It was urged that the Czechs must be "rescued," even though they had ceased their efforts to leave Russia and become "westward-moving."

The Japanese military party was proceeding on the theory that intervention was coming, and that Japan was going to be the chief actor. Their part in the Great War had been but a minor one. It had consisted in the capture of Kiaochow from Germany by overwhelming forces, the "strategic" occupation of most of the Chinese province of Shantung, and a strenuous diplomatic and political effort to prevent China from sending any real assistance to the Allies in the War.

As soon as the wave of Bolshevism reached Siberia, and gave them the excuse, the captains of Japan began activities with the corrupt Government at Peking to secure the full control of affairs on the Asian mainland, whatever their development might be. The result of their efforts was the Sino-Japanese Military Pact. This agreement was signed on May 16, 1918, but it was not until March of the following year that it

was made public, and even then there was much scepticism as to whether the published statement contained all the terms of the agreement.

The Pact provided that Japan and China should dispatch troops for military operations in the Trans-Baikal and Amur Provinces of Siberia, for the purpose of helping the Czecho-Slovaks, and of stamping out the influence of Germans and Austrians, "and of others assisting them." All Chinese troops so dispatched were to be placed under Japanese command, "to ensure unity and harmony." The Chinese were to operate against Trans-Baikal from Kolon, and the Japanese from Manchuli. All details were to be kept secret and were not to be published by either party. The provisions of the agreement were to "lose their validity on the termination of the state of war between Japan and China on the one side, and Germany and Austria on the other."

It has been more than suspected that the real terms of this agreement granted to Japan some, or all, of Group V. of the Twenty-One Demands of infamous memory. As the politico-military clique in control at Peking was no more heavily burdened with patriotism than their fellow-militarists of Tokyo were with scruples, this is quite possible. Whether the terms of the Military Pact went as far as the Group V. demands or not, the effect of the Pact was to bind China to the chariot-wheel of Japan, to force her to advance or withdraw her armies as Japan indicated. More than this, it effectively prevented China from taking any action in co-operation with any new Government which might be established in Siberia for the recovery of China's independence of action and her release from the domination of Japan.

As early as the middle of May, then, Japan was prepared for the next move. A preliminary action occurred about a week after the Czechs seized Vladivostok. About July 6, the Allied commanders in the port issued a declaration in regard to the arrival of

their ships. This statement was to the effect that in view of the danger to the Allied people and troops from the German and Austrian ex-prisoners, the Allied forces had taken command in Vladivostok. All orders which had been issued by the Czechs since their coup of June 29, were approved, and the administration of the city was taken over. Efforts were to be made to thwart the plots of Austro-German spies. The signatories professed nothing but friendship for the Russian people, and protested that their action was not in the interests of any party. The result would be to give the Russians an opportunity to overthrow the yoke which the Austro-German combination wanted to impose on Russia for all time. The declaration ended with an appeal to the citizens to support the new order of things. It was signed by Admiral Knight for the United States, Vice-Admiral Kato for Japan, and by the British, French, Chinese, and Czech commanders.

By this time the news of the Bolshevik attacks upon the Czechs had reached America, and there was a growing sentiment in favour of intervention in Siberia. The Czechs requested aid for their troops in their attempt to leave Siberia and join the Allies on the Western front, and it was generally understood that they were prevented from doing so by the Bolshevik forces, led by Austrian and German ex-prisoners. The menace of these prisoners to Allied interests in the East was also enlarged upon. Further it was urged that, as the Germans were helping the Bolsheviks, there was no reason why the Allies should not help the anti-Bolsheviks.

At the same time these arguments were used with increasing effect in Japan. Both French and Belgian emissaries brought pressure to bear upon Japanese opinion. It was insisted that there were at least 20,000 German and Austrian prisoners under arms in Siberia, and the disastrous effect upon Japan if these enemies should succeed in cutting the Trans-Siberian Railway was emphasized.

The British Press in the Far East was strongly in favour of intervention, and constantly urged it upon the home authorities. To do this, it was necessary to overlook or make light of the bitter campaign against Britain which had been carried on by the Japanese Press in 1916. But this was minimized, as were also many other breaches by the Japanese of the letter and spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the urgent necessity of intervention was insisted upon. Some journals even went so far as to ask that Japan be given a free hand in Siberia if the other Allies could not send troops to join her.

At last the pressure upon America from the various Allies became irresistible, and from the sole opponent of intervention America was persuaded to become its proponent. The Wilson administration, once convinced that intervention could be undertaken without suspicion of exploitation of the Russian people, and that the general sympathy for the Czecho-Slovaks could be used as basis for clearing Siberia of Teutonic influence, succumbed to the pressure of the Allies, and issued an invitation to Japan to join the United States in an expedition to Siberia.

The invitation was promptly accepted, and both Governments issued declarations on August 3rd. The United States declared that:

> In taking this action the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs, not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military forces may be obliged to occupy, and no impairment of Russian territorial integrity, either now or hereafter; but that we are about to do has as its single object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavours to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory and their own destiny.

The Japanese statement included the following paragraph:

In adopting this course the Japanese Government remains unshaken in their constant desire to promote relations of enduring friendship with Russia and the Russian people, and they reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated (the relief of the Czecho-Slovak troops) they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory.

Both of these statements were based upon the theory that a small group of renegade Russians, acting under German influence, and using German money, had suddenly acquired control of the vast territory, immense population, and incalculable resources of Russia, and were devoting them all to German ends against the wishes of the Russian people, and in spite of their efforts to stop them. Only on such a theory was intervention morally justifiable.

The Soviet Government was prompt to state the other side of the case. Through Tchicherin, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, it issued a reply to the Japanese and American statements, declaring that the Czechs were not menaced by German and Austrian prisoners, but instead were being used by landowners, bourgeoisie, and counter-revolutionists, against the peasants and workers. The Soviet Government expressed its conviction that the American and Japanese statements were merely attempts to blind the proletarian elements, but if the statements expressed the real motives of the intervenors, it asked the two Governments "to formulate their wishes in the matter."

How much of this document was intended for home consumption, and how much was a serious appeal to the Governments addressed, it is impossible to state. It undoubtedly did much to crystallize the sentiment of the people throughout Russia against intervention, and rallied them to the support of the Soviet regime. It had no effect whatever upon the plans for intervention. The note was ignored by both America and Japan, and both countries dispatched their expeditions

forthwith. Russia countered with conscription, and threatened an alliance with Germany if the Allies actually intervened.

That the real motives of America were as stated in the declaration issued at the time, there can be no doubt. The United States policy in regard to aggression, military or political, on the continent of Asia, was well known, had been frequently tested, and there was no longer room to suspect its sincerity. American disinterestedness was further indicated by the plan, set forth in the statement, to send to Siberia at the earliest opportunity a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labour advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association. The purpose of this mission was "in some sympathetic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people" of Siberia.

Japan also formed a Temporary Commission on Economic Assistance to Siberia, under the supervision of the Foreign Minister. Baron Megata was made chairman, and twenty members were selected from the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, Finance and Foreign Affairs, and from the business community. This commission undertook to supply the Siberians with rice, wheat, and barley, and to prevent the unscrupulous speculation of dealers in these articles.

Immediately after the issuance of the declarations, the United States and Japan defined the duties of the troops which they were sending to Siberia. According to the statement given to the public the number of the expeditionary forces was not to be more than 7,000 for each nation, and their activities were to be confined to accomplishment of two purposes: to guard the munitions stored at Vladivostok and prevent their reaching the Germans, and to protect the Czech rear against the Bolsheviks and the liberated prisoners.

Not all of the statements and declarations issued

by the Allies could alleviate the suspicions entertained by the Siberians in regard to Japanese interference. The one mitigating factor so far as their attitude was concerned, was the equal participation of the United States. They trusted America in proportion as they distrusted Japan. The mass of the people were not desirous of any interference. They would have resented the Americans coming alone. But as long as the Japanese were coming, they looked upon the Americans as guarantors against aggression. In this light they were even welcome.

The first troops to arrive at Vladivostok under the intervention agreement of the Allies was a detachment of British, who landed on August 3rd. A week later four companies of French Annamese arrived. On the 12th a battalion of Japanese landed. August 15, the first Americans arrived. Allied intervention was an accomplished fact.

General Kikuzo Otami, a member of the Supreme Military Council of Japan, was appointed commander of the Japanese forces, and, by virtue of his rank, became commander of all the Allied forces and of the Russians co-operating with them. Major-General William S. Graves was chosen to head the American Expeditionary Forces. General Knox was placed in command of the British troops. General Elmsley commanded the Canadian detachment.

In addition to the military staff, the Japanese appointed Mr. Matsudaira, former Chancellor of the Japanese Embassy at Washington, as Japanese diplomatic representative in Siberia. Sir Charles Eliot, principal of Hong-Kong University, was appointed British High Commissioner with diplomatic rank, to proceed to Siberia. M. Regnault was appointed French High Commissioner.

The first operation of the Allied troops was to reinforce the Czech forces on the Ussuri River. After their seizure of Vladivostok, the Czechs had advanced down the Ussuri against the Russians, in the neigh-

bourhood of Habarovsk. They were met by a peasant army at the town of Ussuri, and driven back to Spasskoe. A reinforcement of Annamese was not sufficient to give them the advantage. On August 12, however, the British and Japanese arrived. Three days later the Red Army was attacked, and after a slight resistance, retreated to Habarovsk, which was taken a few days later. The Americans meanwhile had taken over the railroad from Vladivostok to Nikolsk-Ussuriski.

British and French effectives were few in number. The American troops never exceeded by more than a few hundred the agreed maximum for each nation, namely, 7,000 men. The Japanese, however, disregarded this provision almost from the beginning. So also did they ignore the agreement that all the Allied operations should centre in Vladivostok. On August 16, Japanese marines were landed, and occupied Nikolaievsk at the mouth of the Amur, over eight hundred miles north of Vladivostok. By the end of August, the Japanese, in addition to the forces landed at Vladivostok, had sent 6,000 men to Manchuli and 30,000 more to other parts of Northern Manchuria, without notifying the Allies and without the consent of China. These troops commandeered the Chinese barracks and made themselves complete masters of the situation in a supposedly allied country. The only diplomatic notification of this occupation was a note sent by the Japanese Government to the President of the Maritime Province Zemstvo, which exercised no authority and claimed none outside of its own province, to the effect that the Soviet forces, led by German and Austrian ex-prisoners, were a menace "to both China and Japan," and on account of her friendship for China, Japan found it necessary to dispatch troops to Manchuli.

Meanwhile the Allied troops were advancing in the north. After the retreat to Habarovsk, the Far Eastern Council of People's Commissars realized the futility

of resistance to Allied arms. A convention was called, which was attended by 450 peasant delegates, and to these President Krasnoschekoff explained the situation. It was agreed that resistance was out of the question, the Red Army was disbanded, and Krasnoschekoff, his staff, and other members of the Government, went to Blagoveschensk. The Allies entered Habarovsk without a struggle. This greatly discomfited the Japanese General Staff, who complained in their official report that the Reds, upon their advance, went back to peaceful pursuits and "disguised themselves as good citizens."

The same thing happened when, about two weeks later, the Allies advanced upon Blagoveschensk. The Soviet turned over the Government of the city to the executive committee of the professional unions, and retired up the Zeya River. No resistance was offered to the Japanese cavalry, and, on September 18, they entered the city.

In the south, the Cossack Atamen, Semenov, had been driven out of Siberia by the Reds in July, and the Japanese had hastened to his assistance. They began preparations for a huge offensive, but, before they could commence operations, they learned that a few hundred Czechs under General Gaida, advancing eastward from Irkutsk, had anticipated them, and entered the capital of Trans-Baikal on September 3. Semenov and the Japanese arrived three days later. These successes were followed by the occupation of other points in the province, and by the middle of October the Red influence had wholly disappeared.

The entire line of the railway from Vladivostok to within 300 miles of Moscow was now in the hands of the Allies. The Americans held the Vladivostok lines; Horvath and the Japanese the Chinese Eastern; the Amur was in the hands of the Japanese; Semenov, with Japanese support, was in control from Manchuli to Chita; and the Czechs held the line from there to the other side of the Urals. The way was open to

Russia, and every opportunity was offered for the Russians to save themselves, with Allied help, from the plots and intrigues of the Bolsheviks.

So far the Allied efforts had been uniformly successful, and there would seem to have been little cause for complaint when the situation was so well in hand. That things were not wholly acceptable to all parties concerned was evidenced in several ways. On September 18, the Russian military authorities, acting in agreement with the Allies, declared the city of Vladivostok to be under martial law. Three days later the Vladivostok Siberian Government, which was receiving Allied support, resigned in a body. On October 12 an international censorship was established, the Americans censoring the English, Czecho-Slovak and Russian messages, and the Japanese the Japanese and Chinese.

At least one important reason for these measures was the strained relations between the Allies. As soon as the immediate and imperative objects of the intervention had been accomplished, the divergence of opinion became apparent. The Japanese wanted to hunt down the Bolsheviks, and attempted to do so wherever possible. General Graves insisted upon obeying orders and abiding by the declarations made at the time of the intervention. The other Allies, especially the French, were bent upon "re-establishing the Eastern front," and urged the dispatch of heavy reinforcements to the Czechs in Europe, who were being driven back by the Soviet troops.

These differences were far more than academic. Each of the Allies made definite efforts to carry into effect its particular view in so far as it had the power. This necessarily brought them into contact at many points, and more than once relations were strained to the breaking point. This was especially true as regards the Americans and the Japanese, whose purposes were as far apart as the poles. It became impossible for either of them to fulfil its desires without

coming into direct conflict with the interests of the other.

The most serious bone of contention was the Chinese Eastern Railway. At the request of the Kerensky Government, the United States had sent to Asia some 200 American engineers, under Colonel John F. Stevens, to rehabilitate the Trans-Siberian railway. Before they could make any appreciable progress in this work, the Kerensky Government had fallen, and the Allies had become the controlling influence on the Chinese Eastern section of the road. England, France, Italy and China had given the United States a power of attorney to take over and run the road for the benefit of Russia until a new Russian Government was established and recognized by the Allies.

After the intervention Japan's consent to this arrangement was asked. She debated the matter through September and October without making any reply. The Japanese military party claimed Siberia as a Japanese sphere of influence, and insisted that Japan should have sole control of the Chinese Eastern. Their contention was opposed by the business interests of Japan, but the grip of the militarists was too strong. Japan finally made counter-proposals which would have practically given her the road, and which, of course, destroyed all possibility of Allied agreement, and greatly increased the tension between Japan and America.

It was not the railroad question alone over which the contention arose. It was Japan's whole course of action since the very beginning of the intervention. Her entire policy had been directly in violation of both the letter and the spirit of the intervention agreement. Instead of limiting the number of her troops in Siberia to 7,000, as agreed, she had sent at least 73,000, and many more were concentrated in Manchuria and Korea, near the scene of operations. Thus she had several times as many troops in Russian territory as all the other Allies combined. From Chita

to Vladivostok every bridge and every public building was guarded by them. If any other of the Allies ordered an officer to any place in Siberia, the Japanese immediately ordered an officer of higher rank to the same place, so that to the Siberians the dominant element would always be Japanese.

The arrivals and movements of all the Allied troops were reported regularly to the Japanese headquarters, as that was the location of the chief command of the Allied force. The Allies, however, could never learn how many troops Japan had in the country, nor anything of their disposition. Under the agreement with the Allies, all operations were to be undertaken only by mutual consent. The Japanese, however, carried on operations all over Far Eastern Siberia not only without the consent of her allies, but without even notifying them. She seized the Russian ports, sent gunboats up the river, and occupied the caravan routes, so that all of the communications of the country were completely under her control.

Japan was in complete and effective occupation of Manchuria and Eastern Siberia. She had troops enough on the ground to have crushed without difficulty the Russians and all the Allies combined. So entirely was the country in her power, and so contrary was her policy to that of her allies, that rumours of an alliance between the military parties of Berlin and Tokyo began to make themselves heard. It was asserted that Japan was to have all of Siberia east of Baikal as the reward of her treachery. These rumours were immediately denied from Tokyo, but it could not be contended that Japan had not placed herself in a position not only to disregard her allies, but to defy them.

At first the Allies had not criticized the course of action of the Japanese. They even supported it until the rising opposition of the Siberians of all parties forced them to take cognizance of the fact that Japan was using their support for purposes of her own, and

very much to the detriment of the interests of the Siberians they had professedly come to help.

At last the Allies realized that Japan's policy could not be reconciled with theirs. This was particularly the case with the United States, and early in November Secretary Lansing sent for Ambassador Ishii, and pointed out the error of Japan's ways. Ishii cabled his Government, and Lansing cabled Ambassador Morris in Tokyo. Morris immediately called at the Foreign Office, but was told that the Foreign Minister could not see him for two or three days.

During that two or three days a bitter struggle was waged behind the closed doors of the Japanese council-chamber. The contestants were again the military and the commercial interests of the Island Empire. The former demanded that Japan defy America. She was all-powerful in Siberia. American troops there were too few to cause a moment's hesitation. The Philippines were but lightly guarded, and could be taken with little difficulty. America's whole attention and power were concentrated on the struggle in Europe, and now was the time of Japan's great opportunity to settle her disputes with the great republic once and for all. The representatives of the industry and commerce of Japan realized full well that any such course would make Japan a pariah among the nations. They had not the confidence in German success that the military party had, and they realized that in case of German defeat, Japan must become an outlaw nation. They knew that in that event their plans for industrial and commercial development would go for naught. They insisted upon international decency and honour, and the observance of Japan's solemn agreements.

For three days war with America hung in the balance. At the end of that time the doors of the council-chamber were again flung open, and, for the first time in the history of Japan, the militarists had suffered a defeat. Commercial and industrial Japan had successfully asserted its right to have a share

in the control of the nation's and their own destiny. November 10 the news of the Armistice arrived to confirm the wisdom of their views, and to utterly discomfit the military party, who were so unprepared for such news that they refused to allow the terms to be published for twenty-four hours after they were received.

General Otani was ordered to send back 35,000 men, or about half his force, as soon as possible. Shortly afterwards the return of 17,000 more was ordered. General Inagaki, the Japanese Chief of Staff in Siberia, who, with his chief, was not wholly in sympathy with the designs of the more rabid militarists, called upon General Graves and expressed regret for the past practices of the Japanese troops, and pledged co-operation in the future.

So the crisis passed. The new state of affairs, however, was not less puzzling to the Allies than the old was embarrassing. The war in Europe had ended. They could no longer carry on hostilities against Germans and Austrians, for all alike were bound by the Armistice. None of the Allies had ever declared war against Russia. They had one and all professed their friendship for the Russian people. Yet here they were in arms against a Government which was accepted by the great majority of Russians, those in Europe at least. They must necessarily accept the Bolsheviks as enemies without any of the formalities required by the conventions of civilized warfare.

CHAPTER VIII

THE WORK OF REACTION

WHILE Bolsheviks and reactionaries, Allies and Czechs, Americans and Japanese, had been enacting their complicated drama in Eastern Siberia, the Soviet Government had not been unopposed in Russia itself. The Bolshevik revolution was hardly a week old when General Alexiev began to organize an anti-Bolshevik army at Novo-Cherkassk. Kornilov was placed in command. The campaign was carried on with no marked success on either side during the whole of 1918. As in Siberia, the Czech victories served to strengthen the anti-revolutionary forces.

In Western Siberia also there was strong opposition to the Bolsheviks. In December of 1917 the Republic of Siberia was proclaimed. Its capital was to be located at Tomsk, its flag white and green, and on February 5 of the next year it opened its first Duma of thirty members. In spite of its generous title, however, this impromptu republic was unable to extend its sway any distance beyond the limits of its capital. For there were many other newly-established Governments in Siberia, and each had its schemes for embracing the whole country.

The best of these local Governments was at Omsk. It had been formed under the leadership of Vologodsky, whom his friends affectionately called the Grand Old Man of Siberia. He was of no party, but a Liberal in his political views. He had been elected to the abortive Constituent Assembly at Petrograd, and was now bent

upon constructive work which would save Siberia at least from the disorganization which was rapidly spreading over the rest of Russia. Yet there was no idea of separatism in his plans. It was hoped to rejoin Russia again when things had become more settled there. One after another of the local Governments recognized the authority of the Omsk Government. Its influence increased. July 23, 1918, it proclaimed the independence of Siberia. Shortly after the Czech activities in Irkutsk and Vladivostok, these cities also recognized the headship of Omsk, and Siberia was nominally united from the Urals to the Pacific, though the adhesion of such captains as Semenov and Horvath was entirely formal.

The main strength of this Government lay in its political tact and its non-partisan, constructive efforts. It showed an admirable spirit of political compromise, and was working towards a real unity. Its great weakness was its lack of money, which the Allies did not see fit to remedy. Nevertheless, by September it was strong enough to commence levying taxes, and it mobilized and equipped an army of about 100,000 men.

Just at this time there occurred at Ufa a conference which represented the culmination of the anti-Bolshevik movement in Russia itself. It called for representatives from all the Governments which had been established in various parts of the country. The Government of Siberia (Omsk), and many of the Siberian Zemstvos, sent delegates. At the Ufa Conference, an All-Russian Provisional Government was constituted, with Nicholas D. Avksentiev at its head. This Government was to be administered by a Directorate of five members. Three of the first five were chosen from the old Constituent Assembly, and Vologodsky and one other from the Omsk Government. On October 7, 1918, it announced its assumption of control in Russia. It moved at once to Omsk, and took over the governmental machinery which had been built up by the Siberian Government, thus virtually superseding the latter.

Almost the first act of the new Government was to announce its decision to issue a loan of 100,000,000 roubles at five per cent., and the following day it began the issue of paper money "to overcome the present shortage." These were signs of weakness, but the new venture soon had even greater difficulties than those of a financial nature to overcome. Although it secured the favourable expressions and even efforts to secure assistance from such Liberals as Kerensky and Madame Breshkovskaya, it had forced upon it at the same time the adherence and support of many of the most reactionary elements of the Empire. Prominent among these were Ivanov-Rinov, whose programme included "iron discipline and no politics in the army, the suppression of Bolshevism, and responsibility to the Central Government." Another was Semenov, who was already acquiring an evil reputation for arbitrariness and violence. Horvath, after a flight of fancy, in which he proclaimed himself the Dictator of Eastern Siberia, a movement which was promptly squelched by the Allies, also rendered a nominal allegiance to Omsk. The new Government was also weakened by the change in attitude of the Czechs, whose activities had made its establishment possible. The Czechs were now openly fighting the Soviet Government, and had acquired a reactionary taint by offering commissions and commands to former officers of the Russian Army.

The attempt to reconcile such elements with the Liberal forces which had originated the Omsk Government, was foredoomed to failure. It would have been difficult in a country of developed political traditions and experience in self-government, but with the hot-headed political theorists of Russia, it was impossible. The three Constituent Assembly men in the Government were Social-Revolutionaries, and they immediately abandoned the non-partisan attitude of the first Omsk administration. Party lines were sharply drawn in the Directorate. The three Social-Revolutionaries began to meet in secret and to railroad through their own

measures with the ultimate purpose of controlling the Constituent Assembly for which preparations were being made. This brought them into conflict with the Zemstvos and other local Governments, many of which were of different political complexion.

Not content with these actions, which had alienated the Liberal element, the "solid three" then picked a quarrel with the Conservative and reactionary elements by dismissing their friends among the officers in the Siberian army and by bringing forward the Social-Revolutionist plan for the division of land among the peasants. This left the Directorate with little support beyond the limited circle of the Social-Revolutionist party.

Thus weakened by the antagonism of so many portions of the political community, the Directorate fell an easy victim to the so-called "Cossack Conspiracy." A number of the Cossack officers, including Semenov, secured the adherence of a Cossack regiment in Omsk, and arrested the three Social-Revolutionaries. The other two members, feeling that desperate measures were necessary, decided to appoint a dictator. Their choice fell upon Admiral Kolchak, the Minister of Marine, as the only military man in the Cabinet, and he was accordingly proclaimed Dictator on November 18.

The character of Kolchak was something of an enigma. He had been the one Russian admiral whom the British felt they could trust under the old regime. He stood out as honest and efficient in the welter of corruption which was the old Russian navy. He had been sufficiently popular among his men so that, when the Black Sea Fleet, which he commanded, mutinied, and killed many of their officers, they rowed Kolchak ashore. That he was an astute politician is evidenced by his success in holding the support of both Liberals and reactionaries as long as he did.

Kolchak assumed the newly created office at once, and began preparations for the attack upon the Bol-

sheviks. While the Czechs conducted a preliminary campaign, he gathered and put into training an army estimated at between 200,000 and 300,000 men. Archangel had already recognized the authority of the Omsk Government, and in January, Denikin, who had succeeded to the Alexiev-Kornilov movement, and was meeting with some success in the Caucasus, submitted to Kolchak. A big offensive was planned for the spring of 1919 on the Siberian front, in the Caucasus, and at Archangel. On March 1, Ufa was captured. In April the Siberian forces were within forty miles of Samara, and from the military point of view everything looked favourable to the Kolchak Government.

This success in the military sphere was somewhat balanced by the increasing suspicion of the people as to the sincerity of the Liberal protestations of the Dictator. The means by which he had secured his office were questionable in their eyes, and his action in January, when he forbade political discussion at a convention of delegates of Zemstvos and town Dumas in Vladivostok, aroused a very real discontent.

Allied support at this time would probably have been sufficient to ensure the permanency of the Kolchak regime, but the Allies were busy at the Peace Conference, and they themselves were not at all sure of the Liberal tendencies of the Dictator's Government. They temporized, offering him money and supplies, but withholding recognition until they could reassure themselves as to the real nature of the Siberian Government. For this purpose they sent a mission, headed by Roland S. Morris, American Ambassador to Japan, to Omsk, in July. This mission arrived on the 21st, and stayed three weeks, investigating the strength and permanency of the Kolchak regime. In spite of the fact that they found many things which they could not approve, and some disintegrating forces at work, their report was favourable to Kolchak, and recognition was recommended. By the time this report could be acted upon, however, Kolchak had met with

heavy reverses in Western Siberia. Morris cabled urging haste to save the situation, but the military weakness caused hesitation, and the plans for recognition were indefinitely postponed.

Kolchak issued a desperate appeal to the people to support him, but they had lost all confidence in his rule, and did not respond. His troops soon became utterly demoralized, and the disorder spread even to the Czech units. The Soviet troops, now greatly outnumbering the Siberian forces, were pressing them hard, and a general retreat was inevitable. The Siberian front was thrown back over 800 miles. On September 12, the Soviet troops captured over 45,000 of Kolchak's men, a number which arouses the suspicion that the capture was not strongly resisted. Kolchak made heroic efforts to renew the offensive, but met with only slight temporary success. The Soviet Army was now far beyond his power, and by the middle of October all hope of saving the situation had disappeared.

Kolchak's army practically melted away. The Czechs had been the only real fighting unit. As long as they continued to move the advance went on. But after a time they tired of carrying on a struggle which was in reality no concern of theirs, and they demanded that they be relieved and allowed to return home. Kolchak had had no difficulty in securing recruits in a war-torn country. His soldiers were outfitted and equipped by the British. Each man found himself warmly clothed and well fed, something which he had almost forgotten during the war days. He was perfectly willing on this consideration to become a soldier, and even to drill and do guard duty. But fighting was another matter altogether. The Siberian peasants had no quarrel with the Russians on the other side of the Urals, so when the order came for them to go to the front, they were of no mind to obey. First by twos and threes, then by squads, then by droves, they started for home, taking their much-appreciated clothing,

rifles, ammunition, and equipment with them. So provided they had no difficulty in securing what they needed, even many things they didn't need, from the peasants along the way, and they arrived home better off economically than they had left, but utterly demoralized.

The underlying cause of the failure of Kolchak, the reason for the lack of popular support and for the withholding of Allied recognition, was undoubtedly the character of the men who held important commands under him. Ivanov-Rinov had been placed in command of the forces in Eastern Siberia. He formed a triumvirate with Horvath and Semenov, which made it impossible for Kolchak to control any one of them. Ivanov-Rinov believed in the knout and in frequent executions. His idea of the way to fight Bolshevism was to hang all working-men. When conscription was instituted for the Ural Army, he found it necessary to kill a dozen peasants to get half as many to join his forces.

Ivanov-Rinov's chief lieutenant was Kalmikov, another Cossack leader, who was placed in charge at Habarovsk. He at once instituted a reign of terror in the lower Ussuri region, and in December of 1918 the Americans and Japanese warned him to cease his harsh treatment of the inhabitants. In January, 1,500 of his men mutinied and sought the protection of the American command. In September he arrested and flogged an American officer and an enlisted man on the pretext that they were without proper identification. A formal apology through diplomatic channels was the only consolation the victims ever received.

But the blackest spot in Siberia was Semenov's territory centring about Chita. Semenov was a Cossack ataman of twenty-eight years, without an atom of regard for the humanities or the rules of civilized warfare. He was loyal to nobody. At one time he goaded the Czechs, to whom he owed his position in Trans-Baikal, to the point of attacking him, and an

open conflict was only avoided by the action of the Japanese in stopping the trains. He held up shipments of rifles on their way to Omsk, demanding that a large percentage of them be given to him. He defied the Omsk Government, under whom he was supposed to be operating, and later refused to recognize Kolchak until arrangements had been made to his satisfaction, meantime forcing the Dictator's hand by cutting the wires between Omsk and Vladivostok, and announcing that the Trans-Baikal, Amur, and Ussuri regions belonged to Semenov. But it was not his political and military shortcomings, nor yet his banditry and high-handed robberies, which marked Chita as the "Ogre's Lair" during his occupation. It was the long record of diabolical murder, torture and crucifixion which has fixed upon Semenov a hatred which will last for generations among the people east of Baikal.

Kolchak's regime was made a reign of terror for all Siberia by such men as these. Villages were burned on the slightest provocation or even on flimsy pretext. Recognized Socialist leaders were tortured and murdered. At Omsk eight such workers, some of them men whose work had been entirely in the field of literature, were murdered, in spite of the fact that their personal safety had been guaranteed by Kolchak's Minister of Justice, Starrinkevitch. At Nertchinsk, a force which was sent to arrest the caretaker of the Zemstvo building, who was suspected of Bolshevik sympathies, arrested instead the President of the Zemstvo, took him outside the building, and shot him. In Kansk, the Mayor was taken out and hanged without trial by the Cossacks. It is a brutal and disgusting record, and volumes could be filled with the revolting details.

The hated activities of these men in his rear destroyed all semblance of *moral* among Kolchak's troops, and when the Soviet forces once got the upper hand, their advance was rapid. Across the Urals they

came, driving Czechs and Siberians before them. Omsk became a city of refugees, military and civil. Thousands and hundreds of thousands flocked in until their very presence was a menace.

On November 10, the Government left for Irkutsk. It was useless to attempt longer to stem the tide of Bolshevism in Siberia by Cossack methods. The journey across Western Siberia assumed the character of a flight. In heavily guarded trains, carrying carloads of silver with them, the remnants of the Dictator's Government fled for their lives.

Their efforts to make speed brought them into direct conflict with their erstwhile allies, the Czechs. They, too, must reach a haven of safety from the oncoming avenger. They retained their organization, and, with 50,000 troops along the line of railway, they could dispose of the transportation facilities as they pleased. They commandeered the best cars, and sent their trains through ahead of all others. Thus they got safely ahead of the rout amidst the curses of those whom President Masaryk had spoken of as "our Russian brothers." Even then, they did not feel sufficiently secure, and finally made an agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionists, who insisted that they make war on Kolchak or get out of Siberia as best they could. The Czechs issued a manifesto declaring the Kolchak Government, for which they had been fighting for over a year, an enemy of the Russian people.

Kolchak and his advisers were desperate. His ministers resigned, and asked him to form a new Cabinet, more satisfactory to the Czechs. Pepelaiev was chosen as the only possible candidate. He organized a Cabinet, and set about his impossible task. He had to appease the more democratic elements, the Czechs, and Semenov, the latter because he was astride the railway, and cut off all access to the Allies and the sea. He promised a Siberian Parliament and other reforms. In September, Kolchak had tried to check the feeling against him by calling a congress of

Zemstvos to consider internal problems. Even at that time, it was apparent that this belated effort was futile, and another attempt coming after defeat and flight was hopeless. The Government disintegrated, and the ministers sought safety as best they could.

Revolution made rapid progress. In the middle of December the towns on the Amur rose and declared their independence of the Omsk Government. On December 25 Kolchak resigned his military command to Semenov "on account of ill-health." Two days later 800 of Kolchak's soldiers mutinied, and set up a "Communist" Government at Irkutsk. The Red Army was approaching Krasnoyarsk from the west, and the railway between there and Irkutsk was but insecurely held by the Czechs. A Japanese battalion occupied the Irkutsk station to insure the safety of the Allied missions. These left on January 5, and by that time all of Kolchak's soldiers had joined the revolutionaries. The Kolchak regime was at an end.

Kolchak himself was in the hands of General Janin, a Frenchman, who for about a year had been the commander of the Allied troops on the Siberian front. Janin surrendered the ill-fated Dictator to the revolutionists. As Moscow had already announced that he and all other captured anti-revolutionary generals would be court-martialled and shot, this action of Janin roused a storm of protest from the Allies. Janin justified his course on the ground that it was necessary to save his entire corps from annihilation. The Japanese made a belated effort to save Kolchak's life by demanding his surrender to them, but this demand was refused, and on February 7, 1920, Kolchak and Pepelaiev were shot. They were sentenced by a revolutionary committee at two in the morning, and met their fate within three hours.

Thus the Kolchak episode was closed. He and the Allies had accomplished nothing by their year and a half of warfare, except to hold the port of Vladivostok, put Semenov in the position of toll-gatherer on the

railway at Chita, and to drive the remainder of Siberia, which before their coming had been opposed to Communism, into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

The economic effort of the United States had been as barren of results as the military effort. Special arrangements had been made by the War Trade Board, the Shipping Board, and the Metal Control, to renew trade relations with Siberia. It was hoped that the co-operative societies would be able to handle the Russian side of this trade. But the cancer of the civil war had found its way into every social organism, and the co-operatives were involved in the political struggle. To deal with any one of them was to give it a political advantage. It made no difference that all were received upon the same terms. In fact that was a disadvantage. In the eyes of the Russians political rivals were not entitled to the same terms. The Red Cross and the Y.M.C.A. workers became entangled in the same web, and their work was to a large extent nullified by it. So good intentions only bred bitterness.

To the bitterness of the Siberians against the Allies must be added bitterness among the Allies themselves. The relations between Japan and America did not improve. In January of 1919, some 1,500 of Kalmikov's Cossacks mutinied, and surrendered themselves, their arms, and their horses, to the Americans. The Japanese at once made a demand that America turn over the equipment to them and cease to "protect the mutineers." General Graves refused, and kept the men under guard while the Allied Council determined what disposition should be made of them. They were later released a few at a time. General Inagaki explained that the disposition of these men was wholly in the hands of the United States, but that, as Japan had furnished their equipment, they had merely requested its return.

Another cause of friction was the Chinese Eastern Railway matter. In spite of its defeat in the previous

October, the Japanese military party still had sufficient strength to block the project for an Allied agreement. They were backing Semenov to interfere with traffic and contribute in every way possible to the general disorganization. Early in February of 1919, the State Department at Washington protested against the delay in the agreement. The protest was effective, and on February 12 it was announced that the agreement was signed. It provided for the operation of the railway under the control and protection of an Inter-Allied Railway Commission, to be made up of representatives of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, and China. All technical matters were to be under the control of a Technical Board, with Colonel John F. Stevens at its head. By the middle of March, the Commission and the Board had been organized, American troops were guarding strategic points in the Maritime Province, the Japanese were guarding the Chinese Eastern, Semenov was in control in Trans-Baikal, and the Czechs held the road to the west. At last it appeared as if the railway problem was on the way to solution.

It was too early, however, to be sanguine. The first difficulty was lack of funds. The railway had always been run at a loss, even in peace times. Now there was no autocratic Government to make up the deficit. A *pro-rata* loan was arranged for among the Allies, and the details agreed upon. Then it was discovered that the United States Government had no authority to make a loan except to recognized Governments who were at war with Germany. So little progress was made, and in July a protracted strike occurred, which tied up all traffic until threats of force were used against the strikers.

The chief embarrassment, however, was Semenov at Chita, who arbitrarily interfered with the railway to suit his own whim, and set the authority and orders of the Inter-Allied Commission at naught. His removal was requested, but without result. In July,

a formal protest was signed by the representatives of all countries, including Japan, and Colonel Stevens withdrew all American inspectors from "the Japanese-guarded sector where General Semenov is active, until adequate protection is guarateed."

In October the United States found it necessary to send two notes to Japan, the first having been ignored, concerning co-operation in the management of the road. Japan replied, signifying her readiness to protect the railway to the best of her ability, but refused to submit Japanese troops to the authority of Stevens, or to participate in individual disputes.

Thus the period of the Kolchak regime closed with the Bolshevik influence dominant in Siberia, with the Allies quarrelling among themselves, and with the Trans-Siberian Railway more disorganized than organized through their activities. The Government in Japan could make agreements, but when their execution rested with the Japanese militarists in the field, the latter allowed their own purposes to take precedence over the Government's, and they showed no scruple in manufacturing pretexts for the violation of both the letter and the spirit of such agreements.

CHAPTER IX

DISINTEGRATION

THE breakdown of the Allies-supported Kolchak regime in Irkutsk was followed by a few days of "Communist" Government, organized by the soldiers who started the open revolt. The real political organization, however, fell to a group of more moderate Socialists, known as the Political Centre. Their rule was destined to be short-lived, for the "Moderates" had had their day, and the result was not all to the liking of the people. The victorious Red Army of Russia had driven the "counter-revolutionists" from the Urals to Krasnoyarsk, was still advancing towards Irkutsk, and the citizens of that city insisted that Irkutsk must be a part of Soviet Russia. They declared their army a part of the Red Army, and took possession of the city until that army came.

The end of the Kolchak dictatorship meant for Western Siberia a united life under Soviet rule. The people had seen what reactionary Government had meant. They had come to the conclusion that it was far worse than the autocracy which had been overthrown. They would have none of it. So they made their choice in favour of Soviet rule. Whether it was to be better or worse remained to be seen, but at least it meant union and peace instead of dissension and civil war.

Eastern Siberia was not yet to have union and peace. The downfall of Kolchak meant disintegration there. Different sections of the country fell under different

masters, some of one political faith, some of another, and some without any at all. This meant more contention for mastery, more civil war, more misery, more economic destruction, more social demoralization, more death, and more murder. The Russians of the Far East had not yet reached the dregs.

The largest part of the territory was nominally in the hands of Semenov. His headquarters were at Chita, and his sway extended from Verkhne-Udinsk within a few miles of Lake Baikal to Stretensk on the Shilka River, some distance north-eastward on the Amur Railway, and to Manchuli, where the Chita Railway joins the Chinese Eastern. The real power throughout this region was in the hands of the Japanese, who were "supporting" Semenov in such strength as to make him, and any troops he ever had, helpless in their hands. There was no time when he was not completely in their control, when he was not entirely dependent upon them for money and supplies. The Japanese Command simply used him as a tool to accomplish their purposes in that part of Siberia.

January 20, 1920, Semenov proclaimed himself as the temporary ruler of Siberia. His claims were vague, and probably were intended to be. The exact extent of his dominion was not announced, and nothing was said as to the manner in which a permanent rule was to succeed his temporary one. As such ruler he made a vain attempt to recapture Irkutsk. He found it impossible to penetrate into Red territory. He then settled down to the task of maintaining by the only methods he knew his already precarious position on the great "Y" of the railways.

At Blagoveschensk no time was lost in restoring a revolutionary Government after the fall of Kolchak. Coming events cast their shadows before, and at the beginning of February the Japanese and White Guards, under the Cossack chieftain, Kuznitzov, discreetly withdrew. The revolutionaries took over the city, and established a People's Revolutionary Committee to

exercise authority independent of all other Governments except Moscow. This Government was composed largely of Communists, but lacked the radicalism which is usually associated with the name.

There was no bloodshed when the city changed hands, no orgy of killing, no looting and destruction of property, no burning of homes. When Kolchak's Cossacks took the city, over 1,000 persons were arrested, and hundreds were executed without trial. The change back to revolutionary government was marked by no such excesses. It was not wholly without bloodshed, but the only persons killed were twenty-four Cossack officers, who, after trial, were convicted of excesses during the former regime, and were shot on Easter-day.

Some requisitioning was done, but there appears to have been a real effort on the part of the Government to pay for what it took though it was not able to control all those who acted in its name. Of out and out confiscation there was apparently little. Many of the wealthier merchants, and the bourgeois generally, fled across the Amur to Taheiho, on the Chinese side, with the result that committees of the employees were elected to continue their businesses until they saw fit to return. Many of these emergency ventures were, of course, failures. The chief difficulty was to control the military authorities, who in the face of emergencies which they were not sufficiently organized to meet in a more proper way, commandeered and confiscated when the necessity arose.

The smaller cities and towns were left largely to their own devices. Nikolaievsk, at the mouth of the Amur, was in the hands of the Japanese, who allowed nothing in the way of a revolutionary Government to be organized there, though it made little difference what the nominal civil Government was, so long as Japan's military command exercised all authority.

Even far-away Petropavlovsk, on the Kamchatka peninsula, turned Communist, arrested its civil and

military officers, and organized a Soviet Government. Bolshevism had reached the eastern limit of Asia.

The peasants had no need for elaborate governmental machinery. Two years of the turmoil of civil war had taught them something of politics. They had no more interest than before in the fine-spun distinctions of the various schools of Socialism, but on one point they were absolutely certain. That was that Siberia could not settle down to peace and order until the country was cleared of all counter-revolutionary elements and their foreign supporters.

With the directness characteristic of the man who lives close to the land, they skipped the stages of political organization, and formed themselves into military companies, whose sole purpose was to fight the reactionaries and the intervention troops. These bands of peasants became known as "Partisans," a name which they inherited from the irregular troops which harried Napoleon on his retreat from Moscow.

The Partisans came in for a great deal of unpleasant notoriety at the hands of a Press controlled entirely by their enemies. They were characterized as Bolsheviks in a day when a "Bolshevik" meant a man with a black beard, a knife in one hand, and a gun in the other, both of which weapons he kept in constant use, much to the discomfort of all with whom he came in contact. They were branded as "Bandits," whose sole military motive was loot. "Thieves," "murderers," "assassins," "savages who cannot even understand the rules of civilized warfare," and other hard names were flung at them. The "kept" Japanese Press demanded their "extermination," and justified in advance any measure of reprisals which the Japanese Army might see fit to take against them.

It is incontestable that in a country distracted as Siberia was at the beginning of 1920 there should be many desperate characters. That some of these found their way into Partisan bands is undoubted. That there were whole bands of desperadoes, bandits pure

and simple, who held themselves out as Partisans, is certain. But to accept these as typical of the Partisans as a whole, and to read such a character into the Partisan activities, is to accept, either wilfully or unwittingly, an error far from the truth.

By the summer of 1920 almost every able-bodied man in Siberia, except those whose training or tendencies had led him to associate himself with the reactionary leaders, or those who had been conscripted by them, had become a Partisan. Surely there is nothing in the record of the Siberians which can justify the characterization of the whole people as a race of brigands. Nor did any wild frenzy seize them in 1920, convert them into human devils for a few months, and then leave them to be seen again as kindly fathers and loving sons. Nay, among the Partisans were many women who shared the honours of the battle with their brothers.

The Partisans were the "Minute-Men" of the Siberian revolution. The Siberian revolution began in 1920. Just as the American revolutionists fought against a tyrant of their own nation, who had the support of foreign mercenaries, so the Siberians fought against a tyrant of their own people, supported by foreign gold. "Bandits," if you like, because they fought without responsibility to any Government, but even the terminology of warfare provides a softer term, "guerillas," for such troops. The Partisans were guerillas just as the Minute-Men were guerillas. They owed allegiance to no existing Government in many cases, not because they did not want to, but because they were under the necessity of driving out the enemy before a Government could be formed. The circumstances of the case necessitated military action before civil action was possible.

In military array they were a motley-looking crowd, and, without knowledge of their purpose and some appreciation of it, they may well have passed for outlaws. The Russian is noted neither for his good looks

nor for his neatness, and fighting for months in the wilderness does not contribute to either. Their arms were as varied as their uniforms. A lucky few had rifles. Another lot had shot-guns. The majority were armed with scythes, rigged up as swords, with pitch-forks, and picks, and even with spades. But they made up in desperate courage what they lacked in appearance, and they started grimly about their task of winning their freedom. Those who denounced them and scorned them as savage bandits, were to learn that such men could not only fight, but could win!

While these bands were organizing themselves in all parts of Far Eastern Russia, Vladivostok was feeling the effects of the fall of reaction at Irkutsk. On Russian Island harbour, the Kolchak administration had organized under General Knox, the British Commissioner, an officers' school. In this school were about two thousand men, many of them conscripts. Towards the end of 1919, these men had been secretly organized by the Communists, and were preparing for a revolutionary move. On the night of January 28, 1920, there was an officers' meeting at the school. The revolutionaries surrounded the building in which the meeting was being held, and captured all of their officers, numbering about 100. They then took the remainder of the island without resistance.

Three days later they advanced on Vladivostok. Fully armed and equipped, with bands playing and red flags flying, they entered the city. Their numbers had increased to over 4,000 by then. They marched through the streets, which were all the while patrolled by American troops "to preserve order," and took half the town without firing a shot. As they approached the house of Rezanov, the commander, he fled to the headquarters of the Japanese Command.

The Partisans from the surrounding country entered the city and completed the work which the conscript cadets had begun. Again they marched past American and Japanese troops without attacking them, and there-

fore without interference. It is significant that General Graves, in his report, states that he could not identify these men with the Bolsheviki.

The Maritime Province was again in the hands of the revolutionaries, where it had been before the Allied intervention began. A Provisional Government was at once established under the leadership of Medvediev. Nikiferov, released from jail when Rezanov was overthrown, became Prime Minister. Leonov, also from a season in confinement, was Minister of Industry. Both were members of a Financial-Economic Council, which was at once organized to deal with economic problems.

With Vladivostok in their hands, the Partisans turned their attention to Habarovsk. Here Ataman Kalmikov was still exercising nominal power under the guidance of the Japanese. His rule was characterized by the same brutalities which had made Cossack domination an object of hatred elsewhere. While there are no exact figures, it is certain that over 1,500 people were executed by his order, and without trial, in Habarovsk. There had been no bloodshed at any time during the Soviet regime, but the record of the Ataman was splashed with blood from the first page to the last.

But now help was in sight. The Partisans of the Maritime Province organized a force under Bolgakov-Belsky, and started north down the valley of the Ussuri. Their numbers grew as they advanced, and they had no difficulty in defeating Kalmikov and his Cossacks, who fled across the Ussuri River into China. The Chinese at once disarmed this force and took Kalmikov prisoner. He had not only invaded their territory with an armed force, but they had a score to settle with him because of his action in firing on Chinese gunboats coming up the Amur. Kalmikov was taken to Kirin, and from there was to be taken to Peking for trial. He attempted to escape, and was killed by his guard.

When the Partisans entered Habarovsk, no attempt

was made to set up another Government there, the citizens recognizing the authority of the Temporary Government at Vladivostok. The transition from Cossack rule to Partisan rule was quietly made. There was no bloodshed and no property loss. There were no arrests and no official executions, although there were several instances where Partisans recognized Cossack officers who had burned their towns, killed members of their families, or committed other crimes, and these were promptly, if informally, disposed of. Within a few days the city's life was much nearer normal than at any time since the Soviet Government of the early summer of 1918.

It was quite obvious to all the world by this time that intervention had been a flat failure. The British and French were already withdrawing their troops, and one transport of Americans had left. Protests were heard in the United States Senate as early as January 1919, against American troops being employed to fight a people against whom Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional privilege, had never declared war. President Wilson defended the policy in July, on the ground that the presence of American troops was vital to the restoration of traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railway, thus saving the people of Siberia from a "further period of chaos and anarchy." He stated that the people were "threatened by irresponsible bands, and that all elements of the population look to the United States for assistance."

This might have been true at one time, but it certainly was not a correct estimate of the situation at the time the President spoke. Among the opponents of Bolshevism in Siberia, there was developing a distinct feeling of antagonism against the United States. This was due to the proposal for the Prinkipo Conference, which was not at all pleasing to the reactionary forces, and to the passive attitude of America toward the revolutionary movement. To the reactionaries, the Americans were "friends of the Bolsheviks."

As the Bolsheviks did not agree to this characterization, they could not be said to look to America for assistance. The great mass of the people only favoured the presence of American troops for one reason, and that reason President Wilson failed to mention. The great mass of the people of Eastern Siberia, who were neither radical nor reactionary, favoured the presence of American troops because they felt that that was their one safeguard against the agressions of the Japanese whom the Americans had invited into their country.

On January 12, 1920, President Wilson announced the recall of the American Expeditionary Forces, and so notified Japan. They were to leave as soon as they had completed their task of assisting the Czecho-Slovaks to leave the country, and had protected the departure of the Stevens Railway Commission. Both of these things were to be done "as quickly as possible." The Japanese at once protested against the withdrawal of troops from the railway until they could replace them, and they were assured that the withdrawal would be delayed sufficiently to allow their troops to take the place of the Americans.

On January 17 the first American transport sailed for Manila, and the evacuation of United States troops continued without interruption until the middle of March, when the last contingent withdrew, and intervention, so far as Americans, British and French were concerned, was over.

Little enough had been gained by the Allied effort. Intervention was always an affront to the Siberians. They feared it from Japan : they tolerated it from America because they thought America would restrain the Japanese ambitions. No political, no military and no economic good was accomplished by the expedition. Intervention delayed two years a stage of development through which Siberia had to pass, and sorry years they were. Sorry, indeed, as the reward of good intentions.

Out of the whole muddle, two small items appear on the credit side of the ledger. First is the Inter-Allied Technical Board, with the work it has done for the Chinese Eastern. Second is the work of the Red Cross, in relieving suffering among the civil population. Over three million people received assistance in the way of clothing and medicines, fourteen million dollars' worth of which were distributed. Such a work left a feeling of gratitude which it is difficult to measure. It is not too much to say, however, that his feeling was almost lost in the wave of indignation, which swept the United States as well as Siberia, when this humanitarian work was prostituted for political ends, and the Red Cross was ordered not to extend assistance to territory controlled by the Soviet Government.

CHAPTER X

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE MARITIME PROVINCE

THE European Allies and America had seen the futility of further interference in Eastern Siberia. In the American statement announcing the purposes of the intervention, she had made no declaration as to when she would withdraw her troops. When the conditions which led her to dispatch troops had ceased to exist, however, she withdrew her forces in accordance with the dictates of good faith and international honesty. When she said she had no intention to interfere with the internal affairs of Russia, she meant it in so far as the circumstances of the World War would allow. It was not an easy task to leave Siberia without making the situation worse, but the moment it could be done, America, Britain and France, withdrew, and left the Siberians to settle matters to suit themselves.

At least, that was their intention. But there were other factors to be considered. When America intervened, she magnanimously allowed herself to be made the sponsor for the intervention so that the fears of the Russians as to the intentions of the Japanese might be allayed. America allowed the record to read that the intervention was undertaken at her behest. She stated publicly that she had invited Japan to join her in the expedition. It was a splendid gesture, and it in a measure served its purpose. Only to the extent, however, that America actually assumed the responsibility for the intervention, was it more than an empty gesture in the eyes of the Siberians.

If America could have invited Japan to leave Siberia, and that invitation had been accepted with as great alacrity as the one to enter, the story of Allied intervention in the Far East would not have been the sorry tragedy it is. But such an invitation was forestalled by the far-sighted statesmen of Japan. Notice was served well in advance that it would not—of course they said "could not"—be accepted. In order not to injure the over-sensitive feelings of the Japanese, and to save herself from the embarrassment of a refusal, America refrained from extending the invitation. Thereby she broke faith with the Siberians. If she had said that what the Allies came there to do had been accomplished as far as accomplishment was possible, that it was time for all of them to withdraw, and Japan had refused to act upon the suggestion, America would at least have made her own position —and Japan's—clear. Her action, and that of the other Allies, in merely withdrawing their troops and leaving Japan to make the explanations, placed the seal of approval on the continued intervention of the Japanese, and threw upon them a large share of the responsibility for the subsequent events. America, because of her invitation, is one of the chief objects of Siberian bitterness.

Intervention in Siberia had never meant the same thing to the leaders of Japan that it meant to America. To America it was a necessary step for the protection of immediate interests involved in the Great War, and an opportunity to assist another people. To the military leaders of Japan, who had dominated the Government of that country without question until the struggle of October, 1918, the disorganization in Siberia caused by the revolution was a long-awaited opportunity to complete the work begun in the Russo-Japanese War by completely reversing the condition which had existed at the beginning of that war. Just as Russia had been the great and growing Power of north-eastern Asia, with Japan trembling before her, so now was

Japan to be the dominant Power, and Russia might tremble.

It has already been shown how the moment it became evident that the Russian revolution offered any possibilities of Japanese action in the direction of Siberia, the Japanese General Staff began to make its preparations for intervention. Three months before intervention actually took place they had an agreement with China for the invasion of Trans-Baikal. Japanese diplomacy held them in leash until some form of diplomatic approval could be obtained from the Allies. America was approached, and her innocent diplomats fell easy victims to the blandishments of the islanders. She invited Japan to join her and the other Allies in an expedition in which no one nation should send more than 7,000 troops.

Japanese diplomacy and Japanese warriors were both satisfied, and there must have been a jolly party in Tokyo when the news of the "invitation" was received. Diplomats and militarists could drink their saké together to the glory of Japan and the continued guilelessness of America, who would so obligingly cover Japanese invasion of the northern territory with the cloak of American fair-dealing.

Plans long ready were put into execution at once. Instead of 7,000 Japanese troops, 70,000 and more crossed the boundaries of Siberia. From the very start it was clear that Japan did not intend to be restricted in her operations by the spirit of the intervention nor by the letter of her own declaration in regard to it. The Allies, and especially America, were ignored. Japan had her own work to do upon the continent, and she could not tolerate "foreign interference."

When the rest of the Allies began to make preparations to withdraw, Japan began at once to make preparations to stay. None of the old excuses would do, so new reasons must be brought forward. An elaborate argument was put together to justify the continued presence of Japanese troops, even the

increase of their number, after the remainder of the Allies had left. Bolshevism was an international menace. Its advance into Asia, and its dissemination among the ignorant millions of China, meant destruction to modern civilization. Japan was next door to the scene of this coming conflagration, and must, therefore, at whatever cost to herself, save the world from the approaching danger. She thought the world should help her, but if it would not, then Japan, because of her "special position" and more immediate danger to her own social structure, must do it alone.

Thus was the world prepared for Japan's refusal to be bound by the written word of her intervention announcement that she would withdraw her troops as soon as the Czechs were rescued. Such shallow reasoning seems to satisfy the formalities of diplomacy and world politics. At home, however, there was another and much more important reason for further action in Siberia. Militarism is hard to justify to an overtaxed people except by "glorious" results. After a year and a half of effort on a huge scale in Siberia, the Japanese Army had accomplished nothing. There were no results, glorious or otherwise. The death-roll had only run to a few hundreds, but the cost in money had reached three hundred million yen. Something more must be done, or the people would demand explanations instead of celebrations.

So Japan notified the Allies of the necessity for the dispatch of more troops to guard the Trans-Siberian Railway, and to hold the line against Bolshevism at Lake Baikal or thereabouts.

While Japanese statesmen and generals were building up a specious case for their further activity in Siberian territory, and drawing the attention of the world to the danger of Bolshevism on the west, a situation of real military significance was developing in the Maritime Province. The Partisan Army, which had driven out Rezanov and Kalmikov, and was operating under the orders of the Temporary Government

of the Far East, had increased in numbers from a few thousand to upwards of 25,000. This was a force as strong in numbers as the Japanese themselves had in the Maritime Province.

There were no open hostilities between the Partisans and the Japanese because of the watchful control of the Temporary Government and its repeated orders that Partisan troops should not come into conflict with the Japanese. But there was intense feeling between them. The Partisans hated the Japanese as an alien race, as invaders of their land, and as the supporters of the cruellest and bloodiest form of reaction. As the Partisan forces increased in number, the Japanese began to fear the consequences to themselves. There were frequent clashes between small parties of the two armies.

By April 1 Japan found herself in a position where she was faced with the necessity of action. She must increase her troops in the Maritime Province, she must withdraw, or she must put the Russians in a position where they would be harmless. The first course was not at all advisable on account of the international situation. Japan's activities in China during the War, and the Shuntung matter, had already made her a defendant at the bar of the world's opinion. She could not afford to undertake military aggression on a large scale in another direction just at that time. The second course was entirely out of the question as beneath the dignity of the Japanese Army.

The third course was therefore to be preferred. But America was to be considered. Her troops had just left Vladivostok. They knew the ground and the situation. Closely Japan watched the transports. They arrived at Manila. The troops were disembarked. At last the transports sailed for America, and after a few days the American menace to Japan's free action would be gone.

And none too soon. For on April 1, there gathered at Nikolsk-Ussuriski a conference of delegates from

all parts of Eastern Siberia to consider ways and means for a union of the Russian Far East under one Government. If that conference was successful, and the Russian Far East was united, Japan would have no vestige of justification left for her continued presence in the country. Furthermore, such a united people might well develop sufficient military strength to make necessary much more extended operations than heretofore if Japan was to stay in the country at all.

A note issued by the Japanese Government at the end of March had set forth the new conditions of Japanese evacuation. The Japanese Government declared "in good faith, that it will withdraw its troops as quickly as possible after the withdrawal of the Czecho-Slovaks from Siberia, provided that the political situation in the regions contiguous to Japanese territory is settled, the danger to Korea and Manchuria removed, the lives and property of Japanese residents protected, and the freedom of communication safeguarded."

As Japan was apparently to be the judge of the degree of compliance with these extremely indefinite conditions, it would seem that she had reserved for herself sufficient freedom of action to meet all emergencies. The note in effect stated that Japan would withdraw when she felt like it.

While this may have been satisfactory to the diplomats at home, it was not sufficient to meet the needs of the militarists in the field. To them the rising tide of hatred against Japan in Siberia, and the possibilities inherent in the Nikolsk conference, seemed to demand more drastic action. On April 2, therefore, the Japanese Command presented to the Zemstvo a note setting forth the demands of the Japanese. These were: (1) the Zemstvo must supply the Japanese with quarters, provisions, transportation, means of correspondence, etc., at reasonable prices; (2) the Zemstvo must submit to all agreements made by the Allies and the Russian authorities at any time; (3) the Russians must not restrict the freedom of

persons helping the Japanese Army, without the Japanese consent; (4) the actions of all groups threatening Japanese troops or the peace of Korea and Manchuria must be liquidated; (5) all papers publishing anti-Japanese articles must be suppressed; (6) the Zemstvo must exert all means to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects, including Koreans.

There is sufficient impudence apparent on the face of this document to warrant the unquestioned belief of the Japanese Command that the Russians would refuse to comply with its terms, and thus give them an excuse for aggressive action. They believed that the Russians were so obstinate that they would refuse any conditions, but nevertheless they subtly inserted aggravating clauses which it would take us far afield to discuss, such as the inclusion of Manchuria in the sphere of their protecting care, and the tender consideration for the Koreans, whom they themselves were persecuting on every occasion. A Korean was a Japanese citizen, and now a dead Korean independence worker would serve a double purpose. He would be one less enemy of Japan, and one more cause for aggression upon the Russians.

The Russians, however, were more appreciative of their situation than the Japanese gave them credit for. They at once appointed five men, with Zetlin at their head, to form with an equal number of Japanese, headed by General Takayanagi, a Russo-Japanese Conciliation Commission for the settlement of the present demands and all other questions which might arise between the two authorities.

The Conciliation Commission held its first meeting on April 3, and its second on the 4th. At 7.30 that evening this meeting adjourned. The Russians, though not without protest, had agreed to all the Japanese demands. General Takayanagi assured them that now the agreement had been reached there would be no more trouble. After a general hand-shaking, the members went their several ways.

That same night, about eleven o'clock, without warning, and without any provocation that has yet come to light, the Japanese opened fire in the streets, arrested and disarmed all Russian guards, shelled the Zemstvo building for hours, and created a reign of terror throughout the city. Some thirty persons were killed, many injured, and all strategic positions were occupied by the Japanese.

The following morning, General Oi issued a proclamation, which read:

CITIZENS: On the basis of the Japanese statement of March 31, the Japanese Command entered into negotiations on April 2nd with the Russian authorities for the peaceful continuation of Japanese troops. Unexpectedly, during the night of April 4–5, Russian armed groups attacked our stores, garage and troops stations, and opened fire on various patrols.

In view of such unlawful actions and in order to prevent danger from Russian armed troops, the Japanese Command is forced to demand their disarmament. In this case, the Japanese Command, not pursuing any selfish aim, cannot permit the further development of disorders, and will take measures after negotiating with the Russian authorities.

Commander of Japanese Forces in Siberia,
GENERAL OI.

It is possible that Russians fired on Japanese on the night of April 4. That there was anything in the nature of an "attack" is absolutely unsupported by any evidence. That the Partisan troops were responsible for any difficulties with the Japanese is hardly possible in view of the extreme precautions taken by the Russian authorities to prevent any such conflict. General Oi's attempt to shift the responsibility for the outrage on to the Russians was inherently weak. Later developments were to demonstrate its utter falsity and prove beyond all cavil that the Japanese action was taken pursuant to a definite plan, which included the whole Maritime Province.

News began to come in from other cities. At Nikolsk-Ussuriski, on the morning of April 5, the Japanese had concealed machine-guns so that they com-

GOVERNMENT BUILDING AT HABAROVSK AFTER THE JAPANESE BOMBARDMENT

manded the market-place, and when the square was filled with people, suddenly opened their deadly fire. Hundreds of men, women and children were killed and wounded.

At Habarovsk, also, a massacre occurred on the morning of April 5. A great church holiday was approaching, and the streets were filled with people. In the Government building the officials had settled down for their day's work. As at Vladivostok and Nikolsk, the Japanese troops suddenly opened fire on the city. The Government building and the Cadet Corps building, which served as headquarters for the Partisan staff, were battered to pieces with artillery. Three schools, several stores, and a theatre, were set in flames by incendiary shells, and gutted or burned to the ground.

The destruction of property, and even the unwarranted attack upon the military headquarters, might have been justified by some peculiar Japanese logic, if the people had been spared. But with what seemed an insane fury, the Japanese turned machine-guns upon the people in the streets. Men, women, and children went down in the awful hail. Six hundred dead, and all of the hospitals and remaining schools in the city filled with wounded, was the price Habarovsk had to pay to Japanese strategy.

When the events in the outlying portions of the Maritime Province became known, it was idle for General Oi or anybody else to continue the talk of sniping or other provocation. At Vladivostok the attack was made at night, and no one could be certain at the time who began it. But in Nikolsk and Habarovsk the massacres began in broad daylight, and everybody knew that there was no disturbance whatever until the Japanese shells began to burst and the Japanese machine-guns commenced their deadly work. It was now plain for all to read that the simultaneous attacks were all parts of a prearranged plan, devised and executed by the Japanese Command.

It is hard to justify these attacks on any possible ground. If the Japanese had been fired upon, as General Oi claimed they had, there was no conceivable necessity for destroying the Government buildings on that account. If the Japanese were afraid the Partisans were going to attack them, as was claimed at Habarovsk, that could not necessitate the slaughter of hundreds of peaceable citizens. There is but one explanation of the Japanese massacres of April 4—5, and that is that they were deliberately resolved upon by the Japanese Command to instil a wholesome terror of Japanese arms into the Siberians for all time to come. That such terror so inspired would be accompanied by an undying hatred of the perfidious perpetrators, a hatred which would destroy all prospects of trade expansion and economic development, was a matter which was the concern of diplomats. It was beneath the notice of great warriors.

That such tactics were not new to the Japanese troops in Siberia, but were merely more noticeable than formerly because of the places where they were used, became evident as light began to be thrown into the dark places of 1918–19, when the Japanese and the British and Americans were Allies in name if not in purpose. An instance is afforded by the village of Ivanovka, in Amuria. It was bombarded for two hours, and then surrounded by Japanese troops, who advanced upon the defenceless citizens. Straw and oil were placed in the buildings, and they were soon in flames. All of the men of the village were then driven into the centre of the town, there to await death from the approaching flames. Those who tried to escape were picked off by machine-guns. Thirty victims were locked in a barn, which was then burned. Meantime, the village was looted, and the women and girls subjected to the brutalities of the soldiers. In all, 257 were killed, including ten women and five children. Over 250 buildings were burned, 80 farm machines were destroyed, over 200 wagons and sledges were

burned, and the village machine-shop was reduced to ashes and twisted iron. Siberia offers many instances to parallel this one.

Immediately after the attacks of April 4–5, the Temporary Government protested against the Japanese barbarity. They demanded the release of the arrested Government officials, the surrender of Government buildings, an explanation and apology, the discontinuance of arrests and searches, the return of Russian arms, and the appointment of an Inter-Allied Commission to make a full and unprejudiced investigation of the entire affair. Also they notified the Japanese that they were still ready to abide by the agreement made the previous day.

The Japanese Command ignored this protest, but formulated an agreement which the Russians, helpless in the presence of overwhelming and conscienceless force, were constrained to sign on April 29. This coerced agreement provided: (1) that both sides should discontinue fighting (hostilities had broken out in various places after April 4); (2) no Russian armed forces shall be allowed in the Japanese zone of occupation, which was delimited as follows: (*a*) thirty kilometres from all points of Japanese occupation on the Ussuri Railway, and thirty kilometres from the Chinese boundary, (*b*) thirty kilometres on both sides of the Suchan Railway; (3) Russian armed forces must leave these places within three days; (4) Russians should be allowed to take with them arms in sufficient quantities for their troops, and the Japanese were not to interfere with them in their new stations; (5) Russian troops so withdrawn must not be sent to Trans-Baikal or Saghalin Province; (6) Russian militia detachments to be allowed in the Japanese zone for police purposes only, the number and kind of arms to be determined in each case by agreement; (7) the railway guard to be on the basis prescribed by the Inter-Allied Railway Commission; (8) all firearms and other military supplies, shops,

and stores, with certain minor exceptions, to be turned over to the Japanese, and their disposition to be determined later ; (9) Japanese to retain barracks occupied by them (practically all) until evacuation ; (10) the Russian authorities to safeguard railways and telegraphs, and make every effort to restore communication ; (11) Russo-Japanese Conciliation Commission continued ; (12) all these provisions to be merely temporary, and subject to revision by agreement after either side expresses its wish for such revision.

In other words, Japan coerced the Temporary Government of the Maritime Province into signing what amounted to a diplomatic blank cheque, which Japan might fill in as its generals saw fit. Thus they secured written approval in advance for any aggressions which they might commit. How this one-sided agreement has been used to the advantage of Japan and the disadvantage of the Russians, will appear later. For the present it is sufficient to notice that not only was the presence of Japanese troops approved, but the Russians were to send their own troops out of a portion of their own territory.

In May, came the news of savage warfare at the mouth of the Amur, which was twisted by the Japanese militarists to justify Japan's existing occupation of the Maritime Province, to excuse her intended occupation of Saghalin Province, and to hold up the Russians to the world as human butchers, though the actual events warranted none of these uses.

In the middle of September, 1918, two companies of infantry had been sent by the Japanese to relieve the marines who had seized the town of Nikolaievsk, near the mouth of the Amur, in the previous April. Nikolaievsk was the home of a great many criminal exiles, a frontier town of rather unsavoury character. Among these criminals was a young fellow named Tripitzin, who took advantage of the disorganized state of the country to gather about him a gang of brigands, who set forth upon a career of depredation, posing as

Partisans and Bolsheviks. The Japanese had made themselves particularly hated in this part of the country by the frequent repetitions of such massacres as that at Ivanovka by the crews of Japanese gunboats, which steamed up and down the lower Amur using the Russian villages as targets. It was not difficult, therefore, for Tripitzin to secure a large following for a projected attack upon the Japanese garrison at Nikolaievsk. When the gunboats left before the river froze in the autumn of 1919, they left behind a garrison of 640 men.

In the early part of January, 1920, Tripitzin advanced on the town with about 3,000 men. The Japanese and the White Guards burned the outlying houses to prevent their being used as cover by the attackers. Near the town was a fort built by the Czar, which was occupied by about 50 Japanese. The Russians took this fort, surrounded the town, and bombarded it with the guns of the fort. This lasted for three days, when the defenders asked for a parley. On February 29, the Japanese and the Whites surrendered. The Japanese, however, retained their arms under parole. Two weeks later, the Japanese suddenly attacked and destroyed the Tripitzin headquarters. They were soon outnumbered, however, and suffered heavy losses. Finally the survivors, 134 officers and men, surrendered, and were confined in the jail.

May 22, Tripitzin notified the Chinese Consul that the Japanese relief forces were approaching, and that he would burn the town rather than let it again fall into their hands. The Consul protested, pointing to the 4,000 Chinese residents who would be rendered homeless by such an act of vandalism. Tripitzin gave them a few days in which to evacuate. The Consul then asked with regard to the 134 prisoners in the jail. Tripitzin promised to put them on a ship and send them back to Japan. This decision was violently opposed by Nina Lebedeva, his female Chief of Staff. She demanded execution.

On May 25, 4,000 Chinese and 700 Russians went

up the river about thirty versts, to the town of Mago. Two days later Nikolaievsk was burned. Of its 2,000 buildings, only 17 were left. Among the buildings burned was the jail. Nina evidently prevailed upon her chief, for the prisoners were never released.

The Japanese relief forces arrived at Nikolaievsk on June 3. What they actually found was sensational enough, but even this was highly coloured in the official reports to Tokyo. The massacre by a gang of brigands of 134 Japanese who had broken their parole, became by the time the reports reached Japan, a slaughter of the whole garrison of 640 heroic Japanese soldiers, who died gloriously in their efforts to protect their fellow-countrymen against the treacherous attack of "the Reds."

In Japan much was made of the affair. The Press demanded in no uncertain terms that the memory of these heroes must be "consoled." Every effort was made to stir up the people to a war fever. A great public ceremony was held in the Diet Building on June 24, in memory of the dead. It was attended by princes of the blood, ministers, members of the Diet, and many other prominent personages. Prince Tokugawa, President of the House of Peers, declared the Nikolaievsk "massacre" a "gross outrage upon humanity." Premier Hara declared the Government's intention "to maintain the national prestige to the utmost."

Nowhere did there appear the slightest suggestion that Tripitzin and his band were anything but soldiers of the Siberian Army. It was constantly reiterated that these were typical "Reds," and that it was the menace of such "butchers" that necessitated the Japanese operations upon the Asian mainland. In spite of the fact that nothing was known by the Japanese public of the hundreds of Russian women and children who had been massacred by Japanese troops in Siberia, the response of the Japanese populace was feeble, and one or two of the more independent papers had the

temerity to ask what the Japanese troops were doing there anyway. But the incident and its dramatic presentation served to quiet for a time the growing opposition in Japan against the continuance of the intervention.

Meanwhile, the Partisan forces of the Northern Maritime Province, hearing of the depredations of Tripitzin and his gang, sent a force against them. Tripitzin and Lebedeva were captured near the town of Kherby. Here they were taken for trial. The court was composed of 120 men, one chosen to represent each 25 men of the population. The prisoners were found guilty of murder, condemned to death, and on July 25 were shot. Twenty-two other leaders of the gang were tried in the same way, and met the same fate. This, it will be seen, was before any news of the excitement caused in Japan by the Nikolaievsk affair could reach the Partisans at Kherby.

The Japanese military party lost not a moment in turning the Nikolaievsk affair to their advantage. On July 4 it was announced that Japan would occupy such parts of Saghalin Province (which included the adjoining mainland and the great fisheries) as it deemed necessary, until a satisfactory settlement of the Nikolaievsk massacre could be obtained from some Government which Japan would recognize. Immediately the Russian half of Saghalin Island was occupied by Japanese troops, and arrangements were made for a six months' administration.

So all of the Russian littoral from the Korean border to the Okhotsk Sea, fell into Japanese hands. Thus the Siberian coast was linked up with Korea, South Manchuria, Shantung, and Fukien, to give the Japanese control of all the approaches to Asia from the Pacific. Thus was an intervention undertaken purely for purposes of defence and without the slightest intention of interfering with the self-government of the country, converted by the Japanese militarists into a military

occupation of a friendly country, with all the accompaniments of disarmament of its forces, destruction of its communications, imprisonment of its people, the killing of those who resisted, and the flaunting of a foreign flag from its public buildings, its vessels, and its armoured trains. Thus did the American idea of friendly intervention pave the way for the Japanese idea of military conquest.

That it was the intention to extend the sphere of Japanese conquest to the remainder of Eastern Siberia, there is some evidence to prove. The first matter is well authenticated, and refers to the Japanese attempts to control the Chinese Eastern Railway. It will be remembered that the Japanese militarists had bitterly opposed sharing with the Allies the operation of this road, and had insisted that the Japanese alone should have the handling of it. The existence of the Inter-Allied Railway Commission and the Inter-Allied Technical Board were sore points with them. This ill-feeling was constantly in evidence along the line of the road where the overwhelming force of Japanese troops, there in violation of all agreements, repeatedly interfered with the operation of the railway and the orders of the Technical Board.

On April 9, things reached a point where some action was necessary. On that day the Japanese arrested eight Russian railwaymen in Hailar, and attempted to send them to Manchuli, where they would be shot by the Semenov authorities. The protests of the local Chinese officials that the Japanese had no right to make arrests on Chinese territory, were ignored. The Russian employees, however, refused to move the train which was to carry the victims, and they were taken to the Japanese barracks. A rumour spread that they were to be shot there, and a crowd of relatives and friends gathered. The Japanese fired into the crowd first with rifles and then with machine-guns. They included the Czech troops in their fire, and the latter replied. Twelve were killed, including one

woman, and twenty-five were wounded before the fighting ceased.

On April 14, the Technical Board received full reports of the matter, and unanimously, except for the protest of the Japanese member, passed the following resolution:

Whereas, (1) Two Russian railway employees at Imiampo were suddenly arrested and summarily shot on April 6 by some Japanese soldiers without trial;

Whereas, (2) In the evening of April 8 two Russians were refused passage across the Sungari bridge at Harbin by Japanese soldiers, in spite of their passes entitling them to such passage. One of them was thrown over the bridge and the other had his head badly cut by these Japanese soldiers. Both were badly injured;

Whereas, (3) In the evening of April 8 eight railway employees were suddenly arrested at Hailar by some Japanese soldiers and were locked up in a Japanese military car to be transported to some unknown destination, and these acts have already caused serious fighting and resulted in the loss of about fifteen dead and thirty wounded and interruption of communications;

Whereas, (4) Three Russian railwaymen were arrested at Manchuria Station on April 19 by Japanese soldiers;

Whereas, (5) These violent acts have created a widespread excitement and indignation among the railway employees and are most liable to precipitate grave troubles leading to the interruption of communications, the delay of the Czech evacuation and the disturbance of the whole region, all of which tend to defeat the purpose and function of the Technical Board;

Whereas, (6) These acts are regarded by the Technical Board as being in direct contravention of the Inter-Allied agreement covering the guarding of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which duty was assigned to the Army of the Chinese Government by the Inter-Allied Powers, and the military forces of no other nation have any authority in the guarding of this railway;

Whereas, (7) The Technical Board protests in the strongest possible manner against the interference and high-handed actions of the Japanese troops in these and similar instances, and asks for an assurance from the Japanese authorities that such acts will not be repeated;

Resolved: (*a*) That this protest be placed on record; (*b*) That copies of this protest be telegraphed by the Secretary of the Board to the Inter-Allied Commission, and that each member of the Board be requested to telegraph the same to the representative

of his country at Peking; (c) That the Japanese member of the Board be requested to hand a copy of same to the senior Japanese officer commanding the Japanese troops in Manchuria and Siberia.

The other piece of evidence of intended Japanese occupation of all Russian territory, and the seizure of all Russian interests east of Baikal, is even more direct, though not so well authenticated. Certain documents have been brought to light which apparently are originals, though the possibility of forgery is not precluded. The first purports to be a secret order issued by the Japanese War Department on June 12, 1920, to General Oi. It reads:

As the present political situation prevents us from sending a big army, we expect you to act wisely and work out a detailed plan which we hope will be approved and sanctioned by His Imperial Majesty. Our interests make it imperative that occupation of this country be accomplished in the shortest time.

The second is an order of General Oi himself to the commander of the 14th Division, and is dated June 17.

Inform me immediately in how many days can the 14th Division be ready for an offensive against Blagoveschensk. My opinion is that a Japanese civil administration should be established in the whole Maritime Province. That is why I order you to discuss this question with reliable Russian citizens willing to be employed by the Japanese Government.

The third of these telegrams is also from General Oi, to the same commander. It reads:

Our officials obliged to co-operate with local Russian authorities are fully prepared to seize authority at any time and to establish Japanese authority before occupation is completed. You must exert your utmost to hinder the activities of Habarovsk Russian authorities so that Verkhne-Udinsk Government's plenipotentiary cannot achieve any success in his work. I have been informed by our War Department that the general political situation in Europe makes it impossible for us to realize all our plans. Our War Department has ordered me to be extremely careful, so I order you to be also careful.

It may not be possible to prove or disprove the authenticity of these telegrams, but their spirit is so entirely in keeping with the whole course of Japanese action since the first day of intervention in Siberia, that there is nothing in the proposition set forth in them which is inherently unbelievable. The burden of proof is most certainly upon Japan, and she has contented herself with a mere denial by the Japanese Publicity Bureau which she had created at Vladivostok, and an angry and wholly unsupported accusation of forgery.

But at last Japan's course of action in Siberia attracted the attention of the overburdened administration in Washington. Japan's Diplomatic Representative at Vladivostok, Matsudaira, on April 28, attempted to strengthen the Japanese position by declaring that Japan was acting in conjunction with the other Allies. As soon as a reply from Washington could be obtained, the American Consul published the United States Government's denial that it had made any agreement of any kind on Eastern Siberia with the Japanese since the Chinese Eastern Railway agreement of 1919.

The Japanese occupation of Saghalin on the flimsy pretext of the Nikolaievsk affair, however, brought forth a real protest from Washington. This note was received in Japan on July 28, but its contents were not made public until August 3. It reserved any expression of opinion on the Vladivostok affair because of lack of information, but it stated frankly that the United States Government failed to understand the reason for the Japanese occupation of Saghalin, which has no connection with the Siberian mainland nor the Nikolaievsk massacre.

There was much excitement in Japan upon receipt of this note. The Japanese papers outdid themselves in invective at the effrontery of America in presuming to interfere with Japan's affairs. Was it not necessary to uphold the national dignity at all costs? Must not the memory of the heroic Japanese

dead at Nikolaievsk be "consoled"? Again the note of defiance against America was heard.

Through the noise of many voices was heard that of the veteran statesman, Marquis Okuma, he who as Prime Minister presented the Twenty-One Demands to China. He remarked somewhat cynically that United States protests might be many, but they would be "only paper ones." Such was the contemptuous opinion of a man who understood international politics as few men do.

PART III

THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC

CHAPTER XI

THE IDEA OF A BUFFER STATE

WHEN historians come to fix the parentage of the buffer State idea they will find a wealth of material truly embarrassing. From Vladivostok to Irkutsk, and no doubt as far west as Moscow, they will find almost every prominent man of the country ready to sit down and tell them in detail the real story of the inception of the idea, how he first came to the conclusion that such a State was demanded by the conditions in the country and, after much difficulty, succeeded in convincing his associates and in getting them to work for the new State, which has now been successfully established.

Upon whatever brows the historical laurel for the conception of the idea may rest, the honour of having brought the State into being, in so far as such a task can be the work of any one man, unquestionably belongs to Alexander Krasnoschekoff, the former president of the Far Eastern Council of People's Commissars, which was established along the Amur in February of 1918, and continued in power until it was overthrown by the forces of the intervening Allies in September of the same year.

As soon as the news came that the Allies had actually landed in force upon Siberian soil, he realized that it was out of the question to resist them. Any attempt to do so would entail an utterly useless loss of life and destruction of property. A conference was called of the peasant leaders and Krasnoschekoff explained the

situation to them. It was determined that the only thing for them was to accept the inevitable as gracefully as possible. The army was disbanded and Krasnoschekoff and his staff departed for Blagoveschensk. Upon the approach of the Japanese they went up the Zeya River and into the hills. Krasnoschekoff had obtained permission from American Consul Jenkins, at Habarovsk, to send his wife and two children back to America. Many of his followers, however, had sent their families up the Zeya in two boats while they themselves made the trip overland. Near the town of Zeya these two boats were sunk by the Japanese, and all on board lost their lives.

Krasnoschekoff lived in the woods for three months while a whole Japanese regiment tried to find him for the purpose of dealing out to him such punishment as they thought fitting for anyone who entertained the political ideas for which he was well known. They did not find him, however, and finally, through the efforts of a friendly workman, he secured a passport which enabled him to come out of hiding and travel about the country. He went first to Nertchinsk, where after a time he set up as a merchant, joined the Chamber of Commerce and, having thus established his respectability according to the standards of the Kolchak regime, he went to Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, and then from one city to another all over Siberia, always carrying on anti-Kolchak propaganda. In May of 1919 he reached Samaria, where he was arrested as a Bolshevik spy. His captors were ordered to take him to Ufa for trial, but on the way he jumped from the train and escaped into the swamps. He was soon arrested again, but this time merely as a wanderer without proper papers. The dangerous spy charge was thus evaded. He was shifted from one jail to another until he finally reached Irkutsk in September.

When the revolt against Kolchak took place in December the insurgents' first thought was for their comrades confined in the jail. On December 28 the

doors were opened and 250 political prisoners set free. Among these was Krasnoschekoff, registered under an assumed name. He was recognized at once, however, and became one of the active leaders in directing the remainder of the operations.

When the success of the revolt was assured, the question of political organization had to be determined. In Irkutsk itself, the most powerful group was that known as the Political Centre. It was made up largely of Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries, the so-called right wing or conservative Socialists. This group assumed authority as a temporary Government. Krasnoschekoff and the other Communist leaders did not join this Government, though they supported it as the best means of preserving order for the present.

Surrounding Irkutsk, however, were about 30,000 Partisans, peasant troops who had helped to rout the Kolchak forces and who felt that they, as a victorious army, should have some say as to what Government was instituted in place of the one they had overthrown. They had had their fill of conservative revolutionists. It was conservative revolutionists that had formed the Omsk Government, out of which the Kolchak dictatorship had grown. This time they wanted to make sure of the revolution, to shut the door for ever against reaction and counter-revolution. The Communists and the Soviets had done this in Russia. The Communists and the Soviets could be trusted to do it in Siberia. Therefore they wanted Communism and a Soviet Government.

Krasnoschekoff, however, had seen a new light. His experience in Habarovsk had convinced him of two things, one that the Allied Powers would never peaceably accept a Communist State in Eastern Siberia, and the other, which was of much greater importance in his mind, that the conditions in Eastern Siberia were not suitable for Communism. A vast, undeveloped, under-populated territory, it needed the capitalistic system to develop its resources and render it capable of

supporting a large population. When that was done Communism might come, but until then it would never be able to establish itself in the Russian Far East. If the zeal of the people for Communism, of which they knew little more than the name, could be held in check and they could be made to see the real necessities of the situation, many years of turmoil and disorganization might be avoided.

Nothing could be done in this direction, however, without the consent of Moscow, whose victorious troops were rapidly advancing eastward and were already nearing Krasnoyarsk. Moscow's approval and co-operation must be obtained, or the idea of a democratic buffer State in which the institution of private property should be preserved intact would be swept aside along with its proponents. Krasnoschekoff therefore proposed a mission to confer on the subject with the Soviet General Staff, which was then at Omsk.

There were still many of the Czechs west of Irkutsk, and it was necessary to obtain their permission for the passage of such a mission. They consented to allow a mission to go, but they would not permit Krasnoschekoff himself to accompany it. The mission was at once organized and the list of its members did not include the name of the proposer. The mission made its way through the Czech lines, met the advancing Red Army at Krasnoyarsk, and went on through to Tomsk, where it met the Soviet General Staff. Here a secretary of the mission, in which character Krasnoschekoff had accompanied it, became its head, and the plan of an independent republic in Eastern Siberia was laid before the General Staff.

After a lively discussion the Staff agreed to the proposal on the evening of January 18, 1920. The Soviet Army was to continue its eastward movement as far as the river Oka, about 250 versts west of Irkutsk. It was agreed that Krasnoschekoff was to organize the remainder of Siberia into a democratic republic as a buffer State between Soviet Russia on

one side and Japan and the Allies on the other. The boundary between the new State and Russia was to follow the Oka River from the Mongolian border to the Angara River, then down the Angara to the Yenesei, and down the Yenesei to the Arctic Ocean. The territory east of this line is about three times as large as that of the Far Eastern Republic as finally constituted.

After the authorities at Tomsk had been convinced of the advisability of this plan, both from the point of view of Soviet Russia and of the people of the Russian Far East, it was necessary to convince Moscow and secure its approval. Lenin and Trotsky were called on the direct wire and, after long argument, agreed to the plan as arranged at Tomsk. The necessary documents were executed forthwith and Krasnoschekoff left at once for Irkutsk as the representative of Soviet Russia to put the plan into execution.

By the time he reached Krasnoyarsk on the return journey, he received word that the Communists of Irkutsk, in view of the increasing success of the Red armies, had decided to abolish the Political Centre and establish Soviet rule. Krasnoschekoff wired the substance of the new plan in an attempt to stop this movement. The wire reached Irkutsk in time, but was concealed by those who received it until the *coup* had been accomplished and the Political Centre abolished.

A conference was called with the Siberian authorities, and the restoration of the Political Centre was ordered. It was planned to use this conservatively inclined organization as the nucleus around which to form the new democratic Government. This brought down a storm of disapproval, and Krasnoschekoff was denounced by the Partisan leaders as a counter-revolutionary. He was left to face the storm alone. Janin, the Allied commander, Harris, the American Consul-General, and others who might have supported him in the crisis, left the city. The Japanese retired to Sludanka. Semenov withdrew behind them, taking

with him as hostages thirty members of the Political Centre, whom he afterwards drowned in Lake Baikal.

Krasnoschekoff, however, refused to give in. He still insisted upon the buffer State idea, although the task of forming one seemed hopeless in the face of the Soviet victories and the enthusiasm of the people for Bolshevism, which to them had come to represent the revolution. There was still hope farther east, and in March he received new orders to go on eastward until he found a place where the plan could be put into operation.

He left Irkutsk in a prison car, that being the only accommodation available in the disturbed state of traffic. He took with him six Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionists as co-workers, and began looking for a town in which the outlook was propitious for the establishment of his new State. On March 7th he arrived in the neighbourhood of Verkhne-Udinsk on the Selenga River. The Partisans were then advancing on the town and finally took it that very day, driving Semenov out, although the Japanese remained. They took no part in the fighting, but they effectually covered Semenov's retreat, else he would then and there have been " liquidated " and not lingered on to disturb the peace of the land for a year or more to come.

Krasnoschekoff entered the town with his followers and was received by the Japanese garrison which, by a trick of fate, happened to be the very regiment that had hunted him for three months on the Zeya a year before. The commander invited him to his headquarters, but Krasnoschekoff declined, inviting the Colonel instead to visit him. The Colonel also declined and thus the exchange of courtesies ended.

Krasnoschekoff at once set about the organization of his Government. The Partisans were flocking into town with their red flags, prepared to celebrate their victory. When Krasnoschekoff, in the name of the new Government, told them not to bring in the flags they threatened to arrest him and the rest of his " Government." The

argument continued for two days, but at the end of that time, Krasnoschekoff had succeeded in convincing them that their own best interests demanded the establishment of a democratic buffer State and they gave him their support.

The new Government, then established, was known as the Temporary Local Self-Government of Pri-Baikalia. Krasnoschekoff himself did not become a member of the Government. He remained the "ambassador of Soviet Russia at the court of Pri-Baikal."

The first act of the new Government, which controlled only a strip of territory along the Selenga either side of Verkhne-Udinsk, was to make an agreement with the Czechs for their evacuation through this territory. The agreement was strictly carried out and the Czechs went through without the slightest misunderstanding or disturbance. Immediately in their rear gathered 25,000 to 30,000 Partisans under General Eiche for the advance upon Chita.

The new Government, however, was destined to be short-lived. It lasted but three weeks. It could not survive the constant friction between the incoming Partisans and the Menshevik members. Each band had to be met and the old arguments gone over until it had been converted. Finally the territory around Troitzkosavsk seceded and declared for union with Soviet Russia. A conference was called for March 24 at the village of Bichura to carry out this determination. The Pri-Baikal Government had already called a conference at Verkhne-Udinsk for March 28th in an attempt to dampen the peasant enthusiasm for Communism and Soviet Government which some of its own members had been instrumental during their days of revolutionary agitation in arousing. These former agitators now called themselves the "firemen."

As a preliminary to this conference, Krasnoschekoff, with two of the peasants whom he had brought to his way of thinking, set out to attend the Bichura Conference. Here he was met by 200 whiskered

peasants who insisted that they wanted Bolshevism and did not hesitate to denounce the emissary of Moscow as a city dude who had sold himself to Semenov. After two days' debate, Bichura decided to call Lenin on the long-distance telephone and ask him personally in regard to Krasnoschekoff's credentials. He showed them his mandate, but they could not read, so he finally proposed to take as many as wanted to go back to Verkhne-Udinsk with him to attend the conference there. About one hundred accepted the offer. The Bichura Conference adjourned and moved to Verkhne-Udinsk.

At Verkhne-Udinsk were gathered about 400 delegates from the districts as far east as Chita and even some refugees from the Amur towns. After a week of discussion the buffer State idea had won its way to general acceptance. On April 6, 1920, Krasnoschekoff presented a draft of a declaration of independence. This interesting document was first written in English and then translated into Russian because the author's more recent study of political affairs had been in English and he felt more at home in it than in his native tongue. In this declaration was used for the first time the name "Far Eastern Republic." It was preceded by the words "independent democratic." These words proved a stumbling-block in the convention in spite of the progress which the buffer State idea had made. For there was a strong sentiment against independence and in favour of remaining a part of Russia. The idea of a Za-Baikal Republic was proposed as a counter to Krasnoschekoff's plan, but it rallied but few supporters. In the end the declaration was unanimously adopted and the Far Eastern Republic was born.

CHAPTER XII

REINTEGRATION

WITH the proclamation of the new State, Krasnoschekoff's immediate task, as the representative of the Moscow Government, was accomplished. He gave up his Russian mandates and became a citizen of the new Republic. The following day a provisional Government was formed. It consisted mostly of peasants, but Krasnoschekoff was elected president and remained until July of 1921 the foremost leader of the new nation.

The mere formation of a Government, however, was but a beginning. There remained the necessity of securing a country and a people to go with the Government. The problem before the administration was twofold. They must drive out the reactionary elements and their foreign supporters from the territory which they had marked out as their own, and they must secure the adherence of the people who occupied that territory.

If the new Government had little territory and few people when it declared its independence, it did have an army. The Partisans, under General Eiche, were ready to do the bidding of the new authorities. On April 20, two weeks after the declaration of independence, this army started its advance on Chita. On the eve of Easter it arrived within four miles of the city, and its artillery began to drop shells in the streets. The Japanese immediately came out to cover Semenov, and began to advance upon the Partisans. The republicans received orders not to fire upon the

Japanese, and they retired before them to Yablonoi. Two weeks later they again advanced, but this time the Japanese attacked in force, fighting ensued, a number were killed on each side and the republicans were driven back to Mogzon.

Meanwhile, the political side of the problem was also receiving attention. Even before the declaration of independence of the Far Eastern Republic, the Verkhne-Udinsk people had sent emissaries to Vladivostok to urge the union of the Russian Far East in a democratic republic. The Communists of the Maritime Province, however, or rather the more radical of them, were determined to simply hold their ground until the arrival of the troops of Soviet Russia, which they expected to fight on through to the Pacific.

A conference was finally arranged to be held at Nikolsk-Ussuriski on April 1. Here the Partisans and the more radical Communists were gathered in force, and at first strongly advocated a Communist Government. But here again the inherent strength of the republican argument won its way, and within a day or two it became apparent that the conference would in all probability approve the idea of a buffer State.

The action of the Japanese in this contingency to prevent the Far East from becoming united and thus doing away with all possible excuse for their further occupation, has already been related. The massacres at Vladivostok, Nikolsk, Habarovsk and other towns in the Maritime Province served their purpose. The unification of the Far East was postponed for another nine months, and the civil war, with all its suffering and misery, was dragged out without any appreciable effect upon the ultimate result.

Blagoveschensk, as we have seen, was already free from both Japanese and reactionary troops. Her Partisan forces gathered and started westward along the Amur Railway. By the end of March they and the northern Za-Baikal Partisans had driven back the

Japanese and the Semenov troops to Stretensk on the Shilka. Thus the only Siberian territory which remained in foreign control outside the Maritime Province was the "Y" of the railway from Chita to Stretensk and Manchuli Station.

The news of the declaration of independence could not be sent direct to Blagoveschensk because of this intervening territory held by the enemy. It was therefore sent by telegraph through Troitzkosavsk, Urga, Peking, Harbin and Aigun, and from there across the Amur by messenger. The ground had already been prepared for the buffer State idea at Blagoveschensk. Yakovliev and other Communist leaders had pointed out the impossibility of Communist success under the conditions which existed in Siberia and the desirability of a democratic republic in which the institution of private property should be preserved intact. Blagoveschensk, therefore, at once gave its adherence to the Verkhne-Udinsk Government and became a part of the the Far Eastern Republic.

Again the effort was made to bring Vladivostok into the union. The action of the Japanese on April 4—5 had rendered the Government of the Maritime Province helpless in the hands of the Japanese Command. The leaders of the Government were most of them in favour of union and in favour of a democratic form of Government. The necessity under which they laboured of constantly looking into the muzzle of the Japanese rifles, however, made them appreciative of difficulties in the problem which were not so apparent to the Verkhne-Udinsk leaders. A simple acceptance of the Verkhne-Udinsk programme would have unquestionably brought about action by the Japanese which would have nullified the whole plan.

This situation, and perhaps the very human desire to bring about an arrangement in which their part should be a larger one, caused them to advance arguments and suggest plans which caused much ill-feeling among the various groups of Siberians themselves. The

suggestion was made that the Semenov situation should be liquidated by giving the Cossack chieftain a share in the formation of the new Government. This met with instant and indignant refusal from the Baikal people, who had suffered under his brutalities and who were bending their every energy to drive him out of the country for ever. They demanded the complete and unconditional surrender of the reactionary forces, with general amnesty. No compromise with counter-revolution was or could be acceptable to them.

Another cause of disagreement between the two groups was the Japanese situation. The Vladivostok people were under the heavy hand of Japan and they could not bring themselves to surrender the handling of the delicate question of their relations with the islanders to the Trans-Baikal people, upon whom the grip of Japan was much less secure. A misstep in Verkhne-Udinsk might have to be paid for in Vladivostok. So various schemes were put forward whereby the Maritime Province should be in complete control of its own relations with the Japanese. The Verkhne-Udinsk people demurred to this on the ground that such a plan would make the new State a two-headed affair and it would be greatly weakened in dealing with foreign nations. They feared such an arrangement would necessarily result in Japanese domination, of the Maritime Province at least. They demanded independence not only of Russia but of Japan as well.

The real struggle, however, between the two groups centred around the question of the location of the capital of the new republic. The Verkhne-Udinsk leaders insisted that the capital should be as far west as possible to escape the danger from aggression by Japan. Vladivostok, on the other hand, claimed that the capital should be at the largest city. This claim gave rise to a strange alliance. It was originally advanced by those of a conservative turn of mind, the same groups who had advocated concessions to Semenov rather than his

defeat, and temporizing with Japan rather than insistence upon her withdrawal. In their claim on the location of the capital they were supported by the most radical elements who, seeing no hope of turning the Far Eastern Republic into a Communistic State, hoped by bringing the capital to Vladivostok that, in some later confusion, they might secure their end.

A conference was finally arranged to be held in Verkhne-Udinsk early in May. Many delegates came prepared to try to overthrow the buffer State altogether and bring about immediate reunion with Soviet Russia. The debate waxed bitter. The opponents of the republic urged that the buffer State had been wholly unsuccessful, that the Allies would not deal with it any more than they would with the Soviet Government, that it could not take Chita without the help of the Red armies, etc.

At one time it began to look as if these efforts would be successful and the Red Army would be invited to come in and take charge. Krasnoschekoff had almost despaired of saving the republic when help arrived from a most unexpected quarter. The precocious Government of the Far Eastern Republic had already addressed a number of notes to the Japanese Command, all of which had so far been ignored. Up to this time the infant republic had not attained sufficient importance to be considered in the working out of the Japanese policy. The Japanese Command was very favourable to the idea of a buffer State and was ready to assist in its establishment upon one condition—that it should be entirely under the control of Japan. The Japanese policy was therefore to offer encouragement to each of the local Governments and thus strengthen the claims of each and render less likely their surrender to any of the others. In this way disunion could be promoted under the semblance of co-operation, until some one of the local Governments should signify its willingness to be guided by the wishes of the Japanese Command.

So it happened that on May 11th, just when the tide seemed to be turning against Krasnoschekoff and the infant republic, General Oi sent a telegram expressing his gratification at the formation of the buffer State, and stating that the Japanese would evacuate the Far East as soon as a stable Government was established. This telegram arrived at the Verkhne-Udinsk conference in the nick of time. So timely was it in fact, that the opponents of the republic in the conference immediately raised the cry that it was a forgery. Its authenticity was soon demonstrated and the ground cut from under the feet of those who would destroy the new republic.

Five days later occurred another event which marked a step forward in life of the new State. On May 16, 1920, there arrived a note from Tchicherin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Government, in which Soviet Russia recognized the "Far Eastern Republic" as a "separate independent democratic republic." The new republic now had a measure of international standing even though the recognition came from the mother-country, which was itself not overburdened with recognitions from other countries.

The immediate political struggle was won, but the food and economic conditions were becoming so acute that it was determined to send Krasnoschekoff to Moscow with an appeal for aid from Soviet Russia. He started on this mission the end of June. Several questions were settled on this trip. First was the western frontier. It was not possible to go back to the agreement of January 18, because Soviet rule was already an actuality as far east as Irkutsk. The line was therefore drawn along the Selenga River from the Mongolian frontier to the Baikal, and the northern frontier was left for the determination of the Constituent Assembly. All of the railways east of this line, including certain Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway, were ceded to the new republic. It was agreed to exchange the paper currency of the two

Governments, rouble for rouble. Most important of all, the Soviet Government agreed to advance funds and materials to the Far Eastern Republic as needed, such advances to be paid for in surplus rolling stock and in transport of Russian goods through Far Eastern territory. Incidentally the republic granted its first concession. Russia secured a twenty-five years' lease on the peninsula of Sviatoi Nos—the Holy Nose—in Lake Baikal, as a fur animal preserve.

When Krasnoschekoff returned to Verkhne-Udinsk in September with these arrangements completed, he found the conditions somewhat changed in Siberia. When he left, negotiations had been opened with General Oi for the evacuation of Trans-Baikal by the Japanese. By the middle of July these negotiations had been successful and the agreement of Gongota had been signed. A similar agreement had been made between the Japanese Command and the Partisan leaders on the eastern front. By the end of August the last Japanese soldier had left Za-Baikal. This evacuation was apparently the result of diplomatic effort upon the part of the new Government, but the diplomacy was based as usual upon a very definite preponderance of military force. The Partisans had been increasing their number and perfecting their organization until they had an army which was beyond the strength of the Japanese forces on the ground. The same choice which led the Japanese to institute a reign of terror in the Maritime Province led them to withdraw from the more remote Trans-Baikal country.

Semenov, who had never fought a successful battle, but had always been at hand to accept the results of Czech or Japanese effort, found his position hopeless as a result of the Japanese move. In a panic he had sent a letter to the Japanese Crown Prince on July 11. In this epistle he begged the prince, "in the name of the Japanese blood shed at Nikolaievsk," to ask his father to stop the withdrawal of troops from Za-Baikal. His Imperial Majesty did not see fit to

grant this remarkable request, and Semenov hastily followed his supporters as far as Dauria, near the Manchurian border.

The position of the new republic was greatly improved. It had recognition ; it had rights ; it had funds. Its prospective capital had been evacuated by the enemy. Unfortunately, however, it could not take advantage of this evacuation as the Gongota agreement had provided for a neutral zone between the two forces. Chita was in this zone, and the republican troops could therefore not enter the city. For three weeks Chita was left unoccupied by either side and the citizens formed their own local Government, known as the Chita People's Assembly, under the leadership of Constantine Schraber, a " right wing " Socialist.

Meanwhile, an incident which happened at Dauria was fraught with peril for the future. Baron Ungern, one of Semenov's generals, left his camp with 3,000 men, arms, ammunition, supplies, etc., and invaded the territory of the Far Eastern Republic to the south, along the Mongolian frontier. The Japanese refused to accept responsibility for his actions, declaring that he was a rebel against Semenov's authority, and informed the Far Eastern Government that they could take such action against him as they saw fit. Ungern had taken the southern part of the republic's territory around Menza and, because of the lack of communication, it took three weeks for the republican troops to reach him across the broken country. Then they took his base, captured all his supplies, and dispersed his forces. Ungern himself, however, escaped into Mongolia to remain a menace to both China and the Far Eastern Republic until his defeat at Troitzkosavsk in June of 1921.

The Far Eastern Republic had made such headway in its military problem that its position was much stronger than at any time previous, and in September another attempt was made to bring Vladivostok into the republic. Success was assured this time by the

action of the People's Assembly of the Maritime Province in June. This body had passed a resolution in favour of union with the Verkhne-Udinsk Government. A new conference was therefore called at Verkhne-Udinsk. Binassik, Nikiferov and Troop were sent as delegates representing the Maritime Province. These delegates had to go through the country still held by Semenov. The Ataman took advantage of the opportunity to do some negotiating on his own account. He wanted peace provided he should be made commander-in-chief of the new Government. This was flatly refused. Semenov held the delegates for three days but finally let them proceed. They arrived at Verkhne-Udinsk the end of September and negotiations began at once, this time merely on the terms and conditions of union. The union itself was now assured.

While the negotiations were in progress, unattached Partisans began to advance along the railroad. Semenov, finding that Chita was not at once taken over by the republicans, had sent General Verzbitsky to reoccupy it. In and about the city were many former soldiers of General Kappel. Kappel was one of the best of the Kolchak leaders. He had commanded the rear-guard in the retreat from Omsk and won the admiration of friend and foe alike. His men were of a better type than those who had flocked to the banners of Semenov and his kind. Still, many of them were in favour of reaction, and General Verzbitsky gathered 15,000 or 20,000 of these to use as a screen behind which to conduct negotiations for an alleged democratic coalition. It was evident that without Japanese support the reactionaries could not defeat the revolution. Their only hope if they were to save anything for themselves was to compromise with it.

While General Verzbitsky was quietly occupying the former Japanese posts in the neutral zone, he approached the Chita Government with a proposal for

co-operation. Semenov offered to recognize the Chita Government if the latter would appoint the Ataman commander-in-chief of all its forces with absolute independence. Semenov would then act as "protector" of the Constituent Assembly and submit to any Government established by it.

It was hoped that the leaders of the Far Eastern Republic could be persuaded to join in this arrangement, but it quite naturally received no encouragement whatever from them. They were willing to negotiate, however, even though they insisted on a less one-sided basis of agreement. But events ran ahead of the negotiations. In the neutral zone, between the republican forces surrounding the city of Chita and the railroad "Y," and the Semenov forces occupying these positions, were thousands of Partisans—peasants—who for two years had borne the Semenov yoke and were determined to bear it no longer. They were not interested in diplomacy and negotiations. Their one thought was to rid the country of its despoilers. They rose, as the peasants had risen in the Amur country, seized arms and munitions from stragglers and small parties of the opposing forces, and started a war on their own account. They cut the railroad between Chita and Manchuria. They took Stretensk. They started a drive on Borzia. They finally surrounded Chita, forming a second investing ring, inside the republican troops. They captured the Ingoda bridge, just outside Chita. Semenov, who had followed General Verzbitsky to Chita, hastily took his departure by airplane, leaving his troops to make their way out as best they could. They managed to recapture the bridge, but evacuated the city. They tried, as did Semenov, to make their way to Mongolia, but the Partisans cut off this line of retreat. They were pushed back over the Chinese line into Manchuria. Here the Chinese disarmed them.

The cause of reaction was a lost cause in Eastern Siberia. The Japanese, however, did not appreciate

this. They arranged for the transportation of these disarmed Semenov and Kappel troops across Manchuria to the Maritime Province. Here they were gathered in and about the town of Grodekovo and held for such future use as the Japanese Command saw fit to make of them.

The new situation in Chita was far beyond the purview of any previous agreements and it was necessary for some organized force to take control or the results might be disastrous for the city. The Government and army of the Far Eastern Republic was the only force that could do this with any hope of success. So Krasnoschekoff and Eiche entered Chita with their troops early in November.

All the Partisans at once recognized the authority of the republican Government, and by the 10th of the month the negotiations with the Maritime Province delegates were concluded, so that on that date the Russian Far East was once more united, with Chita as its capital.

To be sure, not all of the territory which it claimed was actually under its control. The Japanese still held the Maritime Province south of Ussuri, about half-way between Vladivostok and Habarovsk, and they held the northern half of Saghalin Island and the territory around Nikolaievsk and the mouth of the Amur. They had evacuated Habarovsk for much the same reason they had evacuated Trans-Baikal, the Partisans were gathering in such force as to make it extremely doubtful whether they could maintain their position. So they explained that "the political situation is now stable" and left. In the territories still under their control, the duly elected representatives of the Russian people had given their allegiance to the new Far Eastern Republic.

The infant republic was increasing its strength and its importance. In addition to its internal problems, it found it necessary to give attention to its relations with other countries beside Japan. Its territory was

conterminous with China's for over two thousand miles, and it was natural that, after Russia and Japan, China should be approached with the request for the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations.

The Temporary Government of the Maritime Province had sent Mr. Agariev, a former mayor of Vladivostok, as an envoy to Peking as early as May of 1920. He, however, represented only the Maritime Province. It was not until July that the Far Eastern Republic sent its mission. This was headed by Ignatius Yourin, who had been closely associated with Krasnoschekoff in all his work and had assisted him in the drafting of the declaration of independence of April 6, 1920.

As soon as the mission was suggested, the French and Japanese ministers at Peking had "advised" the Chinese Government not to receive it. China, following this advice, sent instructions to Kiakhta to refuse the mission passports and not to allow them to enter Chinese territory. Yourin telegraphed, asking why China should refuse them admittance when Russia was allowing Chinese delegates to enter her territory without hindrance. China was embarrassed. She was weak and France and Japan were strong. And France and Japan insisted. At last China decided to send a representative to Kiakhta to discuss matters with the mission there.

The war of the Chinese Tuchuns, resulting in the expulsion of Anfu influence from the Peking Government, postponed the matter for the time being, and when the new Cabinet was formed, it was decided that the mission must be received, but unofficially. The French Minister withdrew his protest on condition that political matters should not be discussed. Japan continued to protest against any intercourse. She wanted no *rapprochement* between China and the new republic.

The Chinese Press severely criticized the actions of the representatives of France and Japan. The *Peking and Tientsin Times*, one of the most influential dailies in North China, characterized it as a "huge bluff."

The mission arrived in Peking on August 21. A Chinese official was appointed to examine its credentials. Yourin presented the authorization of the Chita Government. The Chinese at once demanded in addition to this, credentials from the Governments of Vladivostok, Amur, Za-Baikal, etc. These Yourin agreed to obtain.

Meanwhile, the arrival of the mission at Peking had brought out in strong relief the anomalous position of the Russian Minister there. He represented no existing Government, but continued to maintain the Legation and the consular staff throughout China upon such instalments of indemnity and other indebtedness as he could prevail upon China to pay him as the representative of Russia! On September 18 China suggested to the Russian Minister that the diplomatic and consular bodies discontinue their functions. This suggestion was of course not accepted, and on the 23rd China cancelled her recognition of the Russian officials. The following day she took over the Russian concessions in various cities.

This step naturally gave much encouragement to the Far Eastern Republic mission. Lest they presume upon the circumstances, however, China, still acting under the influence of France and Japan, and their insistent warnings against the danger that the mission might use its position to "spread Bolshevist propaganda in China," turned a deaf ear to all of Yourin's requests to open negotiations.

In November, Yourin was able to present his credentials from the five former Governments in the Russian Far East, all of which were now a part of the Far Eastern Republic. Agariev, the Vladivostok representative, became the Vice-President of the mission, and Siberia thus secured unified representation in Peking. Yourin sent a note to the Chinese Government in which he notified it of the favourable progress of affairs in Siberia and assured China of the desire of the Russians not only to treat her fairly now, but to

right the wrongs perpetrated upon China by the old Czarist regime.

China replied by outlining four points which she specified as preliminary to negotiations for a commercial treaty. These were, (1) that the mission should refrain from spreading Bolshevik propaganda; (2) that the new republic should indemnify Chinese merchants for losses and damage suffered by them because of the revolution in Russia; (3) that the republic should protect the lives and remove the restrictions against Chinese in Russia; and (4) that certain specified incidents should be settled at once and steps taken to prevent a recurrence.

Yourin promptly notified China of the willingness of his Government to accept these conditions. China refused to accept this assurance at its face value and asked for proof of the Far Eastern Republic's sincerity. A lengthy list of alleged claims was prepared and their immediate settlement demanded as evidence. Such a settlement would necessitate lengthy investigations upon the part of the republic and effectively delay negotiations for a treaty.

These exasperating tactics in the face of the obvious necessity of a treaty to regulate a trade which in some years has run as high as £13,000,000, were the result of the obstructive efforts of the Japanese advisers in the Chinese Government, who still hoped to prevent any relations between the two republics. They carried their enmity so far as to secure an order to the metropolitan police to refuse Yourin a permit for a lease on a house in Peking, which might be used as a home for the mission. It took some two months to overcome this difficulty.

On the matter of the treaty, however, they have been more successful. Aggravating procrastination and inexcusable delay have marked the conduct of the Chinese officials at every step in the negotiations. Perhaps nothing more clearly illustrates the ineptitude of the Chinese Government and the malign influence

of Japan at Peking than this delay, which has continued to the present time with little show of progress, in the execution of an agreement in which China has everything to gain and nothing to lose. Whatever the future of the Far Eastern Republic, whatever the fate of Soviet Russia, China's legal and diplomatic position would be vastly improved by the execution of such a treaty.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

THE declaration of independence of April 6, 1920, issued by the conference at Verkhne-Udinsk, empowered the Provisional Government to "draft a law and prepare for the convocation of a General Constituent Assembly, which shall be convoked as soon as the reunion of Trans-Baikalia with the other provinces of the Russian Far East has been accomplished, in order to frame a democratic Constitution for the Far Eastern Republic."

November 10th saw this reunion accomplished and the Provisional Government at once took up the task of arranging for elections to such an assembly. While the Vladivostok delegates were still at Chita, it was determined to use the Kerensky election law to govern the elections. January 9, 10 and 11 were designated as the days for holding the elections all over the Far East. A special regulation was adopted, which allowed all soldiers to vote at their stations, one delegate being allotted to each 2,000 men.

Inquiry in every city of the republic failed to bring forth any serious criticism of the manner in which the elections for the Constituent Assembly were conducted. They were not everywhere held on the dates designated, but that is quite in accord with customary Russian procrastination. They were all completed by January 20, and there seems little doubt that everybody had an opportunity to vote and to vote for the man—or woman, for one woman was elected—he or she wished. Even the reactionaries took part, and

THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

General Verzbitsky, the Semenov leader who reoccupied Chita after the first evacuation, was one of the delegates chosen.

Because of the uncertainty of party lines and party designations, it is not possible to fix with any accuracy the exact numbers of delegates chosen from the various parties. The Communists were most active in the election campaign and at first claimed a majority of at least 60 per cent. of the Assembly. It soon became apparent, however, that this claim was grossly exaggerated, and that the Communist representation was by no means the majority of the convention.

Vladivostok elected 1 Socialist-Revolutionary, 12 Communists, 1 Menshevik, 1 Progressive Democrat, 7 National Democrats and 1 Democrat. Habarovsk reported 4 Communists, 5 Socialist-Revolutionists and 1 Democrat. Nikolsk-Ussuriski sent 3 Communists and 1 Socialist-Revolutionist. Chita elected 1 People's Socialist, 1 Menshevik, 3 Constitutional Democrats, 2 Socialist-Revolutionists, and 4 representatives from the Professional Unions. Verkhne-Udinsk was represented by 1 Communist, 1 House Owner, 3 Mensheviks and 3 Socialist-Revolutionists.

As long as the reports included only the large cities, it seemed as if the great majority of the delegates were to be chosen from the various political parties, but when the members actually began to make their appearance in Chita it soon became evident that not only individual parties but all of them put together were to be relegated to a position of minor importance. For here appeared man after man from the country districts and the small towns who refused to profess allegiance to any party, but simply announced that he was a peasant. By the time the Assembly convened it was discovered that these peasants constituted nearly seventy per cent. of the membership. They organized themselves under the leadership of Slinkin into a group, or "fraction," which was thereafter known as the "Peasant Majority."

The date of meeting was originally set for January 28, but the disordered state of transportation delayed the delegates, and on that date not enough had arrived to open the Assembly. It was postponed to February 5, and then to February 12. On that day the first session was held. It was declared a national holiday, and guns were fired in all cities of the republic in celebration of the significant event. 351 out of the 424 members were present at the opening session. A presidium of 13 members was elected with Shilov at their head. The other members were 6 of them Peasants, 3 Communists, 2 Socialist-Revolutionists and 1 Buriat-Mongol. The Assembly was then opened by a speech from Krasnoschekoff.

The convention once organized, it was possible to learn more details in regard to its personnel. Trans-Baikalia had 64 delegates; Pri-Baikalia 64; Amur and Pri-Amur 118; the Maritime Province 54; and the remaining 51 were Army delegates.

As to age the delegates were divided as follows: 29 deputies were from 20 to 25 years of age; 30 from 25 to 30; 39 from 30 to 35; 46 from 35 to 40; 61 from 40 to 45; 69 from 45 to 50; 44 from 50 to 55; 32 from 55 to 60; and one of 62 years. The average age was between 41 and 42 years.

The great majority of the representatives were Russians. 286 were Great Russians; 41 were Little Russians or Ukrainians; 3 were White Russians; 1 was a Pole; 5 were Jews; 3 were Lithuanians; 1 was an Esthonian; 6 were Buriats; and 5 were naturalized Koreans.

There was a sprinkling of educated man: 16 members were college graduates; 9 had attended college for a longer or shorter time without graduating; 69 were middle school graduates; 15 had attended middle school without graduating; 69 were municipal school graduates; and the remainder were self-educated.

Two of the representatives were ex-members of the

All-Russian Constituent Assembly ; 38 were military men ; 8 had devoted their time to political activity ; 13 had been in public work ; 7 had been Government officials ; 3 were labour union leaders ; 16 were co-operative workers ; 35 were schoolmasters and teachers ; 6 had been Court officials ; 5 were journalists ; 1 was a physician ; 6 were engineers; 2 were postal employees ; 2 were railwaymen. There were 1 statistician, 1 accountant, 7 clerks, 1 office keeper, 1 chauffeur, 2 shop foremen, 15 workmen, and the rest were farmers and peasants.

The method of procedure of the convention was for each group or "fraction" to meet in caucus, debate each measure before the Assembly, determine its own view by majority vote and then to go into the convention session and vote as a unit on the measures discussed. In this way the Peasant Majority secured absolute control of every committee and every action of the Assembly. The work of the other parties resolved itself into an attempt to convince the Peasant party in argument and debate and then to wait for the verdict from the Peasant caucus. Thus the Peasant Majority became a court of last resort for the adoption or rejection of the projects of the various political groups. One pet theory after another came to the judgment, was presented, listened to, passed upon, and either found a place in the Constitution or was rejected as a part of the fundamental law.

There was nowhere near the amount of disagreement between the various groups that might have been expected. Three years of civil war had chastened the theorists. They were willing to concede much of their cherished programmes to secure unity and peace. And then the formation of the republic itself was the result of a compromise and agreement upon a fairly definite programme. Democracy, private property and independence had been the great issues before the Verkhne-Udinsk conference, and the success of the buffer State idea and the very fact that the present

Assembly was in existence testified to the agreement on these fundamental questions.

So it was that the programme of one party after another was presented to the Assembly, and one must read them with great care to find any marked differences. The Peasant programme was formulated in fourteen points. 1. Equality before the law. 2. Class distinctions abolished. 3. Universal suffrage for all citizens over eighteen years of age. 4. Security of person, property, and freedom of speech, press, meetings, unions, and strikes for all citizens. 5. Freedom of conscience and separation of Church and State. 6. Free compulsory education for all children from six to seventeen years of age. 7. Amnesty to all political offenders "except State criminals, whose fate will be decided by the Constituent Assembly." 8. All citizens from twenty to twenty-two years of age to be subject to call for State defence. 9. Abolishment of death penalty and corporal punishment. 10. Invalids, aged and children, to be cared for by the State. 11. Safety of private property, but private property cannot extend to land, forest, waters or mines. 12. Progressive income tax. 13. All mills, banks, factories, mines, and trading and commercial establishments to be controlled by the State and subject to be nationalized in case of emergency. 14. Development of industry, introduction of foreign capital, concessions, and commercial treaties with other nations.

The statements of the other parties followed much the same lines, there being only slight variations on minor points. Particularly restrained was the Communist declaration. It read in part as follows:

> Private property will be preserved, but the Government will introduce limitations for protecting the interests of the labouring classes. The establishment of co-operative associations, communistic organizations for farming, and city communistic organizations will be encouraged. The introduction of private capital and private enterprise under Government control is desirable. The co-operative associations will also be controlled by the

Government. Foreign capital will be introduced for the development of industry, trade and natural resources. No extra-territoriality rights will be allowed in foreign concessions, nor can they be guarded by foreign troops. All concessions will be redeemed by the State. Foreign capital will be allowed to participate in State enterprises. Workmen will be invited to participate both in work and in the administration of enterprises, thereby developing workmen's self-activity. Labour unions will be invited to take part in leasing concessions so as to establish minimum wages and minimum working hours for labour protection. Land, forests, mines, ores and waters will be declared State property. All free land will be distributed among the poor labouring classes. Natural resources cannot become private property. Ores and mines will be worked by foreign enterprisers and Russian labour associations. Fisheries and gold mines will be handed over by and by to labour unions and organizations. Distribution of land cannot be changed and progressive income tax will be established. Compulsory distribution of farm produce will be abolished and collective bartering will be established. Private property will be allowed to make profits, but profiteering and extra profits will not be allowed.

One declaration stood out from the general run. It was that of the Buriat-Mongols, who had organized themselves into a "fraction." Their statement was as follows :

There must be no party differences nor animosity among the members of the Constituent Assembly. All parties are united for the salvation of the country from foreign intervention and reaction. The Constituent Assembly must issue without delay laws guaranteeing full self-determination of tribes. The Buriat-Mongols are already enjoying autonomy, their frontier fixed including the former Russian Government's immigration land, and also the former Czar's State cloister land, which was expropriated by the Czar's Government for the Russification of the Buriats. All mines and ores in the Buriat-Mongol territory are recognized as the property of the Buriat-Mongols. They are granted the right of establishing direct trade relations with foreign markets. The local industry is controlled by the Buriat-Mongol administration. The Buriat-Mongols firmly believe that their aims and wishes will be realized to the fullest extent by the recognition of all their rights for self-determination and complete autonomy.

The chief feature of nearly all the declarations, and the one which furnished a source of absolute unity, was

the demand for the cessation of foreign intervention. The Japanese had sent a mission, headed by Major Mike, to watch the proceedings of the convention, and the Major must have been able to report to his Government entire unanimity on the intervention question.

By February 22, all preliminaries were completed and a committee of eleven was appointed to draft the Constitution. The work of this committee was to be reviewed by a committee of thirty-five before it was submitted to the full Assembly. The Peasant Majority had an absolute majority of both these committees. On the second committee were 18 Peasants, 12 Communists, 1 Socialist-Revolutionist, 2 Mensheviks, and 2 Buriats.

While these committees were at work, the Constituent Assembly turned its attention to the foreign relations of the country. A greeting and appeal for assistance was sent to the Congress of the United States on March 11. Announcements of the basic principles of the new Government and requests for the opening of trade and diplomatic relations were sent to various countries.

The Provisional Government came in for a large share of criticism and some rather bitter speeches were made. It was accused of inefficiency, of accomplishing nothing, of deliberately delaying the unification of the Far East, and of various other shortcomings. A vote of confidence was finally passed by a large majority, however, and the Government was requested to remain in office until the Constitution was worked out and a new Government could be established.

In April the Assembly took up the question of amnesty and on the 23rd adopted a law on the subject. This law granted amnesty to all who had participated in the activities of Kolchak, Semenov, Kalmikov and other counter-revolutionaries, "provided evidence can be produced that there was no execution or plunder of people's property committed." All those who had fled

with the retreating bands were forgiven if they returned to the territory of the republic within two months of the publication of the act. The terms of all those already convicted of reactionary crimes was reduced to five years. Partisans were also forgiven military crimes except murder, execution and looting.

By the end of April the Constitution had been agreed upon and on the 29th a permanent Government was elected. This consisted of Krasnoschekoff, president, Matveev, vice-president, Klark, Slinkin, Shilov, Bondarenko and Borodin. Nikiferov was appointed President of the Council of Ministers, and requested to form a Cabinet. The Constituent Assembly constituted itself the National Assembly to continue in existence until the election of its successor in 1923.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC

THE Constitution, which represents the chief work of the Constituent Assembly, is a formidable document. Following the precedent of a number of recent American State constitutions, its 184 articles contain many provisions which would be better left to general legislation. For instance, four pages are devoted to the machinery of local government ; two to a national auditing system ; a page to the regulation of the hours of labour ; and two and a half pages to the matter of budget and taxes. Not that these are not subjects of interest, even of great importance, but they fall more properly under the classification of legislation than that of constitutional law.

"The supreme power of the State is vested in the people of the Far Eastern Republic." Who, then, are the people of the Far Eastern Republic? They are (1) all Russian citizens born in the territory of the republic ; (2) all Russian citizens who were living in the territory at the date of the declaration of independence (April 6, 1920) ; (3) all Russian citizens who came into the country after the declaration of independence or who shall come in after the publication of the Constitution without taking steps to preserve their citizenship in Soviet Russia ; (4) all Russian citizens living in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone who do not in a similar way acquire citizenship in Soviet Russia or some other country ; and (5) all naturalized foreigners.

The legislative power in national affairs is vested in the National Assembly, which is elected by universal suffrage of citizens over eighteen years of age, including women. One member is chosen for each 15,000 of the population and each Assembly is elected for two years. The Assembly must meet on the first of February and the first of November of each year, or oftener if it desires, and the length of its sessions is within its own discretion, except that it must discontinue during the harvest season.

The powers of the National Assembly are enumerated as follows :

1. The enactment of laws governing the State and social life.
2. The approval of treaties with foreign countries.
3. The regulation of the country's finances, internal and external.
4. The arrangement of the money system and the establishment of weights and measures.
5. The organization of the Army.
6. Supreme control over the administration of the republic.
7. The granting of amnesty.
8. The declaration of war and the conclusion of peace.
9. All other questions which the National Assembly shall deem necessary.

The majority of the National Assembly thus has all the power of the English House of Commons without the check of the House of Lords, but it must go to the country every two years. Only in the matter of constitutional amendment is it limited. Amendments must be passed by a two-thirds majority of a two-thirds quorum.

The executive powers of the republic are delegated to a body of seven men, called the "Government." Its members are elected by the National Assembly for a term of two years. This body is a curious mixture of the theories of Government embodied in the American

President, the British Ministry, and a city commission. It undoubtedly has its origin, however, in the Russian custom of electing a "presidium" to conduct a meeting rather than a president after the Anglo-Saxon manner of organization. The chairman of the Government is the nominal head of the republic.

The Government is endowed with the following powers:

1. The appointment and dismissal of all ministers and their assistants.
2. The appointment of diplomatic representatives.
3. The convocation of the National Assembly in extra session.
4. The granting of amnesty.
5. The publication of the laws passed by the National Assembly.
6. The promulgation of provisional laws when the Assembly is not in session.
7. The suspension or annulment of all orders of the Council of Ministers which the Government deems unconstitutional.

Once elected by the National Assembly, the Government is to a certain extent beyond its control. There is no right of recall, nor of re-election unless four of the members have retired. It can veto the laws enacted by the National Assembly and send them back for reconsideration if it deems them contradictory to the fundamental principles of the Constitution. It requires a two-thirds majority to override this veto. When it is overridden, however, any discussion as to constitutionality is apparently at an end for, although the courts are declared to be independent of the other organs of Government, their powers and procedure are to be determined by law. In the case of the promulgation of provisional laws under section 6 above, such laws must be submitted to the next session of the Assembly immediately after it convenes and the Assembly may suspend or annul them.

The direct work of governmental administration is

in the hands of a Council of Ministers, the number, designations and functions of whose members are fixed by special laws except in the case of the Minister of Nationalities, which is established by the Constitution itself. At the present time there are fifteen members of the Council. These are the President of the Council and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, War, Interior, Public Health, Transport, Finance, Education, Labour, Commerce, Food Supply, Justice, Nationalities, Posts and Telegraphs, and Industry.

The Ministers individually and as a body are responsible not only to the Government, but also to the National Assembly and, in case the latter withdraws its confidence, must resign. Ministers must answer all questions submitted by the Assembly and are subject to impeachment for criminal offences as well as to political responsibility.

The Government and the Council of Ministers form a body which corresponds roughly to the American President and Cabinet. It is not named, but is vested with the following powers :

1. The general governance of the country and the direction of its domestic and foreign policies.

2. The organization of the military forces of the republic.

3. Preliminary consideration of questions of peace and the adoption of measures for the defence of the republic.

4. The contracting of loans, concessions, customs, commercial and other treaties, subject to the approval of the National Assembly.

5. The drafting of the preliminary budget.

A large measure of local self-government is provided for and, in actual practice, because of the lack of money on the part of the Central Government, the local powers are being increased even beyond the amount usually demanded. Powers locally exercised must be locally financed.

The general form of the local administrative organs

follows very closely the national organization. There is a Provincial Assembly in each of the five provinces, with one representative to each 2,500 citizens. This Assembly exercises over provincial affairs practically the same control that the National Assembly does over national affairs. It elects a provincial "Board of Administration" corresponding to the Government, which serves as a provincial executive. In addition to its duties in regard to purely provincial affairs, this local Government is also charged with the enforcement of the laws enacted by the Central Government.

In order to supervise this last matter in particular, and to maintain harmonious relations generally between the Central Government and the provinces, a species of proconsul known as a Provincial Emissar is appointed by the Central Government to each province. This Emissar is vested with the power to "control" the actions of the local authorities and is in direct charge of all the officers and instrumentalities of the Central Government within his province.

The smaller units, such as the county, the city and the village, all have their local Assemblies, elected for two years in the case of the counties and the larger cities, and for one year in the rural districts. The village Assemblies consist of all of the citizens of the village and are an exact parallel of the New England town meeting. They work through an executive committee chosen for not less than six months nor more than a year. These local Assemblies will serve not only to manage local affairs but also as excellent schools of citizenship for the more responsible work of the Provincial and National Assemblies.

An exceptional feature of local Government is the provision of the Constitution granting the "full right of self-determination" to all native nationalities and national minorities. This can hardly mean what it says and is not to be looked upon as more than a grant of autonomy in internal affairs to those national groups which are sufficiently self-conscious and suffi-

ciently organized to exercise it. It applies particularly to the Buriat-Mongols, who number about 100,000 in the territory of the republic and are organized into tribes in the neighbourhood of Chita and Verkhne-Udinsk. They are to be assigned a special territory, somewhat after the manner of the Indian Territory of former days in the United States, and within that sphere will do largely as they please under the general supervision of the Government, represented by the Minister of Nationalities.

The judicial system is a distinct departure from the precedents of the western nations. While the courts are declared to be independent of the other Government organs, nevertheless the composition, powers and procedure of the courts and the qualifications and term of office of the judges are under the control of the legislature. The interesting departure is that citizens of the republic assist in the administration of justice not as jurymen but as judges. These citizen judges are drawn by lot from the roster of citizens and each man must serve for ten cases. The regular judges handle all *ex-parte* motions and probate matters but in any trial there must be at least two citizens associated with the judge, and in any case involving the heavier punishments there must be six such judges. In the event of dissatisfaction an appeal may be taken to a court composed of five of the regular judges sitting as a single court. This court examines the record of the case, and if in its opinion there has been an actual miscarriage of justice, it may send the case back for retrial before another judge. No decision must be reversed on matters of procedure only. There is no appeal from the decision of the higher court.

The Bill of Rights of the new Constitution includes equality before the law ; the abolishment of all class distinctions, class privileges and all civil and military titles ; liberty of conscience ; separation of Church and State ; free speech ; freedom of the press ; and right of assembly, to form unions and to strike. All citizens,

their homes and correspondence, are declared inviolable. The right of habeas corpus is provided for. Censorship of the post, telegraph and telephone messages is forbidden. Right of changing the dwelling-place and of free movement within or without the territory of the republic is guaranteed except in cases provided by law. Bodily and capital punshmenit are for ever forbidden. Each citizen has the right to use his native language in communications to officials and in private books. Foreigners are granted all the rights of citizens except as definitely restricted by law.

So far there is no radical departure from the established principles of democratic Government as it is understood in the West. When we come to Division "V," however, with its provisions governing land, labour and the economic system, we strike debatable ground. "Private ownership of lands, forest, waterways and other national resources . . . is for ever annulled. All land in whose soever use or possession it may be is declared to be the property of the toiling people and forms the national funds."

"Here is Communism!" say the unfriendly critics.

"The institution of private property is preserved. All citizens and private companies are guaranteed the inviolability of their movable and immovable properties and estates with the restrictions provided by the principal laws." So answers the Constitution.

This is not Communism, but can the two apparently contradictory provisions be reconciled? A glance at the historical aspect of the matter is of assistance in arriving at a conclusion. Before the revolution, the best lands, mines and forests in Siberia were known as the "Cabinet lands." That is they were held as the property of the Czar and his henchmen. These properties were held out of use altogether or worked by criminals for official enrichment. This situation gave point to the arguments of the advocates of Socialism in the Constituent Assembly against speculation in land.

It was the peasants themselves, the men who owned

land and who wanted the privilege of owning land, who put the nationalization clause into the Constitution. They followed it with the provision that "the fundamental and general principle of the right to work on the land is personal labour." The whole plan is directed toward the elimination of absentee landlordism and land speculation. The man who uses the land has a right to what it produces, subject to the eminent domain of the State.

The apparent conflict comes from the fact that the words which are translated "immovable properties and estates" do not in Russian, as they do in English, include land. They correspond rather to the term "fixtures" as used in connection with English law of real property. That is, buildings, fences, walls, and other improvements to real property are the property of the one who builds them or his vendee. The title to the land itself remains in the State, but the actual benefit from its use accrues to the holder as long as he devotes it to a reasonable use.

The net result of the provisions and the actual intent of those who drew them is not far from the system of land-holding in the United States with a highly progressive beneficial use tax, such as is now advocated in many American States, superadded. Speculation in land without development is eliminated as a source of possible profit for capital in the Far Eastern Republic. There is nothing in the Constitution which need cause any fear for the safety of investments for actual development work.

Concessions are especially provided for in the Constitution. These may be for the exploitation of land, forests, waterways and other natural resources. They may be granted to individuals, societies or companies for any period not exceeding thirty-six years. Foreigners as well as citizens may secure concessions although, other things being equal, preference must be given to citizens of the republic or of Soviet Russia. Companies are preferred to individuals. All concessions, in order

to be valid, must receive the approval of the National Assembly.

"Work is obligatory upon all citizens of the republic." But when the work is for an employer, it is to be done under various restrictions. A day's work must not exceed eight hours by day or six hours by night. Persons under eighteen years or those engaged in unhealthful occupations must not work more than six hours a day. An uninterrupted weekly rest of forty-two hours must be provided for all workers. Overtime work is only allowed with the consent of the unions, except in agricultural labour, where, however, more than eight hours' work entitles the labourer to extra compensation. No night work is allowed for boys under eighteen years of age and it is not permitted at all for women. Children under sixteen years cannot be employed. Women must be released from manual work eight weeks before and eight weeks after confinement. In the case of other work the time is reduced to six weeks. Workers are entitled to one month's vacation on full pay after a year's work, or to two weeks' vacation on the same terms after six months' work.

A minimum wage for all occupants is fixed from month to month by the Government, and all employers are bound to pay at least this wage. As the minimum wage is also obligatory upon the Government itself, it is not likely for some years to come to be high enough to seriously affect private employers. In addition to the actual wage schedule, employers are required to pay to the Government monthly, as premium on the various forms of State social insurance in force, a sum equal to ten per cent. of their payrolls.

The power to levy taxes is vested in the National Assembly. The principle revenue is to be derived from a progressive income tax, a property tax, a tax on title-deeds, inheritance tax, a tax on surplus values, etc., and the income from State enterprises and monopolies.

Universal military training on the militia system is

compulsory for all male citizens between eighteen and forty-five years of age. The standing Army shall consist of all male citizens of twenty years, who are enrolled for two years. Volunteers to the number prescribed by law are accepted. The formation and organization of the Army are determined by the National Assembly but the supreme command is vested in the Government.

All citizens, and especially the labouring classes, must be provided with an opportunity for a "broad education." Instruction in religious teachings and all religious services are forbidden in both Government and private schools. Education is compulsory and free of charge for all children of school age. Co-education is to be the rule in all Government schools. All nationalities may introduce their own language in their own schools.

The flag of the republic is red with the upper left-hand quarter blue. On this blue field are the letters "D. V. R." in red arranged in the form of a triangle.

Amendments to the Constitution do not require the action of a special convention or any other form of special approval by the people. The National Assembly is in fact a permanent constitutional convention. Amendments may be proposed at any time by one-third of all the members of the National Assembly present at the place of its session; by any Provincial Assembly; by the Government; and by petition of 10,000 citizens. For their adoption, it is necessary to secure an attendance of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Assembly and the amendment must receive a two-thirds vote of the Assembly so attended.

CHAPTER XV

THE MEN AT THE HELM

In estimating the character of a newly established State, it is as necessary to know the men who are chosen to administer the laws as it is to know the laws they are to administer. Particularly is this true in the case of the Far Eastern Republic, where the new Government has been born not only of the forces of political revolution, but of social and economic revolution as well. The men who have risen to leadership and assumed responsible positions in the administration of the new State are now sufficiently well known so that a fair estimate of their characters can be made.

The outstanding figure is Krasnoschekoff, the first President of the Government. Alexander Michailovitch was born of poor Jewish parents in the Province of Kiev, in Russia, on December 19, 1880. The family name of his parents, and also of his grandparents—they were not always the same in old Russia—was Krasnoschekoff. This name is not, therefore, as has often been asserted by the enemies of the new republic, an assumed one. There have been occasions where an assumed name was necessary, but this is his real one.

At the age of five Alexander entered the local school, and soon distinguished himself as a good student. By the time he was thirteen he was editor of the school paper, and was well versed in the revolutionary literature of the 'sixties. In 1896, his father, though very poor, took him to the city of Kiev to prepare

for the university. His first teacher was Uritsky, who had a great influence on the young student. He joined a revolutionary "circle for the emancipation of the working-class," and, soon afterward, the Social-Democratic party, the most radical of the Socialist parties of Russia.

Young Krasnoschekoff became an organizer for this party, and from the very beginning was popular with the workers and the peasants as a propagandist. In 1898, the organization was broken up by the Czarist gendarmes, and Krasnoschekoff was arrested and sentenced to six months in prison. At the expiration of his term he was exiled to Nikolaievsk, on the River Bug, where he renewed his revolutionary activity under the leadership of Leon Trotsky. Soon afterwards, when Trotsky was arrested, his young lieutenant succeeded him in the leadership of the local organization.

But Russian revolutionary workers could not remain long in one place and stay out of jail. So Krasnoschekoff left Nikolaievsk and went to Kremenchuk, and then to Poltava in the Ukraine. Here he worked with Martov, now characterized by the Bolsheviks as a "reactionary" revolutionist. Already the young man was compelled to live under an assumed name, for his success had attracted the attention of the police. He organized the first public demonstration in South Russia, and then settled in Ekaterinoslav, on the Dnieper, where he began the organization of the first South Russian Proletariat Association. While a leader of this body, he several times led them to armed conflict with the police. He was again arrested and imprisoned for nine months, after which, in 1901, he went back to Kiev.

But he was now a marked man, and the police were preparing to send him to Siberia. Fortunately for him, his party also appreciated his value to the revolutionary cause, and they sent him "underground" to Berlin. After a short stay there, he made his way to America,

where he lived until 1917. In the United States he came immediately into association with, and under the influence of, the most radical of the reformers, both Socialists and Anarchists. He took the name of Stroller Tobinson to avoid persecution by the Czar's emissaries in America.

He became first a tailor and then a paper-hanger, at which trade he worked for some years. But always his chief interest was in the Socialist movement. In 1906 he took an active part in the organization of the Industrial Workers of the World, travelling for them as an organizer, though he himself never joined, as he was a member of the American Federation of Labour. During this time he was organizer, journalist, and lecturer, but always a student. His was no loud-mouthed frothing, but the sincere speech of a man who has considered well, and is deeply convinced that he is right.

Returning to Chicago, he worked at his trade in the daytime, and at night devoted himself to study in the University of Chicago. He received his Bachelor's degree in 1912, and a short time thereafter was graduated in law. This was the goal of his hope, and he was at once able to secure practice and experience in his new profession, for the "bread strike" prosecutions of 1913 brought him a numerous clientele, whom he ably defended. After these cases were disposed of, he became the head of the Chicago Workers' Institute, and lectured on social and political subjects to hundreds of Russian and American workmen.

While circumstances had driven him to exile in America, Krasnoschekoff's heart was still in Russia, and when the news of the revolution was flashed over the world in March of 1917, he started at once with his wife and two children for Vancouver, and there took ship for Japan. In Japan there was a Kerensky Commission, which was carefully examining those who wished to enter Russia. This Commission detained him a few days, but eventually decided to allow him to enter.

He landed in Vladivostok in the early part of August 1917, with hardly a penny in his pocket. He secured almost at once the secretaryship of the Domestic Servants Union, but this only paid him six roubles a month—and that in paper! He had with him two small typewriters, one Russian and one English. He sold the Russian one for 500 roubles, which enabled him to get a room for his family. His union sent him to the Vladivostok Soviet, and he was also elected to the City Council of Labour Unions. Once more he was in politics.

At this time the City Council of Nikolsk-Ussuriski was looking for a Menshevik member. Krasnoschekoff was openly and avowedly a member of the Bolshevik wing of the Social Democratic Party, but through some error he was appointed to the vacant office. So, with his family, he moved to Nikolsk, and took up his new work. At that time the mayor of the city was Medveviev, who raised some objections to the Bolshevist ideas of the new council member, but the matter was adjusted to his satisfaction, and Krasnoschekoff remained.

Within two weeks after his arrival in the city Krasnoschekoff was elected President of the Soviet of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers of Nikolsk. The end of October the first convention of workers' organizations in the Far East was called at Vladivostok. Krasnoschekoff was sent to this, and became its vice-president. Here he drafted the first by-laws for labour unions in the Far East. It was while this convention was in session that the news of the Bolshevik revolution in Petrograd arrived. The convention broke up over the question of recognition of the new authority.

Krasnoschekoff had not then come to see the necessity of separating the Russian Far East from a communistic Russia, and warmly advocated recognition. He went back to Nikolsk and called a labour conference there. This conference decided to organize the Soviet movement in the Maritime Province. It summoned a conference of all the Soviets of the Russian

Far East to meet at Habarovsk on December 11. The story of its conflict there with the convention of the Zemstvos has already been told.

Here the life of Krasnoschekoff merges in the story of the Russian Far East, with which the reader is already familiar. Whatever may be the future in store for the republic he has done so much to establish, his has been a remarkable career. He has devoted his life to the pursuit of an ideal in which he deeply and sincerely believes. Becoming convinced, after a few months in the Far East, that the only helpful solution of the problem here demanded a democratic State instead of a communistic one, he has worked beyond the limit of his strength to this end. If it is not ultimately successful, it will be because a destiny far beyond the power of any one man to control has decreed otherwise.

And through it all, Krasnoschekoff is a lovable character. His fund of good humour is apparently inexhaustible. His tact is limitless. There is nothing of the swagger or assumption in his bearing which there might have been with a smaller man. His philosophy is deeply ingrained in his life. Though president of a republic he is still "comrade" to the meanest working-man. He is a man of culture and attainments. He speaks three languages, and has read much of the great literature of the world. His boon companion is a professor of the University of Moscow, who would be welcome in the drawing-rooms of respectability anywhere. With him he delves deep into philosophy. He knows his Nietzsche, his James, and his Einstein. And to hear him read from the modern Russian poets is to add the final touch of colour to the picture of a man whom later generations will call "great," if the fates shall grant permanence to the republic to which he has given so much of his life.[1]

[1] Dispatches from Chita state that Krasnoschekoff has been allowed a leave of absence to recuperate his health. The hard work and exposure of the last few years have resulted in tuberculosis.

The second figure in the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, the man who performs the functions of vice-president, though there is no such office, is Nicholas Matveev. Matveev is a Cossack, born in Za-Baikal in 1887. He graduated from the School of Mining Engineering at Nertchinsk. In 1896 he joined the Army as a one-year "volunteer," under the old plan for students pursuing a higher education. The following year he went to the military school in Irkutsk, but soon became involved in revolutionary activity, and was expelled and deprived of the right to take examinations for a commission in the Army. In 1899 he became surveyor or inspector for the Za-Baikal Cossack districts. In this service he came to know many political exiles, who confirmed him in his revolutionary tendencies, and he became a worker among the Cossacks. In 1901 he resigned his position to enter the Polytechnic School at Kiev. He was soon arrested, expelled, and deprived of the privilege of entering any university. From that time to 1910 his story is one of repeated arrests and escapes, of revolutionary work all over Russia, of constant struggle to better the conditions of his fellow-men.

In 1910, when reaction was at its height, and revolutionary work almost impossible, Matveev went back to Petrograd and engaged in literary work, writing for many of the foremost journals. When the World War broke out, he worked as a mechanic in a metal-works in Petrograd, but after four months he was expelled for his bad influence on the men. He was active in the March Revolution, and held a number of offices under the new regime.

Late in March, however, he received a call back to his home in Siberia. At a conference of the rural districts he was elected President of the Za-Baikal Cossacks. He was at once sent back to Moscow to the All-Cossack conference on a remarkable mission. He went, not to take part in the conference, but to inform the conference that the Cossacks of Za-Baikal refused

to take part because, now that the revolution had come, they chose to be considered Cossacks no longer. They would claim no special privileges under the new regime. Had this decision been unanimous instead of by a large majority, Trans-Baikalia would have been spared many sorrows in the ensuing years.

Towards the end of 1917 Matveev joined the Communist party. He assisted in the establishment of the Soviet regime in Za-Baikal, was Commissar of the Interior, President of the Soviet Congress, and Vice-President of the Revolutionary General Staff. When the Soviet regime was overthrown by the Czechs he became a Partisan. He was taken prisoner by the Japanese, and kept in confinement for a year. He was freed upon the overthrow of the Kalmikov regime in Habarovsk, and at once became active in the work of reorganizing the country. He held many offices, and was finally made War Minister in the Provisional Government of the Far Eastern Republic. He was elected a member of the permanent Government by the Constituent Assembly.

A romantic figure in the group of seven is Dimitri Shilov, who was elected to the Government after serving as President of the Constituent Assembly. Shilov was born near Nertchinsk, in 1893, and educated in the local school. In 1912 he tried to establish a revolutionary organization among the students in Trans-Baikal, and to enter into relations with the political exiles. He was threatened with expulsion unless he ceased his activities. He replied that a diploma was not necessary to enable a man to help the people, and he left the school rather than continue under the old regime. For this sacrilegious utterance, and his subsequent action, he was prosecuted and imprisoned for four months.

Upon his release young Shilov began his year's "voluntary" service in the Army, and then entered the People's University at Moscow. There he organized a communistic club among a few of his fellow-

students. They did not have enough for all to remain in school, so they drew lots to see which should remain, and Shilov was not among the winners. He returned to Chita and taught school to secure money to send back for the education of the others.

In 1914 he was called to the Army. He had no desire to serve in the forces of the Czar, and tried to escape. He did not succeed, however, and was sent to the military school at Irkutsk, where he graduated as a company commander. By the time of the March revolution Shilov was commanding a battalion on the Persian front. This front was far from the centre of things, and was neglected in the press of other business. Shilov accepted the burden of revolutionary organization there, and was sent as a delegate to the Army conference. In December he returned to Chita, and became an active worker for the establishment of the Soviet regime there. He became Emissar for Stretensk and Nertchinsk.

In March of 1918 he began his active opposition to Semenov, by the organization of Partisans. When the Partisan force grew to the proportions of an army, Shilov became its commander. It was largely due to his efforts in organization work, and his success in obtaining the co-operation of the Amur Partisans, that Semenov and the Japanese were finally driven from Za-Baikal.

The youngest member of the Government, and one of the keenest, is N. V. Slinkin. Slinkin was born in Tobolsk Government, in Siberia, in 1899. His parents were middle-class peasants. In 1905 the family emigrated to the Maritime Province, and settled in the neighbourhood of Irkutsk. Here the father became a labourer, and was sufficiently successful to provide a tutor for his son.

In 1916, Slinkin began teaching in the primary school. Here he came into contact with the village life, saw the hardships under which the people suffered, and became a revolutionary. He took an active part

in the work of organization that followed the March revolution, but when the Czechs took the Province, he went back to teaching. He did not, however, discontinue his revolutionary activities, but carried on a constant agitation against intervention and the foreign-supported Kolchak regime.

With the overthrow of Kolchak, Slinkin became the President of the local Government of Olginsk, where he lived, and after the Government of the Maritime Province recognized the Chita authority, he devoted himself wholeheartedly to the work of organizing the new Government. He was elected to the Constituent Assembly, and was then chosen as the head of the Peasant Majority fraction. This position gave him perhaps more influence than any other man in the Assembly, except such outstanding figures as Krasnoschekoff, Nikiferov, and Shilov. Slinkin is not a Communist, but a firm believer in the ability of the Siberian people to work out their future through an elective democracy, if only they can be freed from foreign interference backed by overwhelming force.

The third Communist member of the Government is Klark. Born in 1887, Klark became active as a revolutionary at the age of eighteen, when he joined the Social Democratic Party at Chita. In 1909 he went to Australia to escape prosecution. While there he became secretary of the Russian Society, and editor of a Russian paper. While there, also, he was imprisoned for a speech which he made at a labour meeting.

In October of 1917 he returned to Siberia, became a member of the Irkutsk Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, and later chief of the executive committee of the workers on the Za-Baikal Railway. During the Czech and Kolchak rule, he lived in hiding in Vladivostok. After the overthrow of Kolchak, Klark became Minister of Transport in the Maritime Province, and also served as secretary of the People's Assembly. After the union of the Governments he

was elected a delegate to the Constituent Assembly, and was there made a member of the presidium, and later elected to the Government.

Bondarenko is the son of an Amur peasant. He was born in the village of Ivanovskaia, in 1887. He was sent to Tomsk for his education, and there became particularly interested in political economy. In 1905 he returned to his home, and began work as a farmer. In 1914 he was drafted into the Army, was wounded, and returned home. In 1918 he became Chairman of the Ivanovskaia Zemstvo. He took part in the fighting on the Ussuri front, and after the peasants were defeated there, became a Partisan, and fought in the Amur forces until the Japanese were driven from Blagoveschensk. While in the hills he edited a Partisan paper, called the "Revolutionary Call." He was one of the organizers of the Amur Revolutionary Government, and was elected as a peasant representative for Ivanovskaia to the Constituent Assembly. The Peasant Majority chose him as a member of the Government.

Borodin, like Matveev, was a Za-Baikal Cossack. He was born in the village of Zaganov, in 1875. His education was such as he could work out at home as a farmer lad. He took an active part in work for agricultural improvement, and in the various activities of the co-operative societies. His farming interests were mostly in cattle, and he owned much stock before the civil war. When Semenov entered Trans-Baikal, he drove off Borodin's cattle, robbed and burned his house.

Borodin was then President of the district Zemstvo. He left his home for the hills, and became a Partisan. He was soon President of the Military Council of Five, in whom was vested the chief command of the southern Za-Baikal Partisans. It was this army that attacked Olovayannaya and Borzia, and finally drove Semenov out into Manchuria.

Borodin is not a party man, nor has he become interested in the fine points of Socialist philosophy. He

believes in the Far Eastern Republic as a free democracy, and does not want to see any dictatorship, of the proletariat or otherwise. Communism he believes to be impossible of success in Siberia, even if the country had remained a part of Soviet Russia. He is a typical sturdy, practical, democratic Siberian.

Thus the members of the Government stand three Communists and three Peasants, with Shilov not an avowed member of either group. He seems to have been satisfied, from his early experiments with Communism, that it is not fitted for practical use in Eastern Siberia, and has aligned himself with the Peasant Majority to such an extent that they trust him absolutely as one of themselves. The Government is therefore under the control of the large Peasant Majority.

Only less important than the members of the Government in giving character to the administration of the republic are the more important members of the Council of Ministers. While the ultimate control of affairs rests with the Government through its power to appoint and relieve ministers, in the actual work of administration they sit as one body and all are to be heard. A few strong characters stand out in the Council of Ministers, and their influence is large in the decisions of that body.

Foremost among these is Nikiferov, the President of the Council. Nikiferov was born of peasant parents in the Irkutsk Government in 1882. At the age of thirteen he left home to work as an electrician's apprentice. He worked his way to Russia, and by the time he had reached his majority was thoroughly imbued with revolutionary ideas, and became a member of the Bolshevik wing of the Social-Democratic Party. He was arrested in the Crimea in 1906, and imprisoned for a year and a half. He renewed his activities after his release, and in 1909 was rearrested and sentenced to seven years' hard labour at Irkutsk.

He was freed by the revolution, and went at once to Vladivostok, where he worked in the railway shops.

IGNATIUS YOURIN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

He was elected to the Workers' Soviet, and became vice-president of the executive committee. When the Czechs seized the city in 1918, Nikiferov was at once arrested, and spent the entire period of the Kolchak regime in jail. Even there, however, his influence was widespread, and a large following always heeded his decision in important questions.

He was set free when the Partisans drove Rezanov out of Vladivostok, and at once became a member of the new Temporary Government. He had consistently advocated a democratic Government for the Russian Far East, ever since the Bolshevist revolution. This, too, in spite of his party affiliation. He was the leading figure of the delegation from the Maritime Province which finally agreed upon the terms of union with the Verkhne-Udinsk Government, and has since been one of the central figures in the organization of the new republic.

After the November conference, which ended the negotiations between the two ends of the Far East, Nikiferov went to Moscow to bring his wife back to Chita. He saw the Moscow authorities on this trip, but had no official dealings with them. He returned in time to take part in the Constituent Assembly to which he had been elected from Vladivostok. He was not destined to be present at its sessions, however, until it was near the time for adjournment, for upon his arrival in Chita he was taken ill with typhus, and was confined to his bed. Nonetheless, he worked at the draft of the Constitution day after day, and his share in its shaping was a large one.

Nikiferov is a typical son of the soil. His appearance suggests that there is in his veins a strain of the blood of those who inhabited the country before the Russians came. He is slow of speech, and most unaggressive in his whole manner. He does not impress one as a leader, and yet he is trusted and loved even by his most active political opponents. He carries his responsibility as a heavy load, but his countrymen

repay him in the respect which they have for his opinion.

The most picturesque figure in the Council of Ministers, and the one who has been most prominent in the dealings of the new republic with other countries, is Ignatius Yourin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yourin is a Russian of the Russians, a polished gentleman of "the old school," if one may dare to use that expression in connection with any leader in the new Russia. He speaks French fluently and English passably, is an ideal host, and meets all comers with an affability which is most winning. He inevitably brings up recollections of the suave Russian diplomats of the days of the Empire. Yet Yourin's revolutionary record is unimpeachable. He has been an active revolutionary worker for years, and his part in the recent upheavals has been no small one.

Yourin was born in European Russia in the early 'eighties. He graduated from the Institute of Natural Sciences in Moscow, where he specialized in botany. Finding the life of a botanist too vegetative, he decided to seek a field of greater activity, and chose the Army. Here his connections with the Russian nobility stood him in good stead, and he rose to be a colonel in the Imperial Guards. Like most Russians with a conscience, however, he had no sympathy for the Czarist regime, and became an active worker for revolution, his position rendering the task an especially perilous one in his case.

When the revolution came, he at once became one of its military leaders. When the great drive against Kolchak began in the fall of 1919, Yourin was high in the councils of the Soviet troops. He was among those who listened to Krasnoschekoff's plan for a buffer State at the Tomsk meeting in January, 1920. He was impressed with the plan and with its proposer. Also Krasnoschekoff conceived a great liking for this favoured son of the old regime who had devoted himself to its overthrow.

When Krasnoschekoff left Irkutsk in March to travel eastward until he found a place where he could set up his new State, the march of the Red troops eastward had ended. Krasnoschekoff asked Yourin to come with him and help in building up the buffer State. Yourin assented, applied for and secured his release from the military service, and joined Krasnoschekoff. Since that day he has been one of the most valued advisers to the new Government. He was at Krasnoschekoff's side when the declaration of independence was drafted. He assisted in the campaign against Semenov and the Japanese. After they were disposed of, he was placed in charge of the mission to China. Against the greatest odds, he made the new republic known and favourably considered in the Chinese capital, where he remained until the latter part of May, 1921. Then he went to Chita, at the request of the new Government, to become Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Another powerful man in the Council of Ministers is Dr. Fedor Petrov, the Minister of Health, who has been acting-president during Nikiferov's illness. Dr. Petrov is short, well built, quite professional-looking, and one would hardly suspect him of the rather exciting life which his history sets forth. He was born in 1878, and graduated at the University of Moscow twenty-four years later. In 1905 he received his doctor's diploma. He had already been arrested several times for revolutionary activity as a member of the Social-Democratic party. In 1907 he was again arrested at a conference of military revolutionary organizations and sentenced to seven years' hard labour. At the expiration of this sentence he was exiled to Siberia. He settled in the county of Verkhne-Udinsk, where he practised medicine among the peasants and Buriats. He was soon rearrested and imprisoned in Irkutsk, but was released and offered a position by the Governor-General of Irkutsk as a doctor among the refugees who were coming from the invaded districts of European Russia.

Dr. Petrov accepted, but continued his revolutionary activity until 1917, when the time for constructive work began. He was as ready for this as for agitation, and was immediately elected President of the Social-Democratic Committee in Irkutsk. With his political work he continued his medical service among the workers and organized the first refugee home in Irkutsk. In 1918 he was arrested by the Czecho-Slovaks, and was only saved from execution at their hands by the demand of the people of Irkutsk that he be spared because his medical services were so sorely needed. He was active in the overthrow of the Kolchak regime, and supervised the sanitary work among the military units which operated against him. He became the Commissar of Public Health under the Soviet regime, and also served as president of the committee to fight the typhus epidemic. He was at the front with the army which drove out Semenov, and, when the Verkhne-Udinsk Government was formed, became Minister of Health and Chief of the Sanitary Department. In addition to his work as Minister of Health, Dr. Petrov has successfully handled several diplomatic missions of great importance for the new republic.[1]

The stormy petrel of the Council of Ministers is Shatov, the Minister of Transport. Shatov is well-known in the United States as an I.W.W. and general revolutionary worker. He is a splendid example of the product which unrestrained autocracy turns out. He is a revolutionary to the backbone, and glories in it. Wherever there has been an uprising of workers against what they, and he, considered oppression, there went Bill Shatov.

The "Bill" is purely an American acquisition. He was named Vladimir by his parents shortly after his arrival in 1887. His parents were Jews, and the boy had to suffer from the indignities that were heaped upon his race in Russia, and to overcome the difficulties

[1] He was later chief of the delegates at the Dairen Conference.

which were put in their way. In spite of this he finished the Gymnasium, and started in the Technological Institute. His revolutionary tendencies began to make themselves manifest, and young Shatov left Russia to avoid imprisonment, and made his way to the United States.

Here he turned his hand to all kinds of work, from a pick and shovel to the pen of a bank correspondent. This was for his own support. His real work was the organization of the workers for their own advantage. He was associated with every revolutionary in the country, from Haywood to Emma Goldman.

When the news of the Russian revolution of March, 1917, reached him, he set out at once for Petrograd by way of Japan and Vladivostok. He reached Petrograd in June, and from then to the early part of 1920 he was one of the most active participants in the events in Russia, holding over a hundred commissions from the Soviet regime. The last of these took him to Tomsk, to restore the sadly disorganized Siberian railways. When Krasnoschekoff, who had known of Shatov's work, heard he was at Tomsk, he invited him to come to Verkhne-Udinsk and help him in the work there.

Shatov came, and found that it was his military ability that was needed at first. He was made Minister of War in the Provisional Government, and placed in command of the armies on the Amur front. When the time came, he was sent to negotiate with the Japanese, and finally signed the Gongota agreement, under which they agreed to evacuate Za-Baikal. His success in this mission resulted in his appointment as chief of the Military-Diplomatic Mission, which the new Government sent to Vladivostok to negotiate for a similar evacuation there. Before these negotiations could begin, however, Shatov was recalled to Chita in September, 1920, to assume the arduous duties of Minister of Transport and reorganize the shattered railways of the Far East.

Shatov is not as much of a revolutionary as formerly. As is often the case, the actual carrying of responsibility has somewhat mellowed the doctrines which were so firmly insisted upon during his days of agitation. Perhaps Shatov is not so much of a Communist as he was. Not that any such admission could be wrung from him any more than it could from his former associates in Russia. Nevertheless, he has discovered that under a revolutionary regime the men do not work as hard and as regularly as they did under the old capitalistic system. He has come to appreciate more fully the need of a "fair day's work for a fair day's pay." In other words, Shatov the executive has only a mist-to-rain resemblance to Shatov the agitator. The work of the world must be done if the people of the world are going to live, and theories will not do the work.[1]

One other member of the Ministry typifies the man of the Russian Far East so well that he must be mentioned here. Karl Luks was born in Courland in 1888. He completed his education in the Lettish district schools, and after his graduation became interested in the revolutionary movement, in which he at once took an active part. From 1905 to 1916 he spent most of his time in prison in various parts of Russia. He was finally sent to Siberia, and there set free. He settled in Irkutsk Province, west of Baikal, and became an active worker in the co-operative societies. He was first in the Town Council and later Mayor of Nijni-Udinsk, but late in 1917 he became interested in work among the Buriats, and went to Za-Baikal. He continued his work among the Buriats until Semenov arrived at Chita. Then he went into the hills and became a Partisan. Without previous military training he suddenly developed a real military genius. He succeeded Shilov as commander of the Northern Trans-Baikal Partisans, and it was he who drove back the Japanese and finally signed the armistice with them

[1] Dispatches from Chita announce Shatov's resignation on the advice of his physician.

The First "Government."	Born.	Age, 1921.	Party.	Lived in Siberia.	Race.	Previous Occupation.
				Years.		
KRASNOSCHEKOFF	R	42	C	5	J	Painter, Lawyer.
MATVEEV ..	F	44	C	27	R	Government Official.
SHILOV	F	28	—	28	R	Student.
SLINKIN ..	S	22	P	22	R	Teacher.
KLARK	R	34	C	17	R	Journalist.
BONDARENKO ..	F	34	P	34	R	Farmer.
BORODIN ..	F	46	P	46	R	Farmer.

R = European Russia or Russian.
S = Siberia outside the Far Eastern Republic.
F = Far Eastern Republic.
C = Communist.
P = Peasant Majority.
J = Jew.

The Ministry.	Born.	Race.	Age 1921.	Years in Siberia.	Party.	Previous Occupation.
NIKIFEROV .	F	R	40	40	C	Labourer and Revolutionary Organizer.
YOURIN ..	R	R	40	2	C	Army.
BLÜCHER ..	S	R	32	32	C	?
MATVEEV ..	F	R	34	27	C	Revolutionary Organizer.
PETROV ..	R	R	43	7	C	Physician.
SHATOV ..	R	J	34	1½	C	Labour Organizer.
BISONOV ..	?	R	?	?	C	— (absent at time of author's visit).
SCHRABER ..	F	R	33	26	S.-R.	Lawyer.
SHULIKOV ..	?	R	?	?	C	— (absent at time ot author's visit).
GROSSMAN ..	F	J	36	36	C ?	Druggist.
POLYETAIEV	R	R	36	36	C	Exile.
BINASSIK ..	Pol.	J	38	4	C D.	Lawyer.
LUKS	R	Lett	33	5	S.D.	Exile.
PRIKSHAITAS	Pol.	Pole	28	12	C	Postal Service.
ANISIMOV ..	R	R	42	12	S.D.	Teacher.

Key letters same as in previous table, with additions as follows:

S.-R. = Socialist-Revolutionist.
C.D. = Constitutional Democrat.
S.D. = Social Democrat or "Menshevik."

TROUP, Minister of Justice, was appointed just after the author's visit, and information as to history is also incomplete. He is a S.-R. from Vladivostok.

on the Eastern front. The fighting over, Luks returned at once to civil life, and was elected to the Constituent Assembly. After the adoption of the Constitution, he became Minister of Nationalities, a work for which his previous experience with the Buriats eminently qualified him.

Such are typical members of the Administrative Council of the Far Eastern Republic. To describe others would be merely to repeat the main outlines. These are men who without exception have struggled to throw off the yoke of an oppressive autocracy, long since become a disgraceful anachronism in the political world. Their theorizing led them further in argument than they can hope to go in practice. Faced with the actualities of constructive work, they have resigned many of their dreams to follow the example of successful State builders elsewhere.

PART IV

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

CHAPTER XVI

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

THE human material of which these men must fashion their new democracy is uniform neither in kind nor in quality. It has undergone profound changes during the last five years, and these changes would have presented a serious problem to the leaders of an old and well-established State. They vastly complicate matters in the new republic, and render the task of social organization trebly difficult.

One effect of the years of war has been to emphasize the lack of homogeneity in the population of the Russian Far East. In the total population of nearly 2,000,000, the great majority are, of course, Russian. But even among these there are different groups with more or less tendency to separatism. About one-quarter of the whole population are Ukrainians, a people proud of their home and their traditions, who preserve their national dress and customs even in Siberia. They are especially numerous in Amuria and the Maritime Province, where they constitute from 65 to 70 per cent. of the population.

Of Koreans, naturalized as citizens of the old Russia, and their descendants, there are about 40,000, mostly in the Maritime Province. The number of Jews is difficult to estimate because of the frequency of intermarriage with the Christian Russians, but there are at least 10,000 of pure blood who still profess the old faith and practise its forms. Of Tartars there are about 4,000 in the republic proper, and perhaps 2,000

more in the Chinese Eastern Railway zone. Then there are the remnants of the various primitive tribes who still lead the life of their nomadic ancestors, who were in Siberia long before Yermak crossed the Urals.

All of these groups are either sufficiently Russian or sufficiently controllable to present little difficulty when compared to the far more numerous Buriat-Mongal tribes. These are a people of about the stage of development of the American Indians, whom they resemble in many ways. Their men are always on horseback: their women have the short, ungraceful squattiness of the Indian squaws. There are two main divisions of the Buriat-Mongols, who number altogether something over 200,000. One division inhabits the territory along the west side of the Selenga River and the Baikal, and are thus subject to Soviet Russia. The remainder, numbering at least 100,000, are settled in the neighbourhood of Verkhne-Udinsk and Chita.

Engrossed as Siberia was in its own affairs during the years of the war and the peace-making, still her people caught some faint sound of what was going on elsewhere. "A world safe for democracy," "self-determination," "the rights of small nations," and other slogans, reached even this far-distant corner of the world. The founders of the new republic themselves made use of these catchwords in setting forth the right of the Eastern Siberians to exist as a free democratic people. For them, as for others, these ideas were two-edged. The national groups within the territory of the new republic were quick to sense their own advantage in claiming the extension of such doctrines to include themselves.

It was the Buriat-Mongol people, with their tribal organization, in the Russian Far East, but not of it, that presented the most difficult problem to the Constituent Assembly. They had heard, through their watchful leaders, of self-determination and other new and dynamic doctrines in the political world, and they demanded and secured as the price of their adhesion to

the new Government that they should receive by constitutional provision this right of "self-determination."

So it is written in the bond, not only for the Buriats, but for "all native nationalities and national minorities." Just how a court of law would interpret this hitherto undefinitive phrase, "self-determination," and apply it to "all native nationalities and national minorities," it would be hard to say. Let us take a highly suppositious case. Imagine Korea independent: imagine a "national minority" of Koreans living along the Russian coast adjoining the Korean boundary: imagine this minority self-determining that it ought to belong to free Korea. Then imagine any State permitting them to carry out their determination. Yet it is so written in the bond.

To return to facts, however. A fairly complete scheme for national autonomy for the Buriat-Mongols is outlined in the Constitution. The details are yet to be worked out, but in general the plan is that the proper proportion of all moneys which are expended by the State for social purposes, such as public health, education, the various forms of State insurance, etc., shall be paid to the organized national minorities through a special ministry constituted solely for the handling of this matter. This is known as the Ministry of Nationalities, and is the only ministry established by the Constitution.

The policy of the Chita Government is to foster the national cultures of the various national groups. The Minister of Nationalities supervises their national organizations, which he uses in dealing with their respective groups. In addition to fostering national cultures, the Government does what it can through this and other departments to raise the standard of life of the more backward groups. For instance, the hunting tribes, who, under the old system, were practically the slaves of the Chinese and Russian fur merchants, receiving hardly enough for their labours to keep body

and soul together, are being studied with a view to bringing fur trading under Government control, and thus assuring them a decent living.

At the present time there is no indication of racial antagonism between these various national groups, nor between any of them and the Russians. Whether this happy condition can be continued under the forms of democracy is doubtful. Racial differences are excellent materials to the hand of the demagogue. Where all are on an equal footing much trouble can be stirred up. Where special groups enjoy special privileges, whether they are of material value or not, the probability of antagonism is greatly increased. Already it has been demonstrated that the Russian cannot compete economically with the Asian peoples any more than the American or the Australian can. Already this has been a political issue in Siberia. When the Amur Railway was built, the Duma forbade the employment of Chinese labour on the work. That such issues will arise in future under the extremely liberal provisions of the Constitution dealing with separate nationalities is as certain as anything can be in the realm of politics.

Far more serious than the possibilities of such future conflicts of racial or group interests, however, is the condition due to another effect of the changes of the last five years. The tides of war have swept the population back and forth across the vast extent of Russia, and the maelstrom of civil war has washed away the foundations of social organization in Siberia. Families have been broken up. Individuals have been uprooted and cast about until their present whereabouts is a matter of chance rather than choice. In a time when all must suffer, and nobody's situation is too good, they are unsettled, restless. They have lost the sense of permanency. There is no particular reason why they should stay where they are rather than go somewhere else.

Public spirit does not flourish under such conditions. The local Government is of no interest to transients,

because to-morrow may find them in some other town. The provincial Government receives hardly more consideration. Even the national institutions are apt to be vague and far-off things, whose interests are of much less importance to the individual than the things which more immediately affect his personal welfare. Shelter is more than repaired sidewalks : bread is greater than paved streets. Civic pride is a rare virtue. Even patriotism answers only to the call of resistance to reaction or foreign aggression.

The social demoralization is completed by the distorted idea of freedom which is abroad in the land. Every man is a " tavarish "—a comrade. This spirit is much less likely to find its expression in attempts to raise mortals to the skies, than it is in efforts to pull angels down. The ideals of the Russian revolution certainly look towards the lifting of the human level, but its practice inevitably results in lowering it. In a land where all distinctions of class and quality have been abrogated by law, and where there has been no time to re-establish them by custom, the enjoyment of any special privilege arouses instant resentment: possession beyond the average gives rise to the determination, not that all should come into such possession, but that the one should be deprived of it. In America, where some have automobilies and some have not, the social idealist holds out the promise of " an automobile for every family." In Russia, the cry is that " no one should have automobiles." The levelling tendency is constantly downward.

The result is a breakdown of all social control other than governmental. Politeness, courtesy, even consideration, have long since gone by the board. Even the things that the peoples of Anglo-Saxon lands have long considered as " rights " receive scant attention in Siberia. Not legal " rights," but social and customary " rights " are meant. If a man buys a first-class ticket on a boat in England or America, he expects not only a first-class cabin, but the enjoyment with

other first-class passengers exclusively of the saloon, dining-room, and other facilities that are designated "first-class." In Siberia he would be sorely disappointed. He would secure his first-class cabin to be sure. Beyond this, however, he would share everything with the other "tavarishi." A first-class saloon is a far more airy and comfortable place to lay one's bed than the quarters provided for the third-class passengers. And the more enterprising of the third-class passengers are quick to recognize this. All first-class facilities are forthwith converted to third-class use.

Likewise, there is a tendency to sweep away all of the finer things of life in order that no man may be better than another. There is an underlying desire to level everything down preparatory to building up the new civilization, which is to be based on universal equality. That this is a passing phase in Siberia, as it has been in other parts of the world, at the inception of movements towards democracy, cannot be doubted. Nevertheless, even as a passing phase, it makes more difficult the problem of social control, the problem of reorganizing the social life of the new republic.

That the existing demoralization has not penetrated more deeply into the moral life of the people speaks well for the women of Siberia. In a frontier country, where moral standards were never too exacting, the demoralization, following upon years of civil war, might well have resulted in an almost complete abandonment of all standards. Such has not been the case. Many individuals have succumbed to the debasing influence. There is much looseness in sexual relations. But the great majority have retained their respect for the old standards. One sees no attentions forced upon women in the public gardens. A girl may venture forth alone in any city of the republic at any hour of the day or night without fear of annoyance.

Fortunately, the problem of public health is not a difficult one in the new republic. There is comparatively little actual disease to contend with. There is some

dysentery in summer ; occasionally recurring endemic plague ; very little tuberculosis, and, since the typhus was stamped out after the departure of the Kappel troops in 1920, there has been none of that dread disease. In general, the population, young and old, live an active outdoor life, which results in a high average of health.

Nevertheless, the new Government has not neglected the matter of public health. Rather it has taken the stand that as long as conditions are so good they should take advantage of the opportunity to make them better. In the Ministry of Public Health is centred all of the medical work, which in many Governments is scattered through a dozen different administrative organs. Military sanitation, school medical supervision, public hospitals, and home nursing, all come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Health. Its task is the unification and direction of all sanitation work, the cure and prevention of disease throughout the republic.

In the absence of widespread affliction, venereal disease offers one of the chief problems. The Buriats and Mongols are almost without exception syphilitic. From them the evil influence has spread. Under the old regime prostitution flourished. The Buriats and Mongols visited the licensed houses, and left the disease, which was thus passed on to the Russians. Then again, the civil war turned loose upon the country its worst elements, and, after it was ended, dispersed them again among the civil population, thus raising the percentage of those afflicted with venereal disease somewhat above the normal.

The new Government is making a determined effort to stamp out this plague. The licensed houses have been abolished, and prostitution has been suppressed. All cases of venereal disease which are taken to private physicians for treatment must be reported to the Ministry, which supervises the treatment.

This, like all medical attendance, is free to the workers and the peasants, but must be paid for at

reasonable rates by the merchants and salaried classes. Centres of distribution of medicines and medical services have already been established in Chita, Blagoveschensk, Habarovsk, and Verkhne-Udinsk. Others are to be installed as soon as funds permit. The dispensation of all drugs is under national supervision through the branches of the Ministry of Public Health.

All of the hospitals are operated under Government direction, and with Government assistance. This assistance cannot be great at present, and there is a disheartening shortage of necessary equipment and supplies. Yet the amount of relief work done is very large. As an instance of this, a small "ambulatory" in Chita, one of the eight public institutions in that city, cares for 150 out-patients a day. Everything is being done that can be done with the resources at hand to extend the work of the Ministry of Public Health to every one in need of its assistance.

A heavy burden which the new State must assume is a natural outgrowth of the circumstances under which it came into existence. The Russian revolution had its philosophical backgrounds in discussions of the rights of the "workers," as opposed to those of the "owners." The Far Eastern Republic is not an industrial country at present, and probably less than ten per cent. of its population can be classed as industrial labourers. Yet the backgrounds of the revolution, the dominance of the Marxian teachings, and the prominence which they lend to labour, have resulted in the establishment in the new Government of a Ministry of Labour, which, in the absence of the usual industrial problems of such a department, can devote the greater part of its attention to the social features.

Aside from its important function of fixing wages, a matter which will be discussed in connection with the economic problems of the country, the Ministry of Labour has two departments devoted to research work. One of these studies the tariff question, with special reference to the effect of its schedules upon

labour, the other studies the distribution of labour within the country, and furnishes the results of its investigations from day to day to the employment service, which is the most active bureau in the department.

It is through its department of Statistics and Social Welfare, however, that the Ministry of Labour comes in contact with the great majority of the population of the republic. This department handles the complicated problems of social insurance, which is a recognized feature of the new State. The forms of insurance provided for its people by the Far Eastern Republic include war risk insurance, industrial accident insurance, invalidity insurance, which includes both old age and maternity, health insurance, and unemployment insurance.

To finance this ambitious scheme, all employers of labour, including the Government, pay to the Ministry each month an amount equal to 10 per cent. of their payrolls. The Government makes its contribution partly in gold and partly in foodstuffs. The department actually distributes between 4,000,000 and 5,000,000 roubles in kind per month.

To the many complicated problems involved in placing upon a scientific basis such a broad scheme of social insurance for 2,000,000 people, the department has as yet been able to give little attention. It has in some measure temporarily avoided them by shifting them to other shoulders. For instance, the war risk insurance is handled through the Army, and industrial accidents are compensated through the labour unions. In this way the difficulties arising from malingering and fraudulent claims are largely eliminated.

In the matter of unemployment comparatively little difficulty is found. The Government attempts to keep everybody at work, and when money is not available, it at least finds food and the necessary clothing for its workers. The Ministry is therefore only called upon to care for labourers during the time in which the employment bureau is finding work for them. If the job when

found is refused, of course the support stops. In cases where a suitable form of work cannot be found, the man is offered an opportunity to go to Soviet Russia. Such cases, however, are rare.

In its efforts to care for the people of the present generation, the republic has by no means overlooked the needs of the generation to come. Its ideal in the educational field is the elimination of illiteracy, and nine years of school work free for every child. Needless to say, this ambition involves a financial appropriation far beyond the present power of the Government. The actual progress towards this ideal, therefore, is only a small fraction of the whole, and even that much is accomplished under great difficulties.

The task is to build a wholly new school system for a new nation with a new national ideal, and to build it with totally inadequate funds. All of the old preparatory schools, gymnasiums, and specialized schools, were done away with. They were part and parcel of the old regime, and wholly unsuited to teach the children of the new. In their place one new uniform system has been established. This system covers nine years, and is divided into two schools, the first, or lower, school of five years, and the second, or higher, school of four.

In the lower school are required five years of the native language, mathematics, freehand drawing, manual training, and singing. In the second year are added three hours a week of natural science, which amount is increased by four hours of laboratory work the following year, and by an additional hour in the fifth year. Geography and history come in during the third year, and elementary sociology during the last two.

In the first grade one teacher handles all subjects, but in the other grades it is planned to have individual teachers for each subject. A most interesting provision is that natural science is to be taught in the lower school as one subject, and must not be divided into physics, botany, zoology, etc., as separate studies.

In addition to these subjects formally taught, gymnastics and games are to receive seven hours a week, and on one day of each week excursions, students' meetings, debates, and literary competitions are to take the place of the regular schedule.

In the higher school, subjects are required to be covered during the four years as follows: Russian language and literature, 16 hours; psychology, 2 hours; history, Russian and general, 12 hours, of civilization, 2 hours, political, economic and social 3 hours, and art 2 hours; mathematics through analytical geometry, 17 hours; biology, 8 hours; physics, 11 hours; chemistry, 5 hours; geography and physiography, 8 hours; astronomy, 2 hours; hygiene, 3 hours; drawing and drafting, 8 hours; manual training, 8 hours; singing, music, and gymnastics, 8 hours; and French, English, or German, 20 hours.

This makes a required total of 135 hours for the four years, but the capable student is allowed 15 additional hours which he may distribute among the more important subjects, and certain changes can be made in the requirements when a student shows a special inclination towards any particular study.

This nine years' course of study is theoretically compulsory, beginning at the age of eight. It is estimated, however, that there are upwards of 100,000 children of school age in the republic, and, as the facilities are nowhere near adequate for their accommodation, no attempt is made to enforce attendance at the present time. Of buildings there are plenty for the present, for the legacy from the old regime includes 2,600 elementary schools, 70 gymnasiums, 20 professional schools, and 10 normal schools. But of equipment there is little; books, pencils, paper, etc., are all lacking. The books of the old regime are there, but children of a republic cannot be mentally nourished upon pabulum prepared under the direction of a Czar and an Established Church. Therefore must new books

be prepared in many subjects before the work of instruction can begin.

More serious even than the lack of equipment, however, is the lack of teachers. Twelve thousand are needed to fulfil the ideal for the children of the republic. Only 4,000 are now on the rolls, and of these most have to eke out the slender provision which the Government is able to make for them by work outside the schools and by the assistance of parents who are willing to make sacrifices for their children's education. Even this is not the end of the difficulty, however, for of teachers listed, only half have at all adequate preparation and training. The standard set calls for a normal-school training for each teacher in the lower school, and a University degree for teachers in the higher schools. The Ministry is organizing a normal school in Chita for this teacher-training work. This will in time supply the need for lower school teachers. No plan is being considered at the present time for the establishment of a university, as it is felt that the need will not be sufficient for many years to come to warrant the establishment of an institution of university grade in the Russian Far East. The republic will therefore have to depend upon graduates of the Russian universities to supply its higher school teachers.

The question of teachers' salaries is largely academic, as the Government has no money with which to pay more than the barest living. Nevertheless, the nominal amounts show an interesting change from the old regime. In the lower school salaries have been raised from 30 to 100 gold roubles a month, and in the higher school have been decreased from 300 to 160 gold roubles a month. It is evidently the intention to shift the qualitative emphasis to the earlier years. Professors in the new normal school are to receive 250 gold roubles a month.

While the actual school years have received the lion's share of the attention, neither the younger children nor adults have been forgotten in the all-embracing plans

of the republic. For the pre-school years, corresponding to our kindergarten age, garden schools are being organized. Of these there are already twenty in Chita, and some at other cities. Adult education is fostered and encouraged by the formation of clubs for various study courses somewhat after the manner of the extension courses of the universities of the West. Of these clubs there have been organized up to the present time 380 in various parts of the republic.

From this hasty survey of the work now being done by the Ministries of Nationalities, Health, Labour, and Education, it is apparent that the young republic is setting about at once the task of building up anew from the ruins in the midst of which it was born. It is an undertaking which at best must take years for its accomplishment. That the new Government has made so energetic a beginning is much to its credit.

CHAPTER XVII

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

THERE are many baffling problems connected with the economic situation of the Far Eastern Republic, but the outstanding one is the question of transportation. To speak of railways as the arteries of a country is a familiar figure, but in Eastern Siberia the railway constitutes practically the whole nutritive system of the country. Almost the entire population is grouped along the thin line of railroad that runs from Lake Baikal to Manchuli, from Karimskaya to Habarovsk, and from there to Vladivostok. In time of peace the railroad is the life of the people and during the civil war the railroad was always in the centre of the fighting.

After three years of war as a part of Czarist Russia, when railway repairs and new construction had to wait upon the requirements for ammunition and armaments ; after three years more of civil war, during which each side frequently found it a matter of military necessity to destroy parts of the line ; after two years of foreign intervention which placed the terminus of the whole system and its most important junction point in the hands of Japan ;—what had once been a fairly good transportation system was reduced to a sorry state.

For convenience of handling the railroads of the Far Eastern Republic are divided into three parts. The Chita Railway includes that part of the old Russian Trans-Siberian Railway which runs from Verkhne-Udinsk to Manchuli with the branch from Karimskaya to Stretensk, a main line mileage of 880 miles. The

Amur Railway runs from the junction on the Stretensk line to Habarovsk, a distance of 1,248 miles. The third division is the Ussuri Railway comprising all the lines south of Habarovsk, connecting with Vladivostok and Pogranitchnaya, a total of 548 miles.

A few figures will serve to indicate what civil war can do to disrupt a country. A survey was made of these lines in October 1920, as soon as they were cleared of the Semenov and Japanese troops. It was found that on the Chita Railway there had been destroyed 98 wooden and 36 steel bridges and 7 tanks. On the Amur Railway there had been destroyed 419 wooden and 9 steel bridges, including the great steel structure over the Amur River at Habarovsk, the largest bridge in Siberia. On this road also, 87 railway buildings had been burned. On the Ussuri line 47 steel bridges had been destroyed.

So much for the road itself. The condition of the rolling stock was hardly better. Broken and worn-out engines and burned and smashed freight cars contributed a large part of the total. The fuel problem was equally baffling. On the Chita Railway alone the daily requirement was 1,080 tons of coal and 75 cords of wood if the road was to operate at all.

The figures of the survey were collected, and the discouraging results arranged in a series of diagrams, by means of which the Ministry of Transport could present the situation most graphically to the National Assembly as soon as it could take up questions of internal reconstruction. The general conclusion was that in order to deal properly with the transportation problem it was essential that the Ministry should have available for the first year a total in money of 32,546,383 gold roubles.

Such an appropriation was wholly out of the question, and the best the Assembly could do was to appropriate 1,215,000 gold roubles. But this cut of 96 per cent. was only the beginning. The Ministry has actually received in money a total of 200,000 gold roubles!

The difference between estimates and receipts in materials which could be supplied locally was even greater. The estimates called for materials to the value of 42,500,000 roubles, while the receipts have been 100,000 roubles !

Such a situation might well have apalled the stoutest-hearted railway man. In almost any well-organized country the Minister of Transport would have resigned at once when confronted by such conditions. Here in Siberia, by a strange turn of fortune's wheel, the task devolved upon a man who had spent the best years of his life in organizing strikes. Shatov, as a strike leader, could have forced the resignation of almost any manager under these circumstances. But now he was the manager ! He did not resign ; he went to work. And in spite of the overwhelming odds, Shatov has got things done. Not as much as he could have if he had had plenty of money and other conditions had been more favourable, but nonetheless, he has made a very substantial showing. It had to be ! The railroad is the life of the country and it must work !

On the Chita Railway, of the 134 destroyed bridges, 39 have been restored permanently and the remainder temporarily. The seven tanks have been rebuilt. Of a total of 299 engines, 115 are now operating. Of 7,309 freight cars, all but 2,078 are in running order. A few—a very few—passenger coaches have weathered the storms of the last few years sufficiently well to be used for the light passenger traffic which demands passenger coaches. The coal supply falls 50 per cent. short of the requirement but the deficiency is made up with wood.

On the Amur line all the bridges except the big one at Habarovsk have been temporarily restored. A ferry with a capacity of 27 cars takes the freight across the big river. 87 out of 169 engines have been put into working order. Of 3,115 freight cars all but 870 are fit for service. This road operates entirely on

wood. It has coal mines but there is no money to work them.

It is the same story on the Ussuri Railway. The 47 bridges have been temporarily repaired. Of 221 engines, 100 have been put into service. The road has 6,044 freight cars, of which all but 1,670 are serviceable and of which 4,500 are practically new.

Such has been the progress made toward the restoration of the country's transport system. But this is not all. In spite of the lack of money, in spite of the harassing conditions, it has been possible to go even further. In order to operate at all economically certain feeders were necessary and these feeders the Ministry of Transport has undertaken to build. One of sixteen miles from the iron-works at Petrovskoe-Zavod, near Verkhne-Udinsk, to the ore dumps is nearing completion. Another, twelve miles long, to the lumber camps at Taltzinsk is already in use. A coal feeder at Hailyarta, eight miles long, is now under construction.

How has all this been done? This question becomes the more interesting when we learn that the men did not receive any pay for over eight months and then only five roubles apiece! Food and some clothing had been distributed so that the men were not starving, but five roubles was all the money they had had since the founding of the republic.

The matter of handling the men under such circumstances was by no means the lightest of Shatov's tasks during those trying months. It is not easy to keep enough men to run 2,800 miles of railroad at work for eight months without pay. There is a story that when the men struck for money that Shatov took down a company of soldiers with machine-guns and gave them the choice of working or being buried. But that is not Shatov's way, and it would have accomplished no good if it had been. His own statement is much more probable. When the men threatened a strike, he went down and reasoned with them. "The

Government has no money to pay you. If you strike it ties up the railroad and kills the republic. Then Semenov and the Japanese will come back and you can work for them. Shall we strike?" The answer was a unanimous "No!" and the men went back to work. Shatov kept them informed of just what was going on, just how necessary it was for their own salvation and that of the country to get the railroads working again, just how hard the Government was trying to arrange things for them, and insisted that they be treated as well as anyone else who was striving to put the republic on its feet.

That he had the confidence of the men is quite evident from the results. He discovered that under a revolutionary regime the men do not work as hard and as regularly as they did under the old purely capitalistic system and he resorted to methods of spurring them on, which are roundly condemned by labour leaders in the United States. As an executive he sees more clearly the need of a "fair day's work for a fair day's pay," even when the pay is not forthcoming. He has a "laziness chart," which shows how much more time is lost from the men laying off than from sickness and vacations combined. Such legends as "More Miles More Freight," "Each Hour of Laziness Helps to Kill the Railway," "More Speed More Profit," "A Defective Engine is the Railway's Worst Enemy," "The Best Way to Help the Railway is Honest Repairs," "You Can't Go Far on Rotten Ties," etc., were placed where the men must constantly read them. This sort of thing hardly squares with the generally accepted ideas of workers' control. Yet it is common sense and the workers of the new republic are sufficiently conscious of their own situation to realize the truth of the statements and to stick by their work until things are running properly once more.

Their lot is not greatly different from that of the other citizens of the new republic. In the Constitution it is naïvely stated that the republic "recognizes

that work is obligatory upon all citizens." Never was there a truer statement, and the obligation is enforced by a much higher and more powerful law than that of the Constitution. Stern economic necessity has decreed, beyond the power of governments or constituent assemblies to repeal or amend, that the citizens of the republic must work. It is indicative of the willingness of its people to face the facts as they are that the Constitution " recognizes " this.

Siberia has never been a country of easy living. The leisured class has been small to the point of minuteness, unless the old Czarist officials could have been considered such a class. Since the very beginning the Russians of Siberia have been under the necessity of work and hard work. Some improvement in conditions had been made in the earlier years of the present century. A few labour-saving devices were beginning to make their appearance. Some factories had been established to manufacture articles that had hitherto been made by hand. Here and there machinery was used to relieve the pressure of human toil. Foreign commerce brought in some articles which to the old Siberian would have savoured of luxury. A fair start on the road to greater ease had been made.

Civil war and intervention, with their attendant violence, went far to destroy the beginnings thus made. Siberia to-day, or rather that portion of it which is embraced within the territory of the Far Eastern Republic, is a land in which the people are living with a minimum of the machinery and products of modern civilization. The railroad system can be called at best no more than convalescent. A few boats are running upon the rivers. Here and there are the remains of a factory. With these means, wholly inadequate for modern life, the people of the Far Eastern Republic are struggling to maintain their existence.

Most of the thought and most of the energy of the country must for the present be devoted wholly to

this end, the mere maintenance of existence. The territory of the republic is hardly self-supporting in foodstuffs, and the most careful management is necessary to secure a proper distribution of what food is produced at home and to see that the first claim against what little exportation is possible is satisfied by foodstuffs in sufficient quantity to make up the deficit.

For the handling of these economic problems, the new Government is well-equipped with ministries. A captious critic might say it was over-equipped. There is first a Ministry of Agriculture, then of Food Supply, then of Commerce, and then of Industry. Not that there is not sufficient work to make full use of the talents of four men of ministerial calibre, but that better results might be obtained if they were organized into one instrumentality.

The Ministry of Agriculture is busy with the problems of cultivation. The agricultural methods of the Siberians are more advanced in some ways than those of the Asiatics, but there is nowhere near the intensive development with its consequent high production per acre that is found in Japan and China. Rather it is extensive cultivation on the American scale without the American methods. The development of a higher technique is the problem of the Ministry of Agriculture. It must necessarily wait to some extent upon the creation of an economic surplus which at present does not exist.

The work of the Ministry of Food Supply is of much greater immediate importance. Food production in the Far Eastern Republic is along two main lines. The Amur country and the Maritime Province produce grain and the peasants of Za-Baikal raise cattle. The Ministry of Food Supply controls the distribution of the surplus production and arranges the exchange of the grain of the Amur for the meat of the western part of the country. As this involves both the productive activities of over three-quarters of the population and the food supply for all, the task is one requiring both assiduity and tact.

The Maritime Province is for the present removed from consideration owing to the Japanese occupation and control of the production there. The peasants of the Amur produced in 1920 a surplus of about 8,000,000 poods[1] of grain. Of this amount 5,000,000 poods were wheat and 3,000,000 oats. This is sufficient grain to supply the needs of the remainder of the territory. Owing to the continued warfare in the Za-Baikal country, however, the meat production in that year was not adequate and it was necessary to purchase meat from Mongolia and Manchuria. In 1921 the situation was almost reversed. The meat production increased in Trans-Baikal, while the long-continued drought in Amuria has resulted in the loss of much of the crop there. That year, therefore, it was necessary to import grain.

The distribution of these foodstuffs is effected by actual Government purchase of the surplus. Payments are made in cash or in implements, which to the peasants are as much needed as money. The price is not fixed by the Government arbitrarily. It is arrived at in conference with the peasants, where the representatives of the Ministry present carefully prepared statistics and complete reports to show the peasants the current market price of their produce. The Government then pays that figure for it. This eliminates any semblance of confiscation. On the other hand, the peasants are not permitted to extort more than is their proper due. They attempted this in the first conference, but the Ministry's agents were able to show them the injustice of their position and a mutually satisfactory price was agreed upon. In the case of any determined effort to hold up the price, however, the Government has the whip hand, for, like any other Government, it can forbid the exportation of foodstuffs and the peasants would at once be forced to accept the price offered by the Government.

With the country in this state, the prospects for

[1] A pood contains 40 Russian, or 36 English, pounds.

trade are not too bright. The economic surplus created by the industrial population—not more than twenty per cent. of the whole, 89,000 workers at the outside, including Vladivostok—is small to begin with, and, after the amount necessary to make up the food shortage is expended, there is very little left for the purchase of imported articles. The fur catch supplies the principal surplus. There is a considerable amount of the petty trade in soap, cigarettes, pins and needles, tinware, and other small manufactured articles, which appeals to the peripatetic Chinese merchant, but of trade on a "business" scale there is none and not much prospect of any appreciable amount in the near future.

Nevertheless, the Ministry of Commerce is not idle. Much is to be done to build for the future and the most must be made of every opportunity, however small, for present development. The Ministry, for its own convenience, divides the commerce of the country into three classes: Government-directed distribution, the operations of the co-operative societies, and private commerce. In addition to these three, there is at present another class, namely, Government monopolies. These include the trade in furs, skins, wool, horse-hair, etc., but the Government is considering the gradual relinquishment of these monopolies and the extension of free commerce to include all articles except the essential food supply and drugs.

Government-directed distribution has already been discussed. The rapid development of the co-operative societies before the revolution continued after it, and these organizations became even more important factors in the economic life of the country. The extension of their activities brought them into contact with the fourth of the Government economic agencies, the Ministry of Industry. The Ministry saw at once the value of these agencies and depends upon them as its chief instrumentality in the development of home industry. It has taken over all the plants and factories abandoned during the Civil War by their former

owners and arranged with the co-operatives to operate them until they are reclaimed. The industrial activities of the co-operatives have so far been confined to the restoration of old producers rather than to the establishment of new ones. At the present time the co-operatives are in control of the greater part of the industry of the country. In Za-Baikal, for instance, the "Economia," the union of the co-operatives, controls over 65 per cent. of the business of the province.

This "Economia" is a good example of the larger co-operatives and illustrates the scope of their activities. On its industrial side alone it has departments of mining, chemicals, mechanics, building, etc. This is merely for the extension of its work into the field of industry and does not include the larger but older work in the field of agricultural production and exchange.

The largest undertaking of the Economia is the smelter at Petrovskoe-Zavod. This smelter is over a hundred years old. It was built by exiled prisoners at the order of the Czar and remained the property of the Imperial household until the time of the revolution. The nearest deposit of iron ore is about sixteen miles north and heretofore the ore was brought to the foundry by wagon. A spur of the railroad has just been completed. Suitable coal for smelting is lacking in the territory of the republic and must either be imported from Soviet Russia or the smelter must continue to use charcoal. Even under these conditions and with its antique equipment, the smelter has a capacity of 5,400 tons of pig iron per annum, with a production cost of less than $40 gold a ton.

The foundry has not been in operation for the last two years, but the Economia has undertaken to start the work again. With the opening of the new spur track to the ore deposits, the blast furnace will again be started and the works reopened. As fast as conditions will allow, the old machinery and equipment will be replaced by new machines of the latest type, and

Petrovskoe-Zavod will become the iron centre of the Republic. At full capacity it will employ about 1,500 men.

The Economia has also undertaken to restore the gold production to its pre-war level. A production running close to $10,000,000 before the war has fallen to between ten and twenty per cent. of that figure. The principal fields are located in the Bargusin taiga, though there are other important deposits near Chita.

At Verkhne-Udinsk a glass works has been reopened and is now producing ninety per cent. of its pre-war output. Pane-glass, bottles, glasses, saucers, and containers of all sorts and of very fair quality are made. Most of the necessary materials can be obtained in the province.

Three tanneries with a capacity of 32,000 hides a year are run by the society and there are private tanneries with a capacity of 36,000 hides per annum. All are now running at about 80 per cent. of their pre-war output. Three soap factories have an annual capacity of 3,600,000 pounds of soap. These have not been in operation since the war because of the shortage of materials. Sufficient materials have now been arranged for, however, so that these factories are being reopened.

The salt supply for this part of the country has come from the works at Usal, near Irkutsk. This is now in Soviet Russia and only a small portion of the former supply is available. Therefore the Economia is opening works at the Kirensky salt deposits, which will soon be in operation with a production of about 540 tons a year. As this is not enough to supply the need, a large salt works is to be constructed on the Selenga salt lake. This will give an additional 320 tons of ordinary salt and also about 300 tons of sulphate for the glass works, and about 30 tons of caustic soda for the soap factories.

The Economia, in addition to these undertakings, is also planning the restoration of a concrete mill with

an annual capacity of 180,000 barrels, a fish cannery which will pack monthly during the season 30,000 cans, a fur-curing works which can handle 250,000 furs a year as soon as the supply from Mongolia is re-established, a vegetable oil works, and two sawmills.

In all of its undertakings, the Economia agrees with its workers for a certain minimum production, and payment is made with products which, of course, the society has in plenty and of any kind locally produced which the workers may want. Thus the monthly orders issued as payment to its workers by the Economia supply to some extent the need of money. They are at least a credit at the largest department store in Za-Baikal. And the products themselves are used as a medium of exchange. A sign over a theatre box-office in Verkhne-Udinsk reads: "Instead of money, bring boots, tobacco or books," all of which can be obtained at the Economia.

Part of this shortage of money is due to the drastic though commendable action of the Government in placing the finances of the country upon a gold basis. At first the new State, following the precedent of all the previous Governments that had been established in Siberia, issued large quantities of paper money. Depreciation also followed the precedents, and by the middle of 1920 the Far Eastern rouble had so little value that it could be exchanged rouble for rouble with the Soviet money. The Government, established by the Constituent Assembly, took up the currency problem at once. They saw that following financial precedents of the other Siberian Governments might lead to following them to an early end. They had the courage to put the whole country, including the Government, under a money stringency in order to establish the gold standard. The law was passed on May 16, 1921, and since that date paper money has been a thing of the past in the republic, and all transactions are based upon the standard gold rouble. This coin has a value of about two shillings. There will be barter and some

inconvenience for a time, but in the end the country will have to thank the men who placed their currency system upon a sound economic basis. Meantime, foreigners can do business in the country without undue concern over the value of the money they have to use.

The industry of the Far Eastern Republic cannot in any near future grow to worthy proportions unless there is an inflow of outside capital. To develop the country with its own capital would too closely resemble lifting oneself by one's own bootstraps. The man with a surplus each year, however small it may be, soon begins to get somewhere. But the man who hardly manages to make ends meet and is more liable to find a deficit than a surplus, takes a long time to get started.

The second case is that of Siberia at the present time. From her own efforts she will have difficulty in creating a surplus of any kind. This is particularly true as long as her fairest province, her fisheries and her only ports are in the hands of Japan. With Vladivostok and the Maritime Province with its fisheries in her hands, she might within a reasonable time coordinate the efforts of her people and soon begin to show a surplus. With these taken from her, the Far Eastern Republic's way to economic development is beyond her unaided power to open.

It is therefore to the problem of interesting foreign capital that the Department of Industry must chiefly devote its attention. Economically, the problem should not be a difficult one. Eastern Siberia is a land of incalculable natural wealth. There is timber; there is gold; there are silver, lead, iron and tungsten. There are thousands of square miles of rich grazing land for cattle and horses. There are innumerable other natural assets which make the Siberians potentially one of the richest peoples in the world. But all these riches are locked from them, and only money—foreign capital—can unlock them. The greatest natural assets available for exploitation by foreign capital are timber and gold. They are the most tangible, the easiest to

handle, and they will pay the quickest returns of any of the resources of the republic.

The timber areas of the country are enormous, totalling over 145,000,000 acres. Over one-half of this is in the old Maritime Province, and about one-third in Trans-Baikal. The total possible capacity of these forests is over 3,500,000,000 cubic feet per annum. Of this amount the areas accessible from the existing means of transportation, and for which labour is available, can produce approximately 238,900,000 cubic feet, or less than seven per cent. of the total. Actual present production is less than one-fifth of this amount. At ten kopecks gold a cubic foot, the available cut would have a value of 23,000,000 gold roubles.

Mineral wealth has been the source of as much interest in Siberia as timber, and mining will also be among the early developments of the new republic. Mining is an old industry in Siberia, especially gold-mining. There is gold to be found in practically every tributary of the Amur river and few places in the country have been prospected without success in finding either gold, silver, or some of the less precious ores. The known resources have hardly been touched and much of the most promising territory has not even been explored, let alone prospected.

Most of the mining at present is alluvial washing. Little in the way of underground development has been done. In spite of this the territory of the republic produced more than one-third of the annual output of all Russia before the Great War. The registered output was over 16,000,000 roubles annually, but it is estimated that the amount stolen from the mines and thus not registered was at least 25 per cent. of this, so that the total production was over 20,000,000 roubles. Nothing like this amount was produced during the past year owing to the unsettled conditions. The production is estimated at 5,400,000 roubles, though but 1,260,000 roubles' worth was registered.

The terms of concessions under which foreign cor-

porations or individuals can exploit mining properties have been under consideration by the Government for some time. The first tendency was to make conditions which would have no effect other than to exclude foreign capital altogether. The error has been realized and more liberal regulations have been approved. Even these will in all probability have to be modified when bargaining over the actual terms of concessions begins.[1]

The question of wages is handled by the Government. The process of wage-fixing begins with the workers themselves. Through their unions they submit each month schedules of what they consider to be proper wages. These schedules are carefully examined by the Ministry of Labour, which submits them with recommendations and all the necessary explanatory data to the Government, which has the final responsibility of actually fixing the schedules. The usual working of such a system would be of little value in the present financial status of the republic, so a modification to suit the conditions is necessary. The Government announces in advance how much it will have available during the coming month to pay all its workers—that is practically all the workers in the republic. This sum is then divided by the committees of the various unions among their members, so that the process is in reality one of dividing rations rather than one of fixing wages.

This situation insures the foreign investor against any possibility of wages being forced too high for his business to bear. The same scale applies to all employers alike, the Government included. The Government cannot pay what even a conservative private employer would consider a reasonable wage. Hence the minimum is sufficiently low. Private employers may go as far above this figure as they desire or as may be necessary to secure the type of labour required.

There remains the matter of taxes. The Constitution prescribes the source of the "principal revenue" as

[1] See Appendix, p. 308, for summary of terms for mining concessions.

progressive income-tax, property tax, tax on title-deeds, inheritance tax, tax on surplus values, etc., and the income from State enterprises and monopolies. Such a series might well work havoc with the profits from a concession, however great. As the taxing body also has control over concessions, however, the concession contract may be so drawn as to set limits to the amount which can be taken by way of taxes during the life of the concession.

The economic situation may then be summarized as follows : The people of the Far Eastern Republic under present circumstances can produce enough from year to year to feed and clothe themselves. They cannot at present produce enough to develop any considerable foreign trade nor to exploit the enormous wealth in natural resources which they possess. Such exploitation requires the use of foreign capital. The people of the republic have so drawn their fundamental laws as to favour the introduction of such foreign capital. With outside assistance the country should rapidly become prosperous and the field for a large foreign trade.

That there is great wealth to be derived from the exploitation of Siberia's natural resources is generally understood. The investment of foreign capital in large amounts is inevitable except for two unknown quantities. One of these unknown quantities is the probability of the present regime being superseded by a communistic order. The other is the possible action of the Japanese. The discussion of the first of these questions falls properly within the field of politics, and the second is a problem of foreign relations.

CHAPTER XVIII

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

ALL discussion of political problems in the Far Eastern Republic centres about two main points. These are Reaction and Communism. The reactionaries have been the chief source of internal disturbance, and one of the foremost external anxieties since the birth of the republic. The question of Communism has been asked more frequently outside the country than in it, and it is a problem only in that it is necessary for the republic to make its disposition of this subject clear to the outside world.

First, who are the "reactionaries"? When the revolution swept across Russia all of the favoured children of the old regime, all the princes and princesses, all the counts and countesses, all the autocratic officials, all the erstwhile generals and lesser officers, all the owners of extensive estates—at least, all of them who could do so—fled the country. They carried with them the frightful tales of the horrors and excesses of the early days of the revolution. These tales, which lost nothing in the telling, were spread over the world, and served a double purpose. They formed the background for a world-wide condemnation of the Bolsheviks, and they aroused everywhere a feeling of sympathy and a desire to assist the ill-fated princes and princesses, counts and countesses, and the other victims of the great cataclysm. As for the military exiles, their desire was to return to the autocratic command of armies, and to handle again the

funds necessary to maintain them. Their appeals for foreign help were in the form of requests for military assistance to put down this monster of Bolshevism.

Quite naturally, anything in or of the new Russia, the Russia which has repudiated them along with its other foreign liabilities, is anathema to these exiles of the old regime.

The great majority of these people are in the various countries of Europe, particularly in France, and as their activities are directed towards Soviet Russia, and affect only indirectly the Far Eastern Republic, they are not of importance to us here. Many of the *emigrés*, however, escaped to Asia, and they are now operating on a front which stretches from Western Mongolia, all along the Siberian line to the Sea of Japan, on the Chinese Eastern Railway, in Japan, Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai.

The chief rendezvous of the reactionaries in Asia is at Harbin, which is a Russian city outside of Russia. Situated at the junction of the line from Peking and the line from Chita to Vladivostok, Harbin is a natural centre of activity. Here are princes and princesses, counts and countesses, generals and colonels, etc., etc., living in various stages of shabby gentility and in diverse degrees of dependence upon charity, flaunting their titles and their uniforms, their Czarist decorations and their old Russian flags, and looking forward to the day when they shall return to their honours, their estates and their palaces.

These people seem wholly incapable of perceiving that the old Russia is gone, and gone for ever. They have no conception of the fact that, whatever may be the evils of the present regime in that distracted country, whatever added upheavals the future may hold in store for it, they and theirs are a part of its history, a part of its past, a past that is gone beyond all possibility of recall.

Such a lingering regard for the past would inspire only pity if it were not for the fact that the devotion

of the reactionaries to the past prompts them to constant conflict against the present. Their activities in furtherance of this struggle take several forms. Some undertake actual military operations. Some engage in plots and schemes. But the most widespread activity, the one in which women and children can take part even more effectively than men, is propaganda, the dissemination of statements unfavourable to the present regime in Russia. The chief point of attack of the Harbin reactionaries is of course the Far Eastern Republic, and their efforts to injure it are unceasing.

If they would limit themselves to a criticism of what is bad in the new order they would find much material, and if they would combine such criticism with comprehensive plans for bringing about something better, they would be entitled to an attentive hearing from the world. The men and women of that disposition, however, have long since returned to Siberia, put their shoulders to the wheel, deep-mired as it is, and are aiding with all their powers the forces of reconstruction. Only the irreconcilables remain outside. Many of the stories which they send out to the world are false on the face of them to those acquainted with the real situation. Almost all of them are contradicted by the inconsistency of later fabrications from the same source.

Yet the lucubrations of these fanatics receive a world-wide hearing, because of the conditions under which "news" is sent from Asia to the rest of the world. The two great news services which supply the world with what purports to be the record of daily happenings in Eastern Asia are Reuter and Kokusai. Reuter has an agency at Harbin, which is supposed to cover the surrounding territory, including the Far Easten Republic from Baikal to Blagoveschensk, a territory of some 600,000 square miles. It has another agency at Vladivostok, which covers the remainder of the Far Eastern Republic, a more modest territory only about half as large. It has no other agents nor correspondents anywhere in the republic.

Harbin is thirty-six hours by rail from the nearest territory of the republic except the Japanese-occupied Maritime Province—as far as New York City is from Omaha, Nebraska. From Chita it is another twenty-four hours by rail. Harbin is as far from the real centre of interest in Siberia as New York is from Denver. Without special facilities, therefore, a man in Harbin is no better off with regard to news from Chita than a man in New York would be in the absence of unrestricted telegraph service with regard to news from Denver.

Reuter's agent, having no direct connection with the Far Eastern Republic, is at liberty to choose, according to his taste, from the thousand and one absurd stories which daily make their appearance in Harbin. Very plainly the value of Reuter "news" emanating from Harbin will depend altogether upon the political bias of the agent there. Reuter's agent at Harbin is an ex-captain of the Czar's Army. He fled from Petrograd at the time of the Bolshevik coup. By his own statement he is bitterly opposed to the new regime in Russia, including that in Siberia, and hopes with all his heart that it will soon give place to "something better." He is himself, and he inevitably makes of Reuter's agency, an organ of reactionary propaganda against the Far Eastern Republic.

Kokusai is in Harbin and elsewhere, in regard to the Far Eastern Republic or any other place, the mouthpiece of the Japanese militarists. The equipment of this agency is the same as that of Reuter. An agency at Harbin and an agency at Vladivostok "cover" the whole territory of the Far Eastern Republic from afar. Its facilities for securing news are no better, and no worse, than those of Reuter. It is not put to the trouble of selecting stories from those afloat in Harbin, however, for its "news" is in large measure furnished to it ready-made by various military officials, whose interest and duty it is to paint conditions in the Far Eastern Republic in as sombre colours as possible.

Thus it is that the world has been served with an unmeasured quantity of misrepresentations and lies about the Far Eastern Republic. Thus it happens that Krasnoschekoff is branded as a wholesale murderer. Thus it is that the world thinks that in the "Nikolaievsk massacre" some six hundred noble Japanese were foully slain by the Partisan troops of the republic, who have never received the credit for hunting down, capturing, trying and executing the gang of bandits who did slay 134 Japanese who had treacherously broken their parole. Thus it is that uprisings, riots, and revolutions are constantly reported as taking place in all corners of the republic, though the people who have lived there never know of them. Thus it is that the entire character of the Government, of the people of the country, of their conditions and their activities, is described to the world without any reference to the truth, but solely to serve the purposes of Russian reaction and Japanese imperialism.

This endless character-assassination would be serious enough alone, but the efforts of the reactionary groups are by no means confined to propaganda. At various points on the long Chinese frontier they have resorted to armed attack. The most dangerous of these groups has been that headed by Ataman Semenov. It will be remembered that his troops were taken across Manchuria, under the protection of the Japanese, and gathered in the little town of Grodekovo, in the Maritime Province. There, still under the protection of the Japanese, and supported by Japanese funds, they have drilled and organized and made endless preparations for the triumphal re-entry into the territory of the Far Eastern Republic.

Unfortunately for the Siberians, Semenov and his band have never seen fit to do more than talk and make preparations. Never since they were first heard of in 1918, have they stepped out from under the aegis of Japan. There has been much discussion of the "march across Siberia to Moscow." The Siberians

have waited almost eagerly for the march to begin. Once away from the Japanese guns, Semenov and his following would have been disposed of in short order. But the procession never started—and never will. There is evidence now that even the Japanese have seen the utter futility of trying to foist Semenov and what he stands for upon the Siberians. The flow of Japanese gold has ceased, and the efforts of the discredited ataman and his few hundred followers to preserve the idea that they are a "movement," are rapidly becoming a laughing-stock.[1]

A braver man was Ungern. When he escaped into Mongolia with his followers in the autumn of 1920, he at once set about making plans for renewing the attack upon the republic. He gathered about him Mongol chiefs, disgruntled at China's overlordship. He received large shipments of supplies through Hailar, through Tsitsihar, through Manchuli itself, which were traced back to the same beneficent source which nourished Semenov and his band. Thus reinforced and equipped, he commenced operations by taking Urga, the capital city of Mongolia. Here, according to their compact, the Russian reactionaries slew the Jews, and the Mongols slew the Chinese. The slaughter continued until over three thousand had been killed.

Preparations were continued, with Urga as a base, until late in May, when Ungern set his forces in motion against Russian territory. He advanced northward in three columns. One followed the west bank of the Selenga River, and was promptly disposed by the Soviet troops sent to meet it. The other flank started across country into the territory of the Far Eastern Republic, but was met and dispersed by the Republican troops. The strong centre column attacked Troitzkosavsk, and, after a fight of several days, was defeated and driven

[1] Since this was written an expedition has been launched against Habarovsk. It met with initial success and captured the city. Within a few days the Republican troops were brought up and quickly drove the invaders back into the waiting arms of the Japanese in the lower Maritime Province.

back into Mongolia. The Republicans followed, and soon turned defeat into a rout. They wanted no more of this Ungern menace, so they chased him clear to Urga, captured his base there, followed him into Western Mongolia until they drove him into the hands of the Soviet troops there, and he was taken as a prisoner to Novo-Nikolaievsk to await his fate. Later advices state that he has been tried and shot.

These were the two principal military efforts of the reactionaries, but there were, and are, other minor ones, which are more aggravating than serious. An example of this is found at Blagoveschensk. Directly across the Amur River from this Russian city is the Chinese city of Taheiho, or "Saghalan," as the Russians call it. Four years ago Taheiho was an ordinary Chinese mud village, with nothing to distinguish it from dozens of others up and down the Amur. To-day it is quite a respectable city of frame, plaster and brick structures, built with the millions of roubles which have been spent by the contending Russians for equipment and supplies.

To Saghalan have fled hundreds of reactionaries, whose activities under the Cossack regime of Kolchak had given them little to hope for from the return of the revolution. Here they remain unmolested, drink the precious vodka which has been forbidden on the Russian side of the river, shake their fists and their sabres at the "damned Bolsheviks," send false "news" of Blagoveschensk to their friends in Harbin, and plot raids across the river above or below the city.

Not all of the reactionaries and their sympathizers are outside of the territory of the republic. Many of the opponents of the new regime still live in their homes in Siberia. For the most part these are people who by reason of position, office, wealth, or privilege, were better off under the Czarist regime than they are now. Most of them are not opposed to the theory of the revolution or of democracy, but disagree violently with its application to themselves personally. They cor-

respond to the conservative class in any democracy. They are to be considered in the same light as those Britons and Americans who have a congenital complaint against progressive income-taxes and employers' liability acts. They damn the Government from morning to night, but take no active steps against it.

There is another group, however, fortunately much smaller, which is in constant communication with the outside irreconcilables, and spends its time plotting all manner of injury to the present authority in the hope of furthering the cause of reaction. Some few of these are moved by conviction, some by the hope of reward under a restored autocracy, but most of them are hirelings. Their machinations are a constant menace to the security of every community within the republic, and even to the republic itself.

The activities of these various reactionary groups produce far-reaching effects in the life and organization of the republic. It will be well to have these effects in mind before we examine the specific complaints of the reactionaries, and see what measure of justification there is for them.

The effect of the presence of the Semenov and Ungern bands has been to keep the republic in a state of war since its inception. It has necessitated keeping an army constantly mobilized, equipped, trained, and ready for action. The size of this army has necessarily been out of all proportion to the size of the reactionary forces. Operating from Chinese and Japanese-controlled territory, the latter were beyond the reach of the Russian intelligence service. They might attack at any point from Kiakhta to Iman, a line over two thousand miles in length, and the republic must be ready to defend itself against attack anywhere along the line. Five thousand men at Urga meant at least five times that many Republicans under arms along the Mongolian border. Semenov's forces and Blagoveschensk raiders demanded a similar provision. The result has been to force the young republic to keep

its army on a war footing during its entire history. How serious a drain this is on the resources even of a well-organized and prosperous country is well known. What it has meant to a new, disorganized, impoverished country, where every rouble has been sorely needed to restore its economic life, and every man has been needed to bring production back to normal, can be readily appreciated. By the middle of 1921 it was apparent that if the menace of the reactionary forces could not be removed, their very existence, even without an attack, would drain the life-blood from the country, and make it an easy prey. China was powerless even to restore her own authority, let alone to protect her neighbour against aggression from her territory. Small wonder then that when Ungern did attack in June, the Republican troops followed up their victory by entering Chinese territory to dispose once and for all of this menace, and left the questions of violation of Chinese sovereignty to the diplomats to straighten out later as best they could. Their action has relieved the strain, though it is impossible to remove it until the question of the Maritime Province is definitely settled.

The reactionary plots inside the republic, if less disastrous to the treasury, have not been without a very pernicious effect upon the life of the people. To protect the Government and the republic against such machinations, the powers of the militia, or national police, have been unduly enlarged. The instruments of reactionary plots are usually the most desperate characters available. Desperate measures are often necessary to defeat them. The forms of law, and the guarantees of the Constitution, may frequently be overlooked in the contact of plot and counter-plot. Under such circumstances it is quite natural that the police organization should draw into its ranks many men of character similar to those whom it is fighting. The contest is liable to degenerate into one between two gangs of gunmen. Raids may sometimes savour of massacre, and executions have the earmarks of

assassination. The Government is powerless to stop the proceedings, because if it halted the activities of the police it would simply be baring the breast of the new nation to the daggers of the brigands who are plotting to take its life. The result is extremely demoralizing. The atmosphere is charged with a feeling of nervous expectancy, and the people cannot settle down to the life of tranquillity which is so necessary to real progress in reconstruction. Particularly is this the case when the underlings of the police force begin to use their power without authority to settle personal grudges, to vent their own spite, for revenge, or for mere loot. All of these things have happened, and there is little doubt that they will happen again. Fortunately, such activities are growing less frequent in all parts of the republic, and in some cities have been discontinued altogether. The control of the civil administration is growing stronger day by day. But the cancer cannot be wholly removed until the day of reactionary plots, supported from outside, has passed for all time.

What arguments do the reactionaries advance by way of justification for their activities? First is the contention that the Government of the Far Eastern Republic is a sort of "envoyocracy," made up of men sent out from Russia to guide the infant republic in the way that Moscow would have it go. The extent to which the names of Krasnoschekoff, Yourin, and Shatov, have figured in the news dispatches regarding the republic, has lent colour to this contention, and has tended to obscure the fact that they are by no means the whole Government.

Krasnoschekoff, it will be recalled, is not the "President of the Republic," but the President of the Government, the presidium of seven, which takes the place of the President in the American or French system. His relations with Moscow have already been fully discussed. There is no doubt of his sympathy with the Communist effort. The sincerity of his conviction

on the question of democracy in Eastern Siberia is equally beyond cavil. While he never saw Siberia until after the revolution, the years of his maturity which he has spent in any part of Russia have been spent in Siberia. He can hardly be seriously considered as a mere envoy of the Moscow powers.

If he were so, his vote in the Government is of no greater weight than that of each of the other six members. These six are all Siberians, born and bred. The table on page 187 shows the birthplace and the number of years in Siberia of each member of the Government. In spite of the prominence of Krasnoschekoff, in spite of the reiterations of reactionaries, the Government of the Far Eastern Republic is a Government by Siberians.

The function of the ministers is not to determine policy, but to carry into effect the policy laid down by the Government. Their positions are administrative, not representative. The desire of the Government would be to get men of ability, regardless of their place of birth or previous association. Siberia, before 1917, was an outlying province of a highly centralized empire. As is always the case with such provinces, men of ability and interest in large affairs made their way to the political and economic centres. To find in Siberia men of sufficient experience and ability to form an efficient ministry would be no light task.

In spite of this fact, however, the ministry is not un-Siberian in colouring. Nikiferov, the President of the Council, is Siberian for generations back. Matveev, and Schraber, were born within the boundaries of the republic. At least nine of the ministers have lived in Siberia for more than four years, and the average residence of these nine is over sixteen years.

The prominent outsiders are Yourin, Shatov, and Blücher. These men are the only members of the ministry who can be cited as evidence of the "envoyocracy" theory. They occupy three important and highly technical departments. It is possible there are

men of Siberian birth who are as well able to handle Foreign Affairs, Transportation, and the Army, as these men are. But it is not probable. It was fortunate for the young republic that such men were willing to come to Chita and devote themselves to these difficult tasks. Small wonder that the Government gladly availed itself of their services. And it did so without the sacrifice of one whit of their independence. The power to "hire and fire" still remains with the Siberians of the Government.

Another favourite canard of the reactionaries is that "the Government is run by the Jews." One senses at once the attempt to play upon race hatred by those who for centuries have made it a part of their political philosophy. The questions might well be asked, "What if the Government is run by Jews? Is there any reason why Jews shouldn't run a Government as well as anybody else?" But the truth is that the Government of the Far Eastern Republic is not in the hands of the Jews. "But Krasnoschekoff is a Jew, and so is Shatov!" Yes, but that is about all the evidence there is. Add Grossman and Binassik, the only other Jews in the Government or the Ministry, and the list is complete. Such Jews as there are in the Government of the Far Eastern Republic are there at the behest and upon the sufferance of the Russian people of Siberia, who retain their services because of their ability. There is no shadow of Jewish control of the Government.

Such are the minor charges of the reactionaries. There are more of them, many more of them. "The Army is in complete control. The secret police is beyond the power of the Government, and slays and robs at its own sweet will. Men opposed to the Government disappear mysteriously, and are never heard from again. The Press is entirely under Government control, and no opposition party can secure publicity. Elections are a farce, because nobody opposed to the Government dares to make a campaign." These com-

plaints are made unceasingly, and garnished with tales of horror and terrorism.

I was much interested in such stories, and rejoiced at the opportunity to spend several hours over the tea-glasses with six of the most prominent and most confirmed reactionaries in Chita. They had no hesitation in telling me their opinion of the present Government, characterizing the men at the head of it as well outside the pale of humanity. In fact they unhesitatingly made statements to me that would have been sufficient to get them all hanged or shot if the Government had been a quarter as bad as they said it was. But asked for specific facts, they became far less definite. Not one of the six knew personally a man who had disappeared mysteriously. After considerable scraping in the corners of their minds, they could definitely state that two Serbs had been murdered, and a Government clerk had been shot. In a country where organized murder has been the order of the day for three years, it would be little short of miraculous if killing should ease over night. Unquestionably men have been killed. Undoubtedly there have been killings by men in the Army or the militia. But of evidence to incriminate the Government, or the men at the head of it, these men, six of the leaders of a bitter opposition, had not a scintilla.

This situation, however, even supported by similar evidence obtained later from every other city in the republic, would only lead to a Scotch verdict of "not guilty for lack of evidence." What is to be said to prove that the Government is not carrying on a campaign of terror against its opponents? It is always difficult to prove a negative, but there is some rather weighty evidence which tends that way. While I was in Chita, elections were held for the Municipal Assembly, under the new Constitution. Before the election, posters appeared asking for support on behalf of half a dozen different tickets, among them that of the "Business Men's Party," of which one of my hosts is a leader. This poster denounced the Government in

almost the same words that had been used in my presence. The Government, however, took no action whatever against the party or its leaders, and three men were elected on this anti-Government platform, among them the man who was with us, a fellow-Cossack of Semenov's ! (Two others of the company occupied public positions of considerable importance.) Of the remaining eighteen members of the Assembly elected at the same time, two were Mensheviks, two were Socialist-Revolutionaries, four were Communists, and the other ten were Peasants. There were various lesser complaints against the manner in which the elections were conducted, but one can hear such even in self-satisfied America and complacent England, and even these reactionaries made no claim that there had been any intimidation of the voters or any restriction of the right to vote.

Perhaps of even greater significance than the failure to substantiate their complaints against the Government, was the absolute political sterility of these reactionaries. One thought the people were suffering from a disease from which they would some day recover, and again set up a Czar. Another was of the opinion that anything would be better than the present system, and was even ready to welcome the Japanese, or Semenov, as their representative. A third thought the only solution was to send all the Communists back to Moscow. The remainder were for foreign intervention, preferably by the United States, to drive out the present authorities, and enable the people to elect "a really democratic Government." Not a practical, constructive idea in the lot. Only an obstinate refusal to accept their loss as a part of that which had fallen upon the whole country. Only vain kicking against the pricks.

This is typical of the whole reactionary movement. Semenov, Ungern, the Harbin princes, all the train of those who oppose the present regime, are utterly devoid of a constructive suggestion. Their whole political

philosophy is that what there is is bad and therefore they are possessed of the mandate of Heaven to wipe it out and substitute themselves in its place. That such a substitution would work for the weal of the people of the country does not even occur to them as a desirable campaign statement.

A visit to the People's Assembly of Amur Province at Blagoveschensk, throws much additional light on the subject of internal politics, and particularly on the subject of Communism in the Far Eastern Republic, which has been intentionally reserved for later discussion. The meetings were held in the large theatre of the city. The auditorium was a mass of red flags, bearing socialistic and communistic slogans. Pictures of Muchin, the local labour leader, who was killed by the "White Guards," as the Czarist military organizations styled themselves, shared honours with Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky, the last two, however, having somewhat the lion's share. A huge banner across one side of the hall bore the legend in letters two feet high, "Down with Intervention!" This seemed to be of particular interest to Major Ugami, the head of the Japanese Military Mission, who sat near us.

The predominance of communistically inclined banners was due to the zeal of the committee in charge of decoration, and was not a reflection of the sentiment of the Assembly. Its nominal membership is 182. Of these 170 arrived for the opening session. To the left of the rostrum sat the Communist "fraction," as the various parties are called in Russian assemblies. They were twenty-four in number. On the opposite side of the hall were the Mensheviks, who numbered about eighteen, and back of them sat a disconsolate group of a dozen or so self-styled "Democrats," the extreme "right" fraction, who, the other groups asserted, wanted the return of the Czar. They were the "reactionary" representation in this, the first assembly of Amur Province to be elected under the new Constitution.

But these groups were of minor interest. In the centre of the hall, from the stage to the rear row, were seated the Peasant-Labour "fraction," a very healthy fraction indeed, which would have had no difficulty in being a whole meeting without any assistance from the other fractions. Here were 118 delegates representing, not the Communists, the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks, nor political theorists of any colour, but there to give voice to the wishes of the people of Siberia for a stable, peaceable, democratic Government. Most of these delegates were men who bore upon them the marks of long toil. Their average age was over forty years, and they bore themselves with a seriousness which augured well for the success of their first attempt at popular Government.

One of the delegates was a man who had spent two years in America, and could speak enough English to tell us his views. He ran a "bread-shop" in the city, and was a member of the Peasant-Labour group. Asked as to the freedom of the elections by which the Assembly had been chosen, his answer came promptly.

"Absolutely free!"

"Was there no interference on the part of the Government or the military?"

"None whatever. Everybody had a chance to vote, and to vote for any man he wanted."

"But how about printed matter—could the candidates get printing done?"

"All they wanted. The town was flooded with papers and hand-bills for all kinds of candidates."

"Did they criticize the Government?"

He smiled. "I should say they did. The reactionaries called it all the names they could think of."

"Were any of them interfered with because of these papers?"

"Not a one so far as I ever heard. Some of 'em are sitting over there now," pointing to the group of "Democrats."

I then asked, "Are you a Communist?"

English failed him. It had no negative of sufficient power. He resorted to the Russian "Nietu!" saying it with a combination of tones which would make even a Cantonese pale with envy, "I have to work for what I get, and I want real money for it when I give it up."

"What do you think of the present Government?" I asked.

He shrugged his shoulders. "It's the best we can do," he replied; "this is the first time the people have ever had a chance to manage their own affairs, and it's up to us now. If we don't make it a good Government it's our own fault."

This man came as near stating the present political philosophy of the vast majority of the Siberians as anyone can come. They have considered Communism, its advantages and disadvantages. A determined effort was made in the Verkhne-Udinsk conferences to make the new republic communistic, and the Siberians fought out the issue then and there. They recognized the appeal of the communistic argument against exploitation of labour by capital, and attempted to secure themselves against such exploitation by nationalizing the land and all other natural resources, and providing in the Constitution that the "fundamental and general principle of the right to work on the land is personal labour." This simply means that whoever uses the land will hold title thereto under the State, just as in England or America, but, unlike England or America, nobody can hold land out of use for speculative purposes, profiting without effort on his own part by the improvements which his neighbours make upon their land. Further than this in the direction of Communism the Siberian peasant would not go. Little interested as his representatives were in the more involved problems of Governmental forms, anxious as they were to return to their homes and their fields, they conceded much on all points but this. Here they stood firm. "The institution of private property is preserved: all citizens and private companies are guaranteed the inviolability

of their movable and immovable properties and estates subject to the restrictions of the fundamental laws."

The Far Eastern Republic will not embrace Communism, because all but a small percentage of its people are private landowners, and their temper is unalterably opposed to the fundamental thesis of Communism. An opposite conclusion might readily be drawn from superficial observation. Everywhere are to be seen pictures of Lenin and Trotsky. They are the popular heroes. There is much communistic literature about. The red flag is frequently seen. But talk to the peasant at village after village along the Amur, at town after town along the railroad, and everywhere you find the same thing beneath the red decorations. There has been much amusement at the expense of the Siberian peasant because of his slogan, which is sometimes seen, "We want Bolshevism, but not Communism!" The world in its wisdom knows that these are one and the same. But to the Siberian peasant they are two entirely distinct things. Bolshevism for him symbolizes the forces which made the Russian revolution. The Bolshevists are the men who carried the great movement to a successful conclusion. Lenin and Trotsky are their leaders. Therefore to Lenin and Trotsky all honour! But Communism, no! It may be all right for Russia, but we don't want it here. To the Siberian peasant Communism means that the hard-working farmer, whose day is as long as the light, must give his surplus produce, without compensation, to the city labourer, whose chief interest is in a day of eight hours at the outside. Invariably on the subject of Communism, the answer of the peasant is the expressive Russian "Nietu!" To its whole doctrine they are unalterably opposed, and for the same reason that hard-working men who have been accustomed to reap the reward of their labours are everywhere opposed to it. There is no danger of the Far Eastern Republic becoming communistic so long as the Siberian peasant is free to make his choice.

How then explain the strong communistic influence in the Government, the large proportion of Communists in the presidium and in the Ministry? Again the answer is to be found in the confidence which the Russians place in the Communists as the protagonists of the revolution. The peasants of Siberia have not, and well know they have not, the experience to handle large affairs. For generations the best minds of Russia have been devoted to the work of revolutionary propaganda. It is among the members of the political groups that the new nation must find its governors and its administrators. The Far Eastern Republic has chosen many of its administrators from the more moderate Socialist groups, more than might be expected after the fatal experience of the people of Siberia with the Moderate Socialist Government, which they looked to at Omsk in the early days of 1918, and which ended in the Kolchak dictatorship and the civil war. The rest of the men they have placed in charge of departments of the Government they have chosen from the Communists, not because they are Communists, but because they have the ability to handle the business of the departments, and because the peasants can trust them to preserve the revolution at all costs.

But are not the conditions such as to finally force the people of the republic to embrace Communism even against their will? Will not the combination of the necessity of depending upon Soviet Russia for financial support, and of using many Communists in the high offices of the Government, be used by Soviet Russia to force Communism upon the Siberians? Again, no. And for a reason which goes far in itself to preserve the present form of the democracy, even against local efforts to turn it into the paths of Communism.

In order to gain control of the political power in Russia, the Bolsheviks embraced the tenets of the most extreme "left." These tenets were of the extreme left both politically and economically. The control once safely in their hands, and the country so organized as to

preserve that control, the Bolsheviks were confronted with the necessity of reconciling workable political tenets with wholly unworkable economic tenets. The whole internal strategy of the present Russian administration has been to shift towards the " right " in economic matters as rapidly as possible, without giving its more radical followers an opportunity to break away and lead a new revolt against it on the pretext of the Government having become " counter-revolutionary."

In this strategy a Russian community, in its general social make-up, not unlike Russia itself, functioning successfully while preserving the institution of private property, its people better off economically than those of European Russia, is of far more importance to the Soviet Government than the nominal control over, or the extension of demonstratedly unworkable economic doctrines over, a stretch of territory small in proportion to that already under Soviet rule. In other words, the political situation in Russia itself, the necessity under which its leaders find themselves of shifting to the right economically while holding to the left politically, ensures the Far Eastern Republic against any attempt on the part of the Russian Communists to inject their doctrines into the Governmental organism of a people to whom they are wholly unacceptable.

The eastern provinces of Siberia, the territory of the Far Eastern Republic, will not come under the sway of Communism either through the spontaneous choice of its own people, or through the pressure of their fellow-Russians to the west. To say that it will never be communistic is to venture too far on the road of prophecy, but it is safe to say that it will become communistic only because of the actions of other nations, actions which will prevent the natural development of private property under a democratic form of Government. Those possibilities lie in the field of foreign relations.

CHAPTER XIX

PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

It is already quite apparent from what has been told of the brief but troubled history of the Far Eastern Republic that Japan furnishes the central problem of its foreign relations. From the time of the declaration of its independence on April 6, 1920, the infant State has had to struggle for its very existence against the actions and the machinations of the military leaders of the Island Empire. The recital of these activities in detail would make a long and wearisome story. A brief outline is necessary, however, to an understanding of the present situation in Siberia and the part that Japan plays therein.

That the Japanese have systematically tried to prevent the unification of the Russian Far East and the establishment there of peace and order is unquestioned by any non-Japanese observer of events in that corner of the world. The failure of their attempts to prevent the establishment of the Government at Chita has not deterred them in the least from further endeavours to prevent the general recognition and extension of the authority of that Government.

As soon as the news of the successs of the conference at Chita on November 10, 1920, became public, the Japanese, through the Japanese Publicity Bureau, which they had established for the purpose of talking pseudo-officially with the Russian people, began to circulate stories to counteract the effect of this news upon the population of the Maritime Province. It was stated

that the Government at Chita was not the result of agreement of all the local Governments, that the Vladivostok delegates arrived too late and therefore did not take part; and other stories calculated to injure the prestige of the new Government were started.

On November 26 the Japanese Command sent a note to General Boldyrev, the Russian commander in the Maritime Province, informing him that the Japanese would have to take measures to nullify any orders issued by the Far Eastern Republic which were in conflict with any agreements made with the local authorities, and that if any of these agreements were broken the Japanese would take action to stop such violation without further notice. Two days later General Takayanagi wrote Boldyrev that the Japanese Command had nothing to do with the transportation of the Semenov troops from Manchuli to the Maritime Province, but that Semenov himself, who was with them, had applied to the Japanese for protection and, as they considered him a political offender, such protection would be extended to him.

On December 2 Takayanagi wrote to Zetlin, the Russian head of the Russo-Japanese Conciliation Commission, and asked him a number of questions. Would the Vladivostok Government continue without change? Whether the Far Eastern Republic would not change it? Was the Far Eastern Republic to be a democratic republic? Was it to be constitutional and parliamentary? Was it recognized by Soviet Russia as an independent democratic republic without Communism? Was it entirely free and independent in foreign policy? Would it guarantee the life and property of foreigners, the free use of capital, the principle of the open door and equal opportunity? If there was a change in its programme would the Japanese be informed? Would the basic principles declared by the local Governments be made into laws by the Constituent Assembly?

Ignoring the highly amusing solicitude of the representative of Japanese militarism for democracy, con-

stitutionalism, the open door, and such things, Zetlin sent a serious answer. He informed the Japanese Command that the programme of the Government would not be changed ; that the system of the Far Eastern Republic would be democratic on a constitutional parliamentary basis ; that the only connections with Russia were treaty relations ; that Communism was excluded ; that Capitalism was already established ; that the Far Eastern Republic was independent in its foreign affairs ; that life and property were safe ; that the door of trade was open for all on the basis of entire equality. He added that these basic principles were not to be changed, but that he was always ready to inform Japan of any matters in which she was interested.

Of course this reply had no effect whatever upon the actions of the Japanese Command. Later in the month Takayanagi warned the Vladivostok People's Assembly of the dangers of unconditional ratification of the action of their delegates in recognizing the Chita Government. He stated that if any agreements were broken that the Japanese Army would hold only the Primorsk Government responsible. Then General Oi invited representatives of all political groups to visit him and told them that, as the political situation in Vladivostok was very acute and unstable because of the unification with Chita, he feared that the existing order and tranquillity might be disturbed. The Japanese had made an agreement with the Vladivostok authorities for the cessation of military activities and the Japanese would not tolerate any interference by a "third party."

General Oi did not attempt to reconcile this threat with the oft-repeated assurances of his Government that the sole desire of the Japanese in connection with Siberia was for the unification of the country and the restoration of order. These assurances were never of great moment in the mind of the Japanese Command. They resorted to every artifice to prevent the progress

of unification. They delayed emissaries of the new Government travelling between Chita and Vladivostok, taking advantage of their control of the railroad to hold up their cars for days at a time.

In January of 1921 they spread rumours of the coming overthrow of the existing Vladivostok Government and a possible repetition of the events of the previous April in order to frighten the people and the officials in their efforts to carry unification into effect. They made the claim that the Japanese had been authorized to protect all foreigners and foreign interests in the Maritime Province. The American Consul promptly issued a statement to the effect that the United States had never asked any Government to help it in protecting its citizens or their property in Siberia and that it never would make such a request.

Such incidents would have been disconcerting to any other nation but they were only aggravating to the Japanese. They extended their activities far beyond mere spreading of rumours and issuing of warnings. They requisitioned Russian steamers and barges on the Amur River and refused either to return them or pay for them. They seized cars on the Russian railway to Habarovsk, and without offering any explanation, coolly appropriated the contents. They held in the zone of occupation the 4,500 new steel freight cars needed so sorely by the Russian railways. They sidetracked hundreds of others to serve as quarters for the Grodekovo protégés. They prevented the departure of sanitary trains to fight the pneumonic plague which threatened the country. They refused to allow shipments of foodstuffs to famine districts and of supplies which were absolutely necessary to the livelihood of the fishing population. They prohibited the shipment of railway materials and supplies from the stores at Vladivostok to the railroads to the west. They confiscated coal destined for railroad consumption and used it themselves. They held a trainload of working men with their families at station Evghenyovka for weeks to prevent their going to Chita

to work in the railway repair shops. The protests of the Russian authorities against keeping these people there without money or food brought only derision from the Japanese officers. Finally, to make assurance doubly sure, the Japanese placed a guard over the silver reserves of the banks in Vladivostok and refused to allow them to be touched.

Not only was Russian property confiscated and interfered with on all sides, but Russian officials and private persons were arrested and imprisoned without even a pretext, let alone a shadow of right. Mr. Parfenov, a member of the Vladivostok Assembly, was arrested at Mukden, in Manchuria, by Japanese troops, detained several days while his baggage was searched, and then allowed to proceed. Wherever Japanese troops were in control Russian citizens were arrested on trumped-up charges or none.

In May the Japanese Command discontinued all service on the Vladivostok-Habarovsk telegraph line except for their own messages to and from the Japanese Military Mission at Habarovsk. Only after a vigorous protest from the Russian authorities was the general service resumed.

During all of these occurrences the Japanese never lost a moment in their propaganda. Explanations were always sent out by the Japanese news agencies along with the reports of the events. Always these explanations laid the responsibility for the affair upon some "Bolshevik" or "Communist" official or Government. Unceasingly do these military-controlled "news" disseminators harp upon the allegation, always assuming it as a fact, that the Far Eastern Republic is "Bolshevik" and "Communist." Constantly do the items of "news" go to all parts of the world telling of the rising of the populace against the "Reds" in this or that place. At every move of the Japanese, the "Communists," or the "Bolsheviks," or the "Reds," become "terror-stricken," or flee from Habarovsk to Blagoveschensk or from Blagoveschensk

to Habarovsk as the case may be. For ever they are calling in divisions of "Red troops" or battalions of "Red sailors" from Soviet Russia to protect them against the people. As late as the middle of August, 1921, the Japanese news services sent over the world a detailed story, wholly false, of the "fall of Chita" before the "anti-Bolshevik" forces, the burning of the ministers in their own houses, and the flight of President Krasnoschekoff by airplane. At this time there was direct communication by wireless between Harbin and Chita, messages both private and official were coming through hourly without any mention of such a debacle, and President Krasnoschekoff was in Moscow!

Even these excesses did not mark the limits of Japanese aggression. Japanese troops constantly cross the limits of the zone of occupation as delimited in the coerced agreement of April 29, 1920, upon the continuance of which the Japanese firmly insist when it suits their own purposes. These expeditions reconnoitre the country, train carrier-pigeons, and carry on manœuvres.

Worse than this, there is a constantly increasing mass of evidence of Japanese support of, and co-operation with, bands of hunghutzes, mounted bandits, who ride across the country, robbing, killing, and terrorizing the inhabitants. Any attempt upon the part of the Russians to suppress these bands is met by the refusal of the Japanese Command to allow sufficient armed forces in the zone of occupation, their refusal being based upon the provisions of the April 29 agreement.

Most serious of all, however, was the maintenance of the reactionary groups at Grodekovo and other towns. Here were the remnants of the shattered armies of Kappel and Semenov, living in Russian cars needed for the Russian railroads, fed, equipped, armed and organized by Japanese funds, plotting against the very life of the new republic, an ever-present menace which it must be prepared to meet, protected by the strong

arm of the Japanese military, and reviewed by Japanese officers !

The activities of these reactionary groups were being constantly extended until they had the whole surrounding territory in a state of terror. They were careful never to get outside of the Japanese zone where the Republican forces could attack them and any suggestion upon the part of the Russians that they be allowed to bring troops into the zone for the purpose of suppressing them was instantly rejected by the Japanese, who claimed that the agreement of April 29 provided otherwise and that only militia could be allowed to have arms in the zone and those only in such quantities as the Japanese approved.

On March 7, 1921, the Far Eastern Republic sent a note to the Japanese Command calling their attention to the situation and stated that the populace believed that the Japanese were supporting the reactionary bands. The note gave the Japanese the benefit of any doubt which might exist and suggested that the situation would be greatly improved if the Japanese Command would issue a statement that it was not supporting the Semenov soldiers and was not intriguing against the Far Eastern Government. The following day the Government issued an appeal to the people of the Maritime Province to remain quiet under the provocation and ascribed the rumours against the Japanese to "malicious persons."

The only answer of the Japanese Command to this attempt to settle the difficulties in a friendly way was to inform the chairman of the Russo-Japanese Conciliation Commission that the "latter must guarantee the disarmament of the reactionaries and the forces at Grodekovo in case of disorder"! The unmitigated insolence of this demand is apparent. The Japanese had disarmed the Russian authorities and armed the reactionaries and then informed the authorities they would be responsible in case of trouble !

Trouble was inevitable and on the night of March 30 it came. About three hundred reactionaries appeared

in the streets at Vladivostok, and marched on the railway station. Here they were repulsed and dispersed by the militia, but the Japanese Command at once sent troops to disarm the militia on the ground that "many sympathizers with the mutiny were to be found among them"! Two days later these arms were returned, the Japanese Command announcing that it would not permit an armed struggle between what it chose to call the "rival parties."

Meanwhile, another matter in which the conduct of the Japanese was most exasperating to the Russian people had been developing in connection with the Saghalin fisheries. These fisheries are among the greatest if not the greatest in the world. The salmon catch alone also runs to 30,000 tons a year. By the terms of the Russo-Japanese Fishing Convention entered into in 1906 pursuant to the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japanese citizens were to have the same rights as Russians to fish in certain Russian waters. The method of working the territory is to divide the shore of the Okhotsk Sea and nearby waters into sections of two versts each. These are then offered at public auction and sold, or rather leased for the season, to the highest bidder. The Japanese at once availed themselves of the provisions of this agreement and in 1907 more than three-fourths of the successful bidders were Japanese.

A dispute as to the meaning of the agreement arose almost at once. The Japanese claimed that the provision granting them the right to fish "along the coast" included the right to fish in the inlets. The Russians rejected this contention and the coastline for two versts on either side of all river mouths was closed to foreigners.

It was hardly to be expected in view of the aggressions of the Japanese in other directions that they would not take advantage of the Russian disorganization to secure additional privileges if not actual control of these valuable fisheries. Even Japan's most

persistent critics were hardly prepared for the high-handed method by which Japan accomplished her purpose.

On December 16, 1920, Consul-General Kikuchi sent a note to the Vladivostok Minister of Foreign affairs informing him that all the fisheries in the lower Amur region, including those of Saghalin and the outlying islands, would in future be under the control of the Japanese Command. No reason was assigned for this. The note was simply a bare statement of the fact. This was in itself sufficiently unjustifiable, but the fact that the Vladivostok Government claimed no jurisdiction whatever over the Saghalin and other Amur fisheries and was turning all questions of foreign affairs over to the Government at Chita at the time made it more so.

The note was forwarded to Chita and the Far Eastern Republic protested against the seizure of the fisheries. No attention was paid to this protest and on January 17 the Japanese sent another note to the Vladivostok Government notifying it that all moneys paid by Russians and Japanese for fishery leases must be deposited in a special bank "to be agreed upon" and that the Russians would be allowed to withdraw only one-third of it. The remaining two-thirds must be used "by agreement" and the Russians must account for all moneys to the Japanese. This note also stated that the Government must set a price for the fishing grounds instead of selling them at auction and that the Japanese as well as the Russians would have the right to issue permits for boats to go to the fisheries "to avoid delay." Also that the Japanese must have the right to stay after the season was over "to guard the fisheries," and that they must have the right to fish in "internal waters."

Having received no reply to this unexcused and inexcusable piece of international robbery, the Japanese forwarded another note to the Vladivostok authorities, although they had been repeatedly informed by these

authorities themselves that they had no jurisdiction of the matter, insisting upon a reply so that the Japanese could participate in the approaching sale and stating that the sale must be postponed until the Japanese received a favourable reply. The following day Consul-General Kikuchi issued a proclamation notifying the public that the fishing-grounds which he had mentioned in his note of December 16 would be exempted from lease.

On March 11, the Far Eastern Republic, in a formal note transmitted to the Consul-General at Vladivostok, reviewed the entire fisheries question and proposed a joint commission to handle the leasing of lots for the present year while the Fisheries Convention of 1907 was revised by mutual agreement. The Japanese delayed their reply to these suggestions until the middle of April, and meanwhile the military further aggravated the situation by sending additional troops into the lower Amur territory.

On March 21, the Japanese commander in Saghalin issued a proclamation announcing that the Japanese would reoccupy Nikolaievsk, Northern Saghalin and other places and that a Japanese civil administration would be established. This administration the population were ordered to obey. At the same time they were requested to "trust the troops, in sympathy with the real motive of the proposed action" and to engage peacefully in their respective occupations.

This outrage upon the sovereignty of the Russian people in their own land after they had succeeded in bringing about order in the districts mentioned against all the efforts of the Japanese to keep it in a state of turmoil, highly incensed the Russians. Nor did the tenor of the Japanese note of April 18, again handed to the Vladivostok authorities, calm their feelings. This note stated that the reply of the Far Eastern Republic was not satisfactory to the Japanese and that it raised questions which could not be discussed at that time. As the fishing season was

approaching, the Japanese would run the fisheries themselves. They published new rules and regulations in the Japanese language, gave additional fishing-grounds to the Japanese, and took the lease money. While they professed to respect Russian rights, they notified the Russian Government that they would protect the Japanese lease-holders by force.

On April 11, Mr. Yourin had handed the Japanese Minister at Peking for transmission to his Government a note from the Constituent Assembly. This note demanded that Japan withdraw her troops from Siberia as a proof that she has no territorial ambition, insisted upon the immediate cessation of interference in Russian affairs, and asked for recognition of the Far Eastern Republic.

This was followed on April 21 by a note of protest from the Government on five points: against Kojima's proclamation in Saghalin of March 21; against the Japanese disarming the militia on the night of March 30; against the Japanese action in regard to the Russian fisheries; against the landing of more Japanese troops; and against the occupation of Dekastri Bay, the institution of a Japanese radio station there, the placing of a censorship on the Russian telegraph there and forbidding the local Russian officials to communicate with the higher authorities except with the consent of the Japanese.

The forwarding of notes in diplomatic form with the unanimous approval of a freely elected Assembly representing all the people of the Russian Far East, was making more and more apparent the hollowness of the reasons advanced by the Japanese for the continued occupation of Siberia. Such notes were rapidly making the Japanese position morally untenable.

The militarists fought the new development in their characteristic manner. They issued an order in Saghalin to all inhabitants except the Japanese, prohibiting the publication of papers and magazines and forbidding them to "speak or think" of things un-

favourable to the Imperial Japanese Command. They sent out punitive expeditions which executed peaceful inhabitants and terrorized the country. They ordered 10,000 more troops into Siberia. They sent destroyers to Saghalin. They took a census of the Russian citizens in the territory under their control and so restricted them that they did not dare sell property or even to kill their own cattle. They planned to build a Japanese town at Dekastri Bay. They extended their operations to Kamchatka, sent destroyers there and seized the fisheries, much as they had in Saghalin.

They developed plans on an extensive scale for the conversion of Vladivostok into an "international free port." In other words, the militarists attempted to justify their policy of aggression by further aggression.

Not so the group which opposed them in Japan. As early as January 24, Viscount Kato strongly attacked the Government in the Diet for arousing the suspicions of other nations by its policy in Siberia. He asserted vigorously that there was no justification for continuing the occupation, which would never solve the Russian problem. The only reply which Hara and Tanaka, the Minister of War, could bring forward, even at that time, was the worn-out argument of the danger from Bolshevism. With the progress of the Far Eastern Republic Government, however, the opponents of the occupation policy determined upon further efforts to set Japan right in the eyes of the world. A conference of high officials, both civil and military, was called at Tokyo for May 15. This conference was to discuss the revision of Japan's whole Asiatic policy, and if possible bring about a greater degree of harmony between Japan's military and civil representatives.

The military group held a preliminary conference under the presidency of the Minister of War and framed the conditions under which they would consent to withdrawal from "the region around Vladivostok," making no concession whatever on the northern territory. These

conditions are five in number and may be summarized as follows :

1. The complete abandonment of Communism in the Far Eastern Republic.

2. Absolute freedom of navigation on the Amur River.

3. The opening of Vladivostok as a free port, and the demolition of its fortifications.

4. Indemnification of Japanese subjects for all the losses they have sustained in the past three years in the territory of the Far Eastern Republic.

5. The granting of the right to all foreigners to reside and carry on business in the chief cities of the Far Eastern Republic.

Each one of these specifications furnishes its own interesting sidelight upon Japanese militarist psychology. No. 1 ignores the fact that the people of the Far Eastern Republic in the most solemn manner possible, through their Constituent Assembly, had already repudiated Communism in their fundamental law, and this without urging from Japan. No. 2 asks for the free navigation of inland waters, a thing no free nation grants, Japan herself prohibiting foreign vessels even in coastwise trade. No. 3 is a direct attack upon the sovereignty of the Russian people and an attempt to keep them for ever at the mercy of the Japanese warships. No. 4 is only admissible if the Japanese agree to a similar indemnification of the Russians for all the losses they have sustained in the past three years because of the Japanese occupation. No. 5 ignores the fact that foreigners, by virtue of the Constitution of the republic, are privileged to reside and carry on business, not only in the chief cities, but anywhere they wish in the Far Eastern Republic. By 1 and 5 the militarists would pose as the benefactors of all peoples, and by the remainder of their demands they ensured the prompt rejection of the conditions by the Russians.

Although the sessions of the conference at Tokyo

were conducted in secret, it was very generally known that it was a struggle between the two parties in the Government, one to get out of Siberia and the other to stay in, with all the logic and all the common sense on the side of the former. The public opinion of Japan and of the rest of the world in favour of the evacuation of Siberia was becoming stronger every day. Under these circumstances, it was absolutely necessary for the military party to create a diversion in their favour. Plans were made at once and so openly that it was perfectly apparent to all what was going to happen. The word was given to the reactionary groups that the time had arrived, and on May 22 the Grodekovo troops moved out in force and took Nikolsk-Ussuriski from the local militia. In the next few days several of the surrounding towns were occupied. On the 26th the Japanese disarmed almost all of the Russian militia in Vladivostok "to avoid possible bloodshed"! The next morning they returned the arms to the militia "on condition that there should be no fighting"! When they started to leave the building, the Kappelist troops, who had been brought into the city, opened fire on them. The fire was returned and the Japanese at once disarmed the militia again for breaking their agreement not to fight.

The Kappelist troops took control of the city without difficulty and set up a Government, at the head of which was Spiridon Merkoulov. Immediately a conflict ensued between the Kappelist group and the followers of Semenov, who had already announced himself as the saviour of Russia, and who expected to step into authority as commander-in-chief of the forces of the new Government. Merkoulov was upheld by the Japanese, however, and Semenov stock has been declining steadily ever since.

The new Government at once suppressed the independent papers, but even reactionary sheets protested against its policy. Strikes of the labourers began. Arrests were made on a grand scale. All of

the features of the old struggle between the forces of liberalism and autocracy became apparent at once and have continued to the present day. Commercially speaking, Vladivostok is a city clubbed into insensibility. Politically it is a city conquered. It is not allowed to retain the Government it elected, nor to place itself under the only Russian Government in the Far East.

The Japanese militarists, however, blunderingly supposed that they had demonstrated to the world by this crude stratagem the necessity for their continued occupation of the Maritime Province " to preserve peace and order." That they convinced anybody is doubtful. Certainly outsiders have long understood the real facts. Japanese statesmen know the truth. Possibly a section of the Japanese people were impressed by the " bloodless overthrow " at Vladivostok, but that this section is large is doubtful.

Following this overthrow of the elected Government at Vladivostok, and the substitution for it, under Japanese auspices, of a dummy Government which could claim no shadow of popular support, the Far Eastern Republic, through Yourin, who early in June had become Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a comprehensive note to Japan, reviewing the recent events in no uncertain terms, asking the Japanese Government whether it approved the actions of the Japanese Command, whether it intended to hinder the progress of the Far Eastern Republic, whether it thought it necessary to establish friendly relations with the Russian people, and whether it intended to withdraw its troops. This note demanded that the Japanese Command refrain from further interference with the Governmental authorities in Vladivostok, that it give a straightforward answer to the questions asked, and expressed the confidence of the Far Eastern Republic that the Japanese Government would undertake negotiations for the creation of new relations between the two peoples.

The Japanese Government, following its usual method

when a note cannot be answered with credit to itself, sent no formal answer at all. Nevertheless, it was apparent to all the world that something must be done before long. While Japan was trying to make up its mind what this something should be, an event occurred which, perhaps more than any other occurrence of recent years, wholly upset the Japanese. President Harding suggested that the Powers interested in Pacific problems meet in Washington and discuss these problems. Japan was taken aback. She was well aware that there were a number of " affairs " in which she was the chief actor that it was best not to discuss before the world. Her statesmen backed and filled. They did not know whether they could accept the President's kind invitation or not. At least, they wanted to know what the conference was going to talk about. The authorities at Washington very properly answered that that would have to be decided later. Japan must either come into the conference or stay out. To stay out was fatal, and Japan reluctantly forwarded the " accepts with pleasure " note.

November 11, the date set for the Pacific conference, was perilously close, and it behoved Japan to set her house in order with all speed. Shidehara, at Washington, showed a new interest in the settlement of the Yap dispute. Peking perceived a new amenability on the Shantung question. And Chita was at last informed that Japan was ready to negotiate with the Far Eastern Republic for the withdrawal of her troops from Siberia. After some jockeying, a conference was agreed upon. Plenipotentiaries of the two Governments met at Dairen late in August, and negotiations are still in progress.

That lengthy negotiations should be necessary merely confirms what is already known. There is no more reason for negotiations over the evacuation of Siberia than there is over the evacuation of Shantung. Japan need only notify the rightful Government in both cases that she will withdraw her troops at a certain time,

and the Far Eastern Republic and China will see to the rest. That lengthy negotiations should be necessary in either case confirms an oft-repeated statement. Japan will only withdraw her troops in either case after she has secured every obtainable concession for that withdrawal.

That she must withdraw from Siberia under present conditions is inevitable. Why then cannot the Siberians merely sit back and wait until the time comes? The map reveals the answer. There is a railroad running through the country—its alimentary system. Vladivostok harbour is its mouth, the road from Nikolsk to Vladivostok is its throat. Here, with one hand firmly pressed over the mouth, and the fingers of the other dug deep into the gullet, is the Japanese Army. Slowly it is strangling the life out of the young republic. If Vladivostok were open and the Japanese fingers removed from the throat at Nikolsk, the Ussuri Railroad, from Vladivostok to Habarovsk, would at once begin to pay its own expenses, and show a profit which might be used in assisting the remaining roads to reach a higher efficiency. Their traffic would also increase as normal trading was renewed.

But Vladivostok is not open, and the fingers still press deep at Nikolsk. They slackened their hold to some extent in the winter of 1920. The Vladivostok Government had recognized the Far Eastern Republic. Things were becoming more nearly normal. The city was quiet. Trade was beginning again. Capital was gradually recovering from its fright. Taking advantage of this situation, the Chinese Eastern Railway lowered the rate to Vladivostok from all points in Manchuria, so that it could compete with the rate through Dairen over the South Manchuria Railway of Japan. The traffic through Dairen at once dropped to a fraction of its former amount. That through Vladivostok increased accordingly. From the middle of April to the latter part of May 250 carloads a day were loaded in Manchuria and sent through the

Russian port. Part of the income from this traffic came to the Russian railways for the haul from Pogranitchnaya to the sea. At Vladivostok it was distributed to the ships of various nations.

Such a condition was not at all satisfactory to the Japanese. They greatly preferred to have this freight go over the Japanese line from Changchun to Dairen, and from there in Japanese ships to all parts of the world. That it should go through Vladivostok was not at all reasonable. A fortunate coincidence saved the situation for them. Just as it became quite apparent that Vladivostok was too peaceful and too orderly, the Kappelists moved in from Grodekovo and abolished the peace and order at Vladivostok. That port at once became unsuitable for the transhipment of goods. The traffic from Manchuria again started southward, safely in Japanese hands once more. The Japanese ships at Dairen were again assured of cargoes. And ships of other nationalities at Vladivostok must look elsewhere for business.

Vladivostok is not only the mouth of the Russian Far East. It is the heart as well. For here was the centre of all the commerce of the country, the home of the great banks, of the head offices of the great commercial concerns, the railway and steamship shops, the factories, the main industrial life of the country. Japan's grip on the Maritime Province has almost stopped the beating of this mighty heart. Commerce, finance, industry are dormant under the Japanese domination, much to the satisfaction of the merchants, financiers, and manufacturers of Japan.

As Vladivostok is the heart of the country, so too would it be the pocket-book of Eastern Siberia. Its commerce, finance and industry paid before the war the major share of the Government income from this territory. The post-office receipts alone were over 12,000,000 roubles per annum. Functioning normally, the ordinary taxes and other receipts from Vladivostok and the Maritime Province would relieve the financial

distress under which the young republic is constantly growing weaker.

So it is that the problem of relations with Japan becomes one of whether Japan can be forced to relinquish her grip upon the throat of the country before she strangles the young republic to death. The Chita Government starved into disaster, anarchy and chaos will follow, and Japan might then look for the world's approval of her occupation of the entire country as far west as Baikal, to restore the order which she herself would have been the chief instrument in destroying.

The conference at Dairen was therefore one of the tests of strength between the will of the Russian people to hold on with ever-weakening sinews and the spirit of defiant banditry in the Japanese militarists to keep their fingers deep in the throat of the victim in the face of the increasing attention of the rest of the world. The life or death of the young republic hangs on the result of the struggle.

After the problem of the relations with Japan, the most important matter for the Far Eastern Republic is the relations with Soviet Russia. It is natural that one should be influenced by the other. It is quite obvious that the new republic, with a population of less than two million people scattered over a wide territory, and almost entirely without industrial or commercial development, cannot exist against the will of two such neighbours as Japan, with her 60,000,000 people on one side, and Russia, with her 150,000,000 on the other. Its existence will necessarily depend either upon the good-will of both, or upon the interest of one in its continued existence being sufficient to check the determination of the other to destroy it.

The people of Eastern Siberia are Russian by birth, and no less so by association and sentiment. Their natural inclination to friendly relations with the motherland, even under the present conditions, has been developed to the point of utter necessity by the senseless efforts of the Japanese Command to secure military

and political control over their country. The spokesmen of Nippon are loud in their denunciation of the domination of the white race over portions of the yellow, and very positive in their assertions that such an unnatural situation cannot continue. If they or their military leaders have any reason to think that the domination of the yellow race over portions of the white is a condition any more logical or any more likely to be permanent, they will not find it necessary to go farther than Siberia to discover how egregious is their mistake.

Japan's inordinate ambition has driven the people of the new republic to seek counsel and assistance from Russia. And Russia has responded. The new Russia may or may not be opposed to imperialism. In her present condition she offers no menace to the security of any other country, least of all to the countries of the Far East. The renunciation of the old imperialistic ambitions, however, does not mean that she will stand idly by and see her own interests injured, her commercial future destroyed, and her territory occupied by other nations who still cling to the imperialistic view of world politics.

Eighteen years ago Japan astonished the world by going to war with the Russian Empire, and justified her action by showing that the success of the Russian efforts to control Korea would threaten the national existence of Japan. "Korea in Russian hands would be a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan." The world sympathized with Japan, and that sympathy, expressed in terms of moral and financial support, was in no small measure responsible for her successful termination of the war.

To-day Japan is not pointing a dagger at the heart of Russia, but she has her fingers deep in Russia's throat. Her control of Vladivostok, the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and the only port of Siberia, is slowly strangling the 10,000,000 Russian people east of the Urals, and is a present burden with which the mere menace of Russian control of Korea

cannot for a moment be compared. In other words, Japan's success in 1905, and her policy since that time, have conspired with recent events in Europe to more than reverse the situation of eighteen years ago, and to make Japan on the mainland a far more serious menace to the people of Russia than Russia ever could have been to island Japan.

Therefore must Russia, even out of the depth of her present difficulties, respond to the call for assistance from her brothers east of Baikal. Economic necessity demands that Eastern Siberia shall not remain in the hands of the Japanese. All of the forces of sentiment, traditional enmity, international politics, and economic interest, are therefore united to bring Russia to the support of the Far Eastern Republic.

The extent to which Russia can extend assistance at the present moment, however, is limited by her own difficulties. The arrangements made in the summer of 1920 for financial assistance have already been mentioned. In November an agreement was made for through traffic on the railway, with the usual provisions for international traffic. In the same month an agreement was made governing the joint use of the Selenga River. In February, 1921, an arrangement was made with the Irkutsk mint to print paper money for the republic. Other agreements fixed for the boundary between the two States regulated fishing on Lake Baikal, and determined other minor matters.

From this it appears that the relations between the new republic and Soviet Russia are in general the normal relations between contiguous States at peace with each other. That they are bound together much more closely than is usual with neighbouring States by the bonds of tradition and sentiment, is unquestionable. Hardly less so is Russia's readiness to assist the younger State against further aggression by Japan. How much of that readiness could be converted into tangible assistance under present conditions cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy.

The third immediate problem of foreign relations for

the Far Eastern Republic is China. The two countries are contiguous for over 2,500 miles, and the commerce between them before the war exceeded 80,000,000 roubles per annum. The dispatch of the Yourin mission to Peking, and the early negotiations with the Chinese authorities, have already been related. By April of 1920 negotiations had proceeded to the point where a draft treaty had been made by the Russians and submitted to the Chinese. The draft contained fifty-three articles, and covered all outstanding matters between the two countries. The Chinese Government also prepared a draft of thirty-seven articles. Negotiations were promised as soon as the Chinese authorities received the official notification of the action of the Constituent Assembly on the question of private property.

The Peking Government, however, even though it receives the recognition and the representatives of the other nations of the world, is hardly its own master. Ever since July 1920 it has been under the domination of Chang Tso-lin, who nominally holds office under it as Inspector-General of Manchuria, but who, through the exercise of military force, dictates its policy. Marshal Chang, in his turn, relies largely upon the favour of the Japanese to secure his own immediate ends, and is therefore attentive to suggestions from that quarter.

When the forces of Baron Ungern took Urga, there was much jockeying among the many Chinese generals as to which one should recover the Mongolian capital. Not that each coveted the honour, but that each was afraid to take his army so far from Peking lest some other military baron take advantage of his absence to secure funds which might otherwise have come to him. The overlord of Manchuria was finally persuaded—Chinese generals of high rank are not "ordered"—to undertake the task by a promise of something approaching $10,000,000, Chinese currency (£1,000,000). He set about making his preparations in a leisurely way, so far as military effort was concerned. There is a story, fairly well authenticated, though not proven, that he

offered Ungern $600,000 (£60,000) to retreat before his advancing hosts. Ungern wanted $1,000,000 (£100,000), and the bargaining went on, Chang meanwhile receiving $3,000,000 (£300,000) from Peking on acount.

Chita had repeatedly asked Peking for permission to enter Chinese territory and co-operate with Chinese troops in an effort to capture Ungern, but such permission was always refused. Chang could not afford to have such a good excuse for milking the Peking treasury eliminated. So negotiations of all kinds dragged between the two Governments. The Chinese raised one petty objection after another, and interposed every sort of hindrance to real progress. Meanwhile, Marshal Chang was appointed High Commissioner for Mongolia, and given full authority to settle all questions relating to that territory. Also meanwhile, the troops of the Far Eastern Republic followed the retreating Ungern into Mongolia, and themselves took over the capital. This exploit of a half-starved republic was of course very humiliating to an Inspector-General proud of his military prowess, and also very disturbing to his financial arrangements, which were still $7,000,000 short. He assumed an injured air, and refused to have any further intercourse with the Chitans until they delivered Urga to him. Incidentally, he grossly violated all the rules of diplomatic courtesy by seizing two of Yourin's trunks and taking copies of the documents which they contained before returning them to their owner.

So it is that negotiations between the Far Eastern Republic and the Chinese "Republic" remain in *statu quo,* as it were, while Chang recovers his equanimity, or some other development urges the Chinese to action. Meanwhile, commerce between the two countries proceeds without regulation, and consequently with much uncertainty. The respective nationals are wholly without treaty or other rights in the territory of the neighbouring country, and the outstanding problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway remains unsolved.

The problem of commercial regulation is merely a matter of getting at it. There is no feature in this connection which presents any special difficulty. The standard provisions of commercial treaties can be used with little alteration. The matter of the legal position of nationals of one country in the territory of the other, however, presents some knotty problems of an unusual nature.

Until the Chinese Government withdrew its recognition from the former Russian Minister in September, 1920, Russians in China enjoyed the same treaty rights as Americans, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and the nationals of other treaty Powers. The outstanding feature of these treaties was the provision for extra-territoriality, the right of treaty Power nationals to be tried for all offences and sued on civil contracts before their own consuls or courts. The purpose of these provisions was to exempt the treaty Power nationals from the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts, whose practice was based upon principles entirely different from those underlying Western jurisprudence.

When China withdrew her recognition of the Russian diplomatic and consular corps, she at the same time assumed jurisdiction over Russians living in Chinese territory. She embraced this opportunity the more eagerly, as she had been contending for some years that her own laws had been so reformed and her courts so remodelled that she was quite able to administer justice in accordance with Western standards, and that therefore she was entitled to the abolition of the extra-territoriality provisions. Now she had an opportunity to demonstrate her ability by her treatment of the Russians.

The result, however, has hardly been such as to strengthen her case. In practice the present system works a very real hardship upon the Russians in Chinese territory, which includes, of course, the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, in which is the city of Harbin. The Chinese formerly had no written law of their own, as the term "written law" is understood in the West.

Their new code is drawn up after Western models, and embodies principles of law with which the majority of Chinese are wholly unfamiliar. The judges appointed to administer the law have therefore been working under a serious handicap from the very beginning. However fair and just they may intend to be, the difficulties in their way are almost insurmountable. The result is most unfortunate for the Russians. Upon accusation by any person, no matter how irresponsible, and without any attempt at verification upon the part of the authorities, Russians are thrown into Chinese jails, and held there for months, in some cases it has been as long as six months, before any examination of their cases is made.

Even this is not the whole story. All proceedings must be translated from Russian into Chinese, and vice versa. The problem of securing proper interpreters is a most baffling one. At present the interpreters are employed by the court at a salary of $100 a month. A good Chinese-Russian interpreter can earn as much as $500 a month in Harbin from commercial concerns and banks. The court interpreters are consequently neither competent nor reliable, and in some cases are rankly dishonest. Prisoners, parties, lawyers, and judges, are thus alike placed entirely at the mercy of an underpaid subordinate.

The situation thus created is well-nigh intolerable and the responsible Russian citizens of Harbin are willing to help in any way possible to remedy the evil. It has been suggested that the Russians in China or the Russian or Far Eastern Government contribute a certain amount toward the expenses of the courts so that competent and honest interpreters can be obtained. An offer of this sort would be wholly futile, however, because of the apalling loss of face which would result if the Chinese should admit for an instant that they were in need of any assistance or even that the present system was not entirely satisfactory.

In the establishment of a new treaty status the Foreign Office of the Far Eastern Republic will have

few problems that will require more delicacy of handling than this of the treatment of Russians in China. The new Government has already announced its desire to deal with the older nation upon the basis of entire equality and to renounce the unequal privileges obtained from China by force or the threat of force under the Czarist regime. This policy has already brought about a great change in the treatment of Chinese in the territory of the Far Eastern Republic. In the desire to satisfy China as to the good intentions of the Russians in this matter, every effort has been made to secure to the Chinese in Eastern Siberia entire equality. Every protection is given them in the transaction of their business and in their daily life. They enjoy privileges and a standing in the community which ninety per cent. of the Chinese never know at home. The average Chinese has no conception of equality. He has been trained through generations to squabble and wrangle for everything he can get. To give him equality merely means he has acquired a new basis upon which to ask for still more. The idea that the equal rights of others must place a limit upon his own activities never enters his head.

The result of this situation is that the Chinese in the Far Eastern Republic are making themselves an unbearable burden to the communities in which they live. The Russian has taken few prizes for cleanliness, but he shines beside the Chinese. The Chinese homes have all the filthy odours which one associates with the poorest neighbourhoods of Peking. On the streets the Chinese vendors insolently shove others off the sidewalks. Their pedlars cry their wares into the open windows of the Russian houses in the same diabolic manner that they use in the walled alleys at home. Their merchants have created an intolerable situation for the Government employees who receive their food money in gold, by playing havoc with the exchange market. All in all China is most unfortunately represented by the men who have gone into the new republic. And yet how

promptly the howl of "persecution" goes up whenever anything goes against their liking! They are growing fat off a suffering land, and yet even the demand for their share of the taxes is reported to Peking as an "imposition."

To secure any adequate measure of protection for the Russians in China and at the same time to avoid giving rights to these peripatetic merchants which will be grossly abused in practice, is one of the grave problems of the relations between the new Russian republic and her nominally republican neighbour to the south.

The other pressing problem, and one of even greater difficulty, is that of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This road was built with Russian money and is a Russian venture from start to finish, although it runs through Chinese territory. The Far Eastern Republic, by grant from Russia, was entitled to enjoy these Russian rights, but the republic has never been able to enjoy them because of the actual occupation of the road by the Allied forces and the continuance in power upon the Board of Directors of men favourable to the old regime.

With the Far Eastern Republic and the remainder of Siberia dependent upon this road for its very existence, with China aspiring to acquire it and unduly sensitive in regard to any suggestion that she is not entirely competent to manage it, with France anxious for the return of the money she has invested in it, and with Japan determined to rule it or ruin it, the Chinese Eastern Railway promises to continue to be a bone of contention in the Far East for some years to come. Under these circumstances there has been much discussion of some modification of the plan advanced by Secretary Knox to internationalize the road. This plan was defeated at the time it was made by the joint efforts of all those who hoped to get something for themselves out of the prolonged intrigue, and any attempt to institute permanent international control now will meet with similar opposition.

And yet, until such control is an established fact,

there is in this railway question a constant menace to the world's peace. It is hardly probable, in the present state of affairs, that the control will be allowed to go to either the Far Eastern Republic or Soviet Russia, although they are the States most dependent upon the road economically. French interest is purely financial and French control would not be satisfactory to any of the interested parties. Chinese control is unthinkable to anyone who is even superficially acquainted with the superlative inefficiency, ineptitude and corruption, which is the Peking "Government." Japanese control is out of the question from any but the Japanese point of view. It would mean the end of all hope of peace in Eastern Asia for years to come. American control, however disinterested it might be, however efficient it might be, would be wholly unacceptable to Japan and just as unacceptable to China except as it served to stave off Japanese control.

While the road remains the centre of international intrigue and nations are manœuvring for political advantage, the Siberians are dependent upon the road for their economic life. To secure a working solution of this tangled problem in the immediate future is one of the most pressing and most difficult problems of the Government of the new republic. To this Government the problem of C.E.R. is one to be solved by Russia, China and Far Eastern Republic only and no interference of any other Government can be accepted.

Although the relations with Japan, Russia and China are the most prominent concerns of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government and people of the Far Eastern Republic attach hardly less importance to the matter of their relations with the United States. The United States is named first among the countries to whom the declaration of independence is addressed. Like all infant republics, this one looks to the United States for encouragement and assistance in the realization of its aspirations toward a successsful democracy.

It was natural then that the Government of the

United States should be among the first to be approached by the new republic. On March 26, 1921, under instructions from the Constituent Assembly, Yourin handed the American Minister in Peking a communication in which he outlined the history of the Far Eastern Republic, summarized the provisions of the Constitution in regard to private property, spoke of the opportunities for development in Siberia, and asked permission to send a mission to America to make clear the stand of the people of the Russian Far East on all these matters and to take up the question of commercial and diplomatic relations.

Two weeks later the Constituent Assembly itself, spurred by the events of the end of March in Vladivostok, sent a note to the Government of the United States. After reviewing the situation and emphasizing the part which America played in bringing about the intervention of the Allies and the part which Japan had played in continuing it, the Assembly requested an answer to four questions as follows:

1. Does the United States Government adhere to its declaration of August 5, 1918?

2. If it does, then how does it explain the continuance of the intervention after the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops?

3. If it does not adhere to that declaration, then when will the United States Government declare with the same solemnity that the intervention has ended?

4. When will the United States Government, which invited the Japanese Government to a military co-operation in the Russian Far East, require a definite end to the intervention which began in 1918 by that invitation?

The note closed by asking for recognition.

It can hardly be claimed that the Constituent Assembly was not justified in asking these questions. The course of action of the United States had opened the way for just such questions on the part of the people of Siberia, even though she had preserved a technical legal correctness in her position by including in her proclamation of August 5, 1918, a statement

that her judgment in the matter was not intended as an effort "to restrict the actions or interfere with the independent judgment of the Governments with which we are now associated in the war." America had, it is true, carried out her own implied promise to withdraw her troops when the object for which they entered Siberia had been accomplished. She had expressly denied any further agreement with Japan which would cover the events of April 4–5, 1920. Yet she still continues the railway experts on the Chinese Eastern and other railways although the agreement in in regard to Inter-Allied control contains the following provision:

"5. The present arrangement shall cease to be operative upon withdrawal of the foreign military forces from Siberia, and all the foreign railway experts appointed under this arrangement shall then be recalled forthwith."

Only the presence of Japanese troops gives colour of legality to the continued activities of the Inter-Allied Technical Board, which is largely American in personnel. The continuance of these men at their work may therefore be considered a tacit participation by the United States in the Japanese occupation.

The United States Government did not reply to the note of the Constituent Assembly, but two weeks later Dr. James F. Abbott and Lieut.-Col. W. J. Davis, Commercial and Assistant Military attachés, respectively, of the United States Embassy to Japan, left Tokyo for Chita on a mission of investigation. They visited Vladivostok and Habarovsk and then went to Chita where they spent about six weeks. They left Chita the first of July to make their reports to Washington. The reports have not been made public, but it is understood that they were favourable to the new Government and even that recognition was suggested.

The only announcement of the United States in regard to recognition of republics cut out of the old Russian Empire is that of Secretary Lansing on October 15, 1919, in a letter to the Lithuanian National

Council. He said then that although the United States was sympathetic toward the national aspirations of dependent peoples "it has been thought unwise and unfair to prejudice in advance of the establishment of orderly constitutional Government in Russia the principle of Russian unity." This same argument was advanced as the reason for refusing recognition to the Georgian and Azerbaijan republics.

Although no official statement has been made upon the subject, no doubt the same reasoning lies back of the refusal to recognize or have any dealings with the Far Eastern Republic. At any rate the new republic is still without any official communication from the Government of the United States except in so far as the visit of the Abbott-Davis mission can be so considered.

At the same time the Constituent Assembly sent its note to the United States announcing the establishment of a democratic republican Government in the Russian Far East, it sent notes of similar tenor to Great Britain, France, Japan and China. China alone sent an official reply in which, without extending formal recognition to the new Government, it expressed good wishes for its welfare and for peaceful relations with it. The British Government, however, sent an official observer to Chita to make a report on conditions. The Japanese, of course, have had observers in various parts of the country, including missions at Chita, Blagoveschensk and Habarovsk. When Major Mike, the observer at Chita, left the city in May he was refused permission to return in any official capacity because of Japan's part in the events at Vladivostok at the end of that month, and since then the other Japanese observers have been prevailed upon to leave.

Such are the relations of the Far Eastern Republic with its neighbours and the great nations of the world. The problems mentioned are all of them of first-rate importance and upon the early solution of some of them depends the very existence of the new State.

PART V

DOCUMENTS

OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO INTERVENTION

VLADIVOSTOK,
August 5, 1918.

In the judgment of the Government of the United States, a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching consideration of the whole situation, military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it and would injure Russia rather than help her out of her distress. Such military intervention as has been frequently proposed, even supposing it to be effiacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the East, would, in its judgment, be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. Her people, if they profited by it at all, could not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own, or to feed their own men, women and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose of winning on the western front and it would, in the judgment of the Government of the United States, be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces. As the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Cezcho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may be subsequently needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the

Russians in the organization of their own self-defence. With such object in view, the Government of the United States is now co-operating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighbourhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and Japan are the only Powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined.

The Government of the United States has therefore proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the Governments send a force of seven thousand men to Vladivostok with the purpose of co-operating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding so far as it may the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks, and the Japanese Government has consented. In taking this action, the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs, not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military forces may be obliged to occupy, and no impairment of Russian territorial integrity, either now or hereafter; but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavours to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory and their own destiny. The Japanese Government, it is understood will issue a similar assurance.

These plans and purposes of the Government of the United States have been communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, and those Governments have advised the Department of State that they assent to them in principle. No conclusion that the Government of the United States has arrived at in this important matter is intended however as an effort to restrict the actions or interfere with the independent judgment of the Governments with which we are now associated in the war.

It is also the hope and the purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labour advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association, accustomed to

organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest kind in order in some sympathetic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which an opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks. It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Governments with which it is associated will wherever necessary or possible lend their active aid in the execution of these military and economic plans.

(*Signed*) POLK,
Acting Secretary of State.

STATEMENT OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ON INTERVENTION

(*Original as given in "Japanese Year Book,* 1919–20")

The Japanese Government actuated by sentiment of sincere friendship toward the Russian people, have always entertained the most sanguine hopes of the speedy re-establishment of order in Russia, and a healthy and untrammelled development of her national life. Abundant proof, however, is now afforded to show that the Central European Empires, taking advantage of the chaotic and defenceless condition in which Russia has momentarily been placed, are consolidating their hold on that country and are steadily extending their activities to the Russian Far Eastern possessions. They have persistently interfered with the passage of the Czecho-Slovak troops through Russia. In the forces now opposing these valiant troops, the German and the Austro-Hungarian prisoners are freely enlisted, and they practically assume the position of command.

The Czecho-Slovak troops, aspiring to secure a free and independent existence for their race, and loyally espousing the common cause of the Allies, justly command every sympathy and consideration from the co-belligerents, to whom their destiny is a matter of deep and abiding concern. In the presence of the threatening danger to which the Czecho-Slovak troops are actually exposed in Siberia at the hands of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, the Allies have naturally felt themselves unable to view with indifference the course of events and a certain number of their troops have already been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok. The Government of the United States, equally sensible of the gravity of the situation, recently approached the Japanese Government with proposals for an early dispatch of troops to relieve the pressure now weighing upon the Czecho-Slovak troops.

The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with

the desires of the American Government, and also to act in harmony with their allies in this expedition, have decided to proceed at once to the disposition of suitable forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok. In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remains unshaken in their constant desire to promote relations of enduring friendship with Russia and the Russian people, and they reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated, they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory, whether political or military.

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

To the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, Japan, China, France, Italy, Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and to all the Governments and Nations of the World.

We, the authorized representatives of all the people of the Trans-Baikal territory, in Constituent Convention assembled, at the city of Verkhne-Udinsk, address ourselves in the name of the people who elected us to all the nations of the world and their Governments, and solemnly declare :

Two years of internal fratricidal war have devastated our rich country, made possible the establishment of reaction, hateful to the people, of the rule of the robber atamans and their hirelings. A black cloud of violence, robbery and murder overhung us. The rattle of machine-guns, the blaze of incendiary fires, pitiless executions, made life unbearable to us, made peaceful intercourse with our neighbours impossible, and brought upon our territory Allied intervention. Our people, on the verge of desperation, rebelled, writing on their banners " The end of civil war and the union of all the people for liberty and peace ! "

Having overthrown the usurpers, Kolchak and Semenov, the people of the territory of Trans-Baikalia, through their representatives, proclaim :

1. The Far Eastern Provinces, including the territories of Trans-Baikal, Amur, Primorsk, Saghalin, Kamchatka and the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway, due to their economic and geographic position, their extended frontier line and remoteness from the centre of the Russian Republic, shall be and hereby are declared an independent democratic Far Eastern Republic.

2. A democratic Government shall be established in the

territory of the Far Eastern Republic, representing the will of the whole people, as expressed through its duly elected representatives, and guaranteeing to all classes of society the democratic liberties which are the safeguards for the peaceful development of social forces.

3. In order to accomplish its aim, the Convention elects from its midst a Provisional Government in which representatives of all political parties and nationalities of the Republic shall also participate. To this Government the Convention delegates full political and military authority, and empowers it to continue relentlessly the fight against the remnants of reaction, to establish the rule of law and order, to organize local democratic Governments, to draft a law and prepare for the convocation of a General Constituent Assembly, which shall be convoked as soon as the reunion of Trans-Baikalia with the other provinces of the Russian Far East has been accomplished, in order to frame a democratic Constitution for the Far Eastern Republic.

4. The Convention urgently appeals to all the officers and soldiers of the former armies of Kolchak and Semenov to put an end to the rule of lawlessness and violence, to lay down their arms, guaranteeing them, in the name of the people, complete safety, and affording them the opportunity to return to their homes and peaceful labour. The Convention proclaims the abolition of capital punishment as being in contradiction to the democratic aspirations of the people.

5. Addressing itself to the nations of the world through their Governments, the Convention declares that, the Far Eastern Republic aspires to establish friendly relations with all countries, especially with those that lie on its frontiers and whose citizens are residing in the territory of the Far Eastern Republic.

The internal strife has shaken our economic life, has ruined our industry and transportation, and has brought the ghost of starvation before our eyes. Our aim is peace and peaceful labour. In close co-operation with other nations, we want to reconstruct our life upon a democratic basis. Guaranteeing to all foreign citizens full inviolability of person and property, the Constituent Convention invites all Governments to enter into relations with the Government elected by us, and to send their fully empowered representatives in order to establish relations in the common interest of peace and desires to assure

them that the people of the territory wholly support the Government in its ceaseless efforts to establish order and create conditions favourable to peaceful life and labour.

THE CONSTITUENT CONVENTION.

April 6, 1920

RECOGNITION BY SOVIET RUSSIA

MR. KRASNOSCHEKOFF,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern Republic.

On behalf of the Government of the R. S. F. S. R. I have the honour to inform you that taking into consideration the declaration of the Provisional Government of the Far Eastern Republic with regard to the formation of an independent democratic Republic on the basis stated in the said declaration, the R. S. F. S. R. hereby recognizes the establishment of the said democratic Republic with the Provisional Government at the head.

The Soviet Government is ready to enter immediately into official diplomatic relations with the Government of the new Republic in order to conclude commercial and political agreements.

Informing you of the foregoing, Monsieur le Ministre, I consider it my duty on behalf of the R. S. F. S. R., to communicate to you my desire to see the Far Eastern Republic prosperous and at peace with the neighbouring countries.

CHICHERIN,

The People's Commmissar for Foreign Affairs.

MOSCOW, *May* 14, 1920.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC

April 17, 1921.

ARTICLE I.

General Provisions.

1. The Far Eastern Republic is established as a democratic Republic.

2. The Far Eastern Republic shall be governed in strict accordance with the laws enacted under this Constitution which are binding, without exception, upon all institutions, officials, and citizens of the Republic and also upon citizens of foreign countries residing in the territory of the Republic.

3. The laws of the Republic shall be abrogated or altered only in the manner prescribed by this Constitution.

4. Ignorance of the laws of the Republic shall not be a valid reason for their non-observance nor shall it exempt from penalties for such non-observance.

5. The laws of the Republic shall not violate the provisions of this Constitution.

6. The process of promulgation and enforcement of the laws of the Republic shall be determined by a special law.

ARTICLE II.

The Territory of the Republic.

7. The whole of the territory of the former Russian Empire east of the River Selenga and of Lake Baikal to the Pacific Ocean, including the provinces of Pri-Baikal, Za-Baikal, Amur, the Primorsk, Pri-Amur and the northern part of Saghalin, is declared to be the independent Far Eastern Republic.

The Far Eastern Republic inherits all the rights and obligations of Russia with regard to the above territories and with regard to the treaties and agreements concluded with foreign

countries by the fully empowered Russian Government relating to the territory and waters of China and other countries conterminous with the frontiers of the Republic.

8. The boundaries between the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic and the Far Eastern Republic are by mutual agreement declared as follows : the River Selenga from its exit from Mongolia to the administrative border of the former Seleginsk, Burgusinsk and Verkhne-Udinsk counties, the border of these counties to Lake Baikal, the middle of Lake Baikal, the former border between the Yakutsk, Za-Baikal and Amur districts to the watershed between the rivers Kiran and Pessmun and the watershed of the said rivers to the Okhotsk Sea at Cape Medjelind, including all the islands to the south of the latitude of the said Cape.

ARTICLE III.

Citizens and Their Rights.

SECTION I.

Citizenship.

9. The following are recognized as citizens of the Far Eastern Republic :

(1) All Russian citizens born in the territory of the Republic within the boundaries prescribed by Article II of the present Constitution.

(2) All Russian citizens who were living in the territory at the date of the declaration of independence (April 6, 1920).

(3) All Russian citizens who have entered the country since the declaration of independence or who shall enter after the publication of the present Constitution and are not registered as citizens of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

(4) All Russian citizens residing in the territory of the Chinese Eastern Railway who within six months after the promulgation of this Constitution have not acquired the citizenship of any other country nor presented documentary evidence of their foreign citizenship.

(5) All foreigners naturalized under the laws of the Far Eastern Republic.

10. From citizenship of the Republic are excluded all natives of the former Russian Empire who within six months after the publication of this Constitution shall have made a written

statement and presented documentary evidence of their citizenship in the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic or in any other independent State formed in the territory of the former Russian Empire.

SECTION II.

The Rights of Citizens.

11. It is hereby declared that all citizens regardless of sex, occupation, race, faith and political creed are equal before the law. The division of citizens into classes, all class privileges and distinctions, and civil and military titles are abolished.

12. No citizen shall be liable for any criminal act committed by him except in accordance with the law of the Republic.

13. Liberty of conscience is guaranteed to all citizens of the Republic. Citizens shall enjoy their civil and political rights regardless of their religious faith and no person in the territory of the Republic shall be prosecuted by any authority or shall have his rights abridged on account of his religious convictions.

14. The Church is separated from the State. Every citizen shall have the right to profess any faith or none.

15. Only those civil acts shall be legally valid which are executed by the proper civil authorities in the prescribed legal manner.

16. Documents issued to citizens by Government institutions and officials shall make no reference to the religious profession or non-profession of the citizens.

17. Citizens are guaranteed complete freedom of assembly, of speech and of publication.

Criminal publication or speech shall be punishable only in accordance with the law.

Citizens shall not be prosecuted for the free expression of their opinions.

18. The right to organize and maintain unions or societies (including religious societies) is hereby declared, provided such unions and societies do not pursue aims punishable by the laws of the Republic.

NOTE 1. The acquirement of juridical rights by unions and societies (including religious communities and parishes) is provided for by the civil law.

NOTE 2. The suppression of unions and societies shall be effected by judicial procedure.

19. The right of workers to strike is hereby declared, and such right shall in no wise be restricted by the State.

20. The personal liberty, the dwellings and the correspondence of all citizens are declared to be inviolable.

21. No citizen shall be punished except in accordance with the law. No citizen shall be arrested or imprisoned, nor shall a search be effected either of his person or of his home, nor shall there be any other restriction of the liberty of the citizens except as provided by law and only on presentation of a warrant duly issued by a court.

An exception to this law shall be allowed when an arrest is effected *in flagrante delicto*. Such an arrest shall be legal without the writ of a court, but the arrested person shall be informed within twenty-four hours of the charge brought against him.

22. The arrested person or any citizen shall have the right to demand that a charge be brought against the arrested person immediately or that he be released.

23. Without the consent of the householder no person shall enter any dwelling except in response to an appeal for help and in order to give that help, or in case of accident, or in execution of the orders of a court. An exception to this rule shall be allowed only when an arrest is effected *in flagrante delicto*.

24. Censorship of mails, and of telegraphic and telephonic correspondence is forbidden.

25. Every citizen shall have the right to choose freely his profession, to change his place of residence and to move freely within or without the territory of the Republic except when otherwise provided by law.

26. Corporal and capital punishment are henceforth and for ever entirely abolished.

27. Prohibition to own and dispose of property, undertakings, enterprises and their products or the restrictions of the right to ownership thereof shall be effective only in accordance with the law and only in the interests of the common weal.

28. Small nationalities and national minorities within the territory of the Republic shall enjoy the right of the widest autonomy within limits which shall be prescribed by law.

29. Each citizen in communicating with Government institutions and officials and also in official correspondence and in his commercial books shall have the right to use his native language. A special law shall provide for the forms and regulations under

which these languages shall be used in local municipalities, in courts and in official communications.

30. Foreigners residing in the territory of the Far Eastern Republic shall enjoy all the rights of the citizens of the Republic except as definitely restricted by law.

ARTICLE IV.

The Government.

SECTION I.

The Central Government.

SUB-SECTION I.

General Provisions.

31. The sovereignty of the Far Eastern Republic is vested in the people of the Republic, and in them only.

32. The people exercise their sovereignty through the National Assembly and through the Government elected by the Assembly.

SUB-SECTION II.

The National Assembly.

33. The National Assembly is elected by universal, direct, equal and secret ballot on the system of proportional representation for a term of two years, the number of the members being determined on the ratio of one member for each fifteen thousand of the population of the Republic.

34. The legislative power is vested in the National Assembly.

35. All sane citizens of the Republic without distinction of sex, faith or nationality who have reached the age of eighteen years and whose rights are not restricted by law shall enjoy the right of voting for or being elected to the National Assembly.

36. Citizens in military service shall have the right of suffrage for the National Assembly equally with other citizens and shall vote at the elections in common with the whole population. An exception to the common vote shall be made only to the army at the front or during military movements.

37. Citizens in military service or engaged in any other Government work when elected to the National Assembly shall be released from their duties for the entire period of their membership of the National Assembly.

38. The National Assembly shall meet on the first of February

and the first of November of each year. The length of its session shall be within the discretion of the Assembly, but the session shall discontinue during the harvest season. Extra sessions of the National Assembly can be initiated by the Government or at the request of a half the total members of the Assembly.

39. Each National Assembly ceases to have authority when a new National Assembly meets.

40 The newly elected National Assembly shall be opened by the President of the outgoing Assembly and immediately after the opening new presiding officers shall be elected by secret ballot.

41. No member of the National Assembly shall be arrested or subjected to criminal prosecution except by order of the Assembly itself, unless in the case of an arrest made *in flagrante delicto*, in which case the President of the National Assembly shall be notified within twenty-four hours of the arrest. The President is empowered to release the arrested member by his own authority, but he shall report the matter to the next session of the National Assembly for decision.

42. The functions of the National Assembly shall be :

(1) The consideration and enactment of the laws governing State and social life.

(2) The consideration, approval or disapproval of all international (commercial or other) treaties between the Government of the Far Eastern Republic and foreign Governments.

(3) The determination of the national budget and the examination of the financial reports ; the appropriation of extraordinary expenditures, the levying of taxes, customs and duties, the investigation and approval of loans, the sanction of note issues ; and the approval of concession agreements, except such as are under the exclusive control of the Government and the Council of Ministers.

(4) The establishment and modification of the currency, and monetary system and of the system of weights and measures.

(5) The organization of the armed forces of the Republic.

(6) The supreme control over the administration of the Republic.

(7) The granting of amnesty.

(8) The declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, and

(9) The determination of other questions at its own discretion.

43. During the recesses of the National Assembly the Government shall have the right to issue provisional laws, dealing with matters that do not admit of delay until the re-assembling of the National Assembly. These laws must neither modify nor suspend this Constitution either in whole or in part. All such laws shall be submitted for the consideration and approval of the National Assembly immediately on the resumption of its sessions. The National Assembly shall have the right to suspend the application of such laws pending discussion.

Sub-Section III.

The Government.

44. The Government of the Far Eastern Republic shall consist of seven members and shall be elected by the National Assembly for two years.

45. The election of the Government shall take place during a session of the National Assembly by a secret vote, the election shall only be held when two-thirds of the members of the Assembly are present at the session. In order to be duly elected to the Government the candidates must have received not less than half of the votes of the Assembly present.

46. There shall be no re-election of the Government before the expiry of its term of office except in the event of death or retirement of four of its members.

47. Members of the Government shall be citizens of the Far Eastern Republic holding electoral rights for the National Assembly.

48. The functions of the Government shall be :

(1) The appointment and dismissal of the President of the Council of Ministers, the Comptroller-General, the Ministers and their assistants on the recommendation of the President, and all other officers whose appointment and dismissal is vested in the Government.

(2) The appointment of representatives of the Republic in intercourse with foreign countries.

(3) The convocation of special sessions of the National Assembly.

(4) The granting of amnesty.

(5) The publication of laws passed by the National Assembly.

(6) The promulgation of provisional laws during the recess

of the National Assembly in accordance with paragraph 43 of this Constitution.

(7) The suspension and annulment of all orders of the Council of Ministers which in the opinion of the Government are in conflict with the laws or the spirit of this Constitution.

49. The Government and the Council of Ministers together shall constitute the supreme executive power within the territory of the Republic, and the functions of this supreme executive power shall be :

(1) The general administration of the country and the direction of its domestic and foreign policies.

(2) The organization of the military forces of the Republic.

(3) The preliminary consideration of terms of peace and the defence of the territorial integrity of the Republic.

(4) The conclusion of loans, and of customs, commercial and other treaties and financial agreements, and the granting of concessions, by and with the advice and consent of the National Assembly.

(5) The drafting of a preliminary financial budget.

50. The Government has the right to veto any law passed by the National Assembly if in the opinion of the Government such law is in conflict with the Constitution. Laws thus vetoed shall be returned to the National Assembly for reconsideration and if after reconsideration two-thirds of the members of the Assembly present shall again pass the Bill, the law shall be valid and shall not be subject to the veto of the Government.

51. All Acts of the Government and all provisional laws, issued in accordance with paragraph 43, in order to become effective must be countersigned by the Council of Ministers or by one of them, the Council of Ministers as a body being responsible to the National Assembly for such signature.

52. On a charge of high treason being preferred, members of the Government shall be prosecuted by special resolution of the National Assembly.

Sub-Section IV.

53. The Council of Ministers shall consist of all Ministers. The number of the Ministers shall be specified by special statutes governing their organization.

54. The President of the Council of Ministers may hold a portfolio or remain Minister without portfolio.

55. The Comptroller-General shall be present at all the meetings of the Council of Ministers and the Government in a consultative capacity.

56. Ministers shall be citizens of the Far Eastern Republic entitled to electoral rights for the National Assembly.

57. A Minister shall not simultaneously be a member of the Government, but he may at the same time be a member of the National Assembly.

58. All Ministers shall have the right to appear before the National Assembly on questions relating to their respective departments.

59. The Ministers as a body and individually shall be responsible before the National Assembly for the actions, orders and resolutions of the Council, and also of each Minister and likewise for the ministerial counter-signature of all Government Acts. In addition to their political responsibility, Ministers shall be liable to prosecution by the National Assembly for offences committed in the performance of their respective duties.

60. In case the National Assembly passes a vote of no confidence in the Council of Ministers, the latter shall resign.

61. The Ministers shall answer all questions and interpellations from the National Assembly.

Sub-Section V.

Initiation of Legislation.

62. The right of initiating legislation is vested in all citizens of the Far Eastern Republic holding electoral rights for the National Assembly. This right shall be subject to conditions stated in the next paragraph.

63. A declaration in favour of enacting a law or resolution shall be signed by a thousand citizens. The draft of the proposed law or resolution shall be added to the declaration.

64. The right of initiating legislation is vested in the Council of Ministers as a body. This right is also vested in the Government of the Far Eastern Republic.

65. The right of initiating legislation is vested in all the members of the National Assembly. A declaration in favour of enacting a law or resolution shall be signed by not less than five members of the National Assembly and the draft of the proposed law or resolution shall be added to the declaration.

SECTION II.

Local Authorities.

SUB-SECTION I.

General Provisions.

66. The Local Government shall consist of self-government bodies elected by all the people of a district by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation.

67. The Governments of the provinces, counties, urban districts, rural districts, and villages shall control within their respective jurisdiction all local administrative and public affairs and shall enforce within their respective jurisdictions all laws and resolutions of the Central Government.

68. Local Government bodies shall independently control local administrative and public affairs ; subordinating themselves to the laws enacted, by the Government of the Republic, and to the established legal control of their activities, the Local Government bodies shall have the right to issue, provided they do not violate this Constitution and other State laws, by-laws which shall be binding equally with the national laws and regulations, on all persons and institutions. Duly issued compulsory by-laws may be suspended and abrogated by the Government of the Republic when in conflict with the interests of the Republic.

69. Within the limits of their respective jurisdictions, the Local Government bodies when carrying out the laws, regulations, and instructions of the Central Government shall act in accordance with the directions of the Central Government and be liable to legal proceedings in case of non-compliance with such regulations and instructions.

70. For the execution of State tasks requiring rigid centralization (military schemes, railway control, etc.) and also for the administration of lands, enterprises, public works and other properties under the control of the Central Government, the Central Government shall establish in a manner defined by law its own local offices. The possible bases and methods upon which the Local Governments participate in the accomplishment of the aforementioned State tasks shall be defined by law,

Sub-Section II.

Provincial Governments.

The Provincial Assembly.

71. The Provincial Assembly of Delegates elected by the people of the province for two years by universal equal, direct and secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, shall be the highest provincial authority.

72. The election to the Provincial Assembly shall be in conformity with the laws of election to the National Assembly, the number of members of the Assembly being in the ratio of one member to each two thousand five hundred citizens.

73. A general election of a new Provincial Assembly before the expiration of the term of the sitting Assembly can take place either on the order of the State legislative authorities or on the order of the Provincial Assembly or on the demand of one-third of the provincial electors. An election of new delegates for a given electoral district before the expiry of a current term, shall be held only on the demand of two-thirds of all the electors of the district.

74. The Provincial Assembly shall meet at its own discretion, but not less than twice yearly. Special sessions of the Assembly shall be called when deemed necessary by the provincial administration and on the initiative thereof or on the demand of not less than one-third of the members of the Provincial Assembly.

75. The functions of the Provincial Assembly shall be :

a. The election of the provincial administration.

b. The control of all the administrative organizations in the province.

c. The settlement of all local administrative matters and public affairs.

d. The enforcement of all laws, instructions and regulations of the Central Government ; and

e. The settlement of all such questions as by special laws come within the competence of the Provincial Assembly, and all questions pertaining to the province that the Provincial Assembly, without violating the Constitution and laws of the Republic, may desire to discuss.

76. For the execution of tasks assigned to the Provincial Assembly, the Assembly shall have the right :

a. To issue regulations upon all matters, within the competence of the Provincial Assembly.

b. To levy local taxes and duties in accordance with the State legislation.

c. To discuss and approve the provincial budget.

d. To provide for the enforcement of the laws, regulations and instructions of the Central Government.

e. To approve the plans of the provincial administration and to discuss and approve the reports of its work ; and

f. To adopt measures for the effective solution of all administrative problems in the province.

The Provincial Administration.

77. The provincial administration shall be elected by the Provincial Assembly for two years.

78. The Provincial Assembly shall have the power to decide upon the election of a new provincial administration before the expiration of any current term also to prosecute the members of the administration for criminal offences. The Government shall have the right to prosecute the members of the provincial administration and shall also have the right to initiate a new election of the administration, and for this purpose it shall have the right to call for a special session of the Provincial Assembly.

79. The provincial administration shall organize the following departments : executive, labour, justice, social welfare, education, finance, agriculture, food supplies, commerce, industry, public health and others.

80. The provincial departments shall be subordinated (paragraph 69) to the corresponding Ministries through the provincial administration, which shall be responsible for the work of all the provincial departments.

81. The functions of the provincial administration shall be :

a. The enforcement of all the laws, regulations and instructions of the Central Government.

b. The execution of all resolutions and regulations of the Provincial Assembly,

c. The organization, direction and supervision of the work of all authorities subordinate to the provincial administration.

d. The adoption of measures for the prevention of crime.

e. The drafting of a preliminary provincial budget.

f. The convocation of the Provincial and, when necessary, of the County Assemblies of Delegates.

g. The accomplishment of all other tasks which by special law are committed to it.

82. The provincial administration shall have the right to pass special regulations during the recess of the Provincial Assembly on matters within the competence of the Provincial Assembly, such special regulations being necessarily submitted to the Provincial Assembly for discussion at its next session.

83. The representatives of the Central Government may protest against the regulations and instructions of the Provincial Assembly and of the provincial administration that violate the laws and regulations of the Central Government, and parties or institutions affected by any such regulation may also lodge a complaint there-against, in the manner and on the grounds specified by special law.

Sub-Section III.

The Provincial Emissaries of the Government.

84. In order to effect connection between the Central Government of the Republic and the Local Government bodies and also in order to establish democratic rule and order, a provisional institute of Provincial Emissaries of the Government shall be established.

85. Provincial Emissaries appointed by the Government shall be the Government's representatives in the Provinces.

86. Provincial Emissaries shall be empowered within their jurisdictions to supervise and control the enforcement by the Local Government bodies and also by the offices of the Central Government, of the laws, instructions and regulations of the Government.

Sub-Section IV.

The Administrative Authorities of the Counties, Urban Districts, Rural Districts and Villages.

87. The administrative authorities of the counties, urban districts, rural districts and villages shall have jurisdiction within their respective areas in accordance with the aforementioned provisions of this Constitutions pertaining to Provincial Government bodies. The rural district administration in relation to the village administration, the county administration in relation to the rural district and village administrations, and the provincial administration in relation to the county, the urban district, the rural district and village administrations, shall have the same rights as those vested in the Central Government in relation to the provincial administration.

88. Cities with a population of more than twenty thousand shall be excluded from the general county organization and shall form independent counties; other cities shall be included in the county organization with the status of rural districts.

89. County Assemblies and City Assemblies with the status of County Assemblies shall be elected for two years by the same procedure as for the Provincial Assemblies, their number being in the ratio of one member to each thousand citizens, provided however that the total number of the members in the Assembly be not less than thirty nor more than one hundred and fifty.

90. The Rural District Assembly and also City Assemblies with the status of Rural District Assemblies shall be elected for one year, by the same procedure as for the Provincial and County Assemblies, their number being in the ratio of one member to each hundred citizens, provided however that the total number of the members in the Rural District Assembly shall not be less than twenty nor more than one hundred; and for the City Assemblies mentioned herein the delegates shall be not more than fifty.

91. The County, City and Rural District Assemblies shall be controlled in the same manner as the Provincial Assemblies; provided however that the City Assembly shall have not less than twelve sessions and the Rural District Assembly not less than three sessions a year.

92. The Village Assembly shall consist of all the citizens of the village having electoral rights for the National Assembly and shall be convoked at its own discretion.

93. The Village Assembly shall elect from its members a village committee for a period of not less than six months and not more than one year.

SECTION III.

The Court.

94. The People's Court shall be the only Court in the territory of the Republic.

95. The Court is independent of the other Government authorities and shall administer justice in the name of the people of the Far Eastern Republic.

96. The judicial authorities shall uphold the laws of the Republic and their jurisdiction shall extend over the entire territory and the whole population of the Republic. The per-

sonnel, the competence and procedure of the judicial authorities shall be determined by special laws.

97. Judges shall be elected from amongst those citizens, satisfying the requirements of the law for a period of time determined by law. Judges can be dismissed prior to the expiration of their term, by the decision of the Court.

98. Citizens of the Republic shall participate in the administration of justice by service on juries which shall render judgments in common with the judges. A special law shall define the conditions under which jurymen shall participate in the administration of justice.

99. In the administration of justice the judges shall be guided by the existing laws and by the dictates of their conscience.

100. All causes shall be heard and all judgments and verdicts shall be announced in public. Hearing *in camera* shall take place only by the decision of the judges in conformity with the law.

101. The organization of special courts and the causes to be submitted to these courts shall be definitely determined by law.

102. Complaints to a Court of Appeal are forbidden. The judgment of a court may be submitted to cassation, and the Court of Cassation shall have the right to annul the judgment if such be found unjust.

SECTION IV.

State Board of Control.

103. The National Board of Control is independent and is directly subordinated within its jurisdiction to the legislative authorities.

104. The National Board of Control shall consist of:

(1) The State Comptroller-General and two Assistant State Comptrollers-General appointed by the Government.
(2) The College of State Control.
(3) The Council of State Control.
(4) The Central State Board of Control.
(5) The Local Department of the State Board of Control.
(6) The Field Department of the State Board of Control.

105. The Central College of the State Board of Control shall consist of the State Comptroller-General (who is also the President of the College), his two assistants and five members of the College elected, one by the united workers of the Far Eastern

Republic, three by the united peasantry, and one by the indigenous nationalities of the Republic. The powers of the elected members shall be officially confirmed by the legislative authorities.

NOTE. Until the union of the peasant organizations of the Far Eastern Republic the peasant members of the Central College shall be elected by the peasant delegates of the National Assembly.

106. The Provincial College of the State Board of Control consists of the Manager of the Provincial Department of the State Board of Control (who is also the President of the College), and his assistant, appointed by the Central College ; and of three members of the College elected by the Provincial Assembly for the period of its term.

107. The County College of the State Board of Control shall consist of the Manager of the County Department of the State Board of Control (who is also the President of the College) appointed by the Central College, and two members of the College elected by the District Assembly for the period of its term.

108. The Comptroller-General shall be present at the meetings of the Cabinet and the Government in a consultative capacity.

109. The State Board of Control shall :

a. Supervise the lawfulness and expediency of the work of Government institutions and officers, likewise of social organizations and private enterprises in the matter of national economy.

NOTE. Public organizations and private enterprises are subject to the control of the State Board of Control if and when they are financed or subsidized by the Government or are acting on the Government's orders or guarantee.

b. Supervise the strict and precise execution, both centrally and locally of all laws and regulations lawfully issued and pertaining to the national economy.

c. Investigate the just distribution of various manufactured products and articles of consumption.

d. Investigate the different branches of national economy and report the result to the legislative body.

e. Examine financial estimates, projects, budgets and present their reports thereon to the legislative body at the same time as the budget is brought before the National Assembly.

f. Supervise the proper distribution of assigned credits.

g. Report upon the various financial and economic plans and proposals of the administrative departments, and also upon bills and proposed ordinances submitted to the legislative body for new Government expenditures and report on proposed changes in the financial and economic policy of the Republic.

h. Veto, when exceptional circumstances appear to warrant, any plans of the administrative department that are obviously detrimental to the national wealth.

i. Draw up inventories of the State property and make yearly reports on their working and condition, to be submitted to the legislative body at the same time set for the presentation of the budget.

k. Have direct supervision over the work of all departments and their local branches and generally over all Government bodies.

l. Prosecute Government officials for negligence and offences in connection with their respective duties, and also private citizens for crimes likely to cause losses to the Government; and shall inform the authorities concerned of the dismissal of officials.

110. For the realization of the proposed task, large groups of the working population shall be invited to participate in the State Board of Control, both permanently and for purposes of occasional inspection.

111. A bureau of complaints shall be established in each department of the State Board of Control for the receipt of complaints and declarations concerning wrongful acts, abuses and violations of the law by officials of all departments.

112. The Field Departments of the State Board of Control shall be subordinated only to the Central College of the State Board of Control and through it to the legislative body.

SECTION V.

National Self-administration.

113. All indigenous nationalities and national minorities within the territory of the Republic shall enjoy the right of self-determination on a broad basis.

114. The national self-administrative bodies shall be guided in their activites by the laws of the Republic.

115. A Ministry of National Affairs with corresponding national departments shall be established to control and guide the national self-administration.

SUB-SECTION II.

Autonomy of the Buriat-Mongols.

116. The entire area inhabited by the Buriat-Mongols shall form a special territory under the name of the "Autonomous Buriat-Mongol Territory" the boundaries of which shall be fixed by law.

117. In order to abolish the interlocking of strips of land owned by the Buriat-Mongols and Russians, a special commission for the regulation of land relations of the Buriat-Mongols and Russians, shall be established by the Government, such commission consisting of equal numbers of representatives of the interested parties.

118. The population of the Buriat-Mongols Autonomous Territory shall be subject to the general laws of the Republic, but within the limits of its territory it shall be independent in the matter of establishing courts, economic, administrative institutions and such institutions as pertain to their national culture.

119. The Autonomous Buriat-Mongol Territory within the limits of its competence shall be self-administered, in accordance with general laws of the Republic, by its Territorial Assembly of delegates who shall elect an executive body—Territorial Administration—and the Territorial Assembly of Delegates shall be empowered within the independent spheres enumerated in paragraph 118 of this Constitution to pass territorial laws which shall not conflict with the general laws of the Republic.

120. All laws, instructions and regulations of the Central Government of a general State character shall be enforced in the autonomous Buriat-Mongol territory through the territorial administration.

SUB-SECTION III.

Autonomy of National Minorities.

121. All the national minorities in the territory of the Republic shall be granted autonomy in matters pertaining to their national culture.

122. Autonomy in matters pertaining to the national culture of minorities shall be made effective by their respective self-governing bodies, elected by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot, on the basis of proportional representation.

123. The national self-administrative bodies shall be public

bodies legally authorized, and their competence shall be limited to matters pertaining to the national culture of the respective minorities.

124. The language of the autonomous national cultural groups is the language of the respective nation: Ukrainian, Yiddish, Korean, Tartar, etc.

125. Funds for the satisfaction of the cultural needs of each national minority, in due proportion shall be provided from the general State budget.

ARTICLE V.

The Bases of the National Economic Organization.

SECTION I.

The Land.

126. Private ownership of land, forests, waterways, and their resources within the territory of the Far Eastern Republic is for ever abolished.

127. All land in whose soever use or possession it may be is declared to be the property of the workers and forms the national fund.

128. The manner of the use and management of the land, forests, and waterways and their resources shall be provided for by a special law.

129. The apportioning to the workers of land of agricultural value shall be by allotments established by the land authorities of the local administration according to climate and soil.

130. The general and fundamental basis of the right to use land is personal labour. Exceptions to this rule shall be allowed in cases specially provided for by the land laws and the right to use the land shall not be dependent upon creed, nationality or sex.

131. The people themselves shall decide whether the employment of the land shall be effected collectively, by groups, or by individuals.

NOTE. The land allotment to the Buriat-Mongols for cattle-breeding shall be determined in accordance with the conditions of their economic life.

SECTION II.

Labour.

132. Having undertaken the task of organizing the national economy and an equal distribution of the burden of its restora-

tion, the Far Eastern Republic affirms that work must be obligatory upon all citizens of the Republic.

133. The normal working time shall not exceed eight hours for day work and six hours for night work with an uninterrupted weekly rest of not less than forty-two hours.

134. For persons under eighteen years of age or for those engaged in severe work detrimental to their health the normal working day shall not exceed six hours.

135. Overtime work shall be forbidden except in extraordinary circumstances and with the consent of the professional unions and labour organizations.

136. In agriculture on account of its peculiar nature, overtime shall be allowed, over-time pay being reckoned from the basis of an eight-hour working-day.

137. The valuation of the agricultural products, in cases where hired labour is not used, shall be determined by law on representations from the Union of Peasants, taking as a basis the eight-hour working-day, including the cost of materials.

138. In the case of very severe labour, or labour prejudicial to the health over-time shall be positively forbidden for both men and women under eighteen years of age. Night work shall be positively forbidden for men under eighteen years of age, and for women regardless of age.

139. Women engaged in manual labour shall be released from their work for eight weeks before confinement and for eight weeks after it ; and for six weeks before confinement and six weeks after it, if engaged in other work.

140. Children under sixteen years of age shall not be employed.

141. In order to guarantee to the workers a normal living minimum wage, the Republic shall establish by law on representations from the workers through the central professional organizations, a minimum real working wage which shall be obligatory upon all Government, public and private enterprises.

142. Workers are guaranteed through their professional and industrial organizations the right of voting membership in the Government economic bodies, the right of participation in Government enterprises, and also participation in Government control of private enterprises.

143. The Republic guarantees through the enactment of appropriate laws the protection of labour by the fullest participation of the workers in the Committee for the Inspection of Labour Welfare, elected by the professional unions.

144. Insurance with the full participation of the insured shall be established against all risks for all workers in Government, public or private enterprises or institutions and the premium shall be paid by the respective employers without any reduction of the earnings of the insured.

145. All workers and employees shall be entitled to one month's leave after having worked not less than one year and to a fortnight's leave after working not less than six months with the right to full pay during leave.

SECTION III.

The Financial-Economic System.

SUB-SECTION I.

General Provisions.

146. The institution of private ownership is maintained. All citizens and private companies are guaranteed the inviolability of their movable and immovable property subject to the restrictions provided by this Constitution.

147. The granting to private citizens or companies of the right to use and develop the resources of land, forests and waterways, by lease or concession, shall be in accordance with the legislation governing such leases or concessions; it being provided that the term for any concession or lease shall not exceed thirty-six years. Leases and concessions may also be granted to foreign persons or companies, provided however that other conditions being equal, preference should be given to citizens and companies of the Far Eastern Republic. In the case of competition between private persons and public organizations preference shall, all other conditions being equal, be given to the public organizations.

148. The Government shall, by appropriate legislation, give the fullest assistance to rural economic life in all its forms, in the first place to those lowest in the economic scale; and also to the promotion of all forms of public collective economic life, with a view to their development.

SUB-SECTION II.

Taxes.

149. No person shall be exempt from paying taxes except in cases provided for by the law.

150. Except in cases specially exempted by the law dues for the State or local administration shall be collected only in the form of taxes.

151. No taxes, direct or indirect and no duties shall be introduced or collected within the territory of the Republic except under the authority of the law.

152. The levying of State taxes and duties shall be the prerogative of the legislative authority. The levying of local taxes and dues by the local self-administrations shall be in accordance with paragraph 76 relating to local self-administration.

153. Indirect taxes on commodities of general consumption shall be allowed as a provisional measure only on the grounds and to the extent strictly specified by law. On articles of luxury indirect taxation shall be allowed as a permanent measure; and indirect taxes shall be subject to yearly revision by legislative process.

Sub-Section IV.

State Revenue and Expenditure and the State Budget.

154. The principal State revenue shall be derived from the progressive income tax, property tax, tax on title-deeds, inheritance tax, tax on unearned increment, tax on donation, etc, and the income from State enterprises and monopolies.

Note. The minimum income and also the minimum property and stock-in-trade not subject to tax shall be determined by law.

155. State monopolies commercial and industrial and the extent of their contribution to the State treasury shall be determined by legislative process.

156. All the State revenues and expenditures shall be incorporated in the general State budget.

157. The State budget shall be submitted for approval to the National Assembly not later than two months before the financial year.

Note. Until the approval of the first budget all State expenditures shall be met by credits allotted by the Government in each specific case by legislative process.

158. If the State budget be not approved before the financial year, the Government may, pending the approval of the budget avail itself of credits equal to those allotted in the previous budget to meet necessary Government expenses, but only for a period of not more than one-third of the year.

159. No expenditure of Government funds shall take place without an appropriation in the State budget or without the passing of a special law.

160. No pensions nor rewards shall be provided from the State treasury except as authorized by law.

161. All appropriations in the State budget shall be used for the purposes and within the limits specified in the budget, and shall not be used for any other purposes without special sanction from the Government.

Sub-Section IV.

State Loans.

162. No State loans, domestic or foreign no financial obligations which would embarrass the State treasury, and no mortgages shall be concluded without the sanction of the law.

Note. All loans, financial obligations and mortgages concluded or made by the Republic before the ratification of this Constitution, but sanctioned by the National Assembly, shall be recognized as valid by the Republic and guaranteed as if the Constitution were in effect.

163. No new currency system shall be introduced, no currency shall be debased, no currency shall be withdrawn from circulation, and no new monetary tokens shall be issued except by legislative process.

164. The weight, the fineness and the value of the coinage shall be determined by the law. The control and supervision of everything pertaining to coinage, the settling of disputes regarding fineness, assaying and all matters connected therewith, and the issue of paper notes shall be regulated by law.

ARTICLE VI.

The Defence of the Republic.

165. The people in arms are the sole defenders of their own liberty, and therefore for the defence of the country universal military training on the militia system of all male citizens of the Republic between the age of eighteen and forty-five shall be established.

166. Universal training shall take place at the territorial military centres without interrupting the participation of the citizens in social productive work.

Note : The division of the Republic into territorial military

districts and the manner of universal military training shall be established by legislative process.

167. The permanent bulwark of the defence of the country shall be the regular People's Revolutionary Army. The Army shall be organized on the basis of universal military training for all male citizens of the Republic and shall consist of :

(1) Male citizens of twenty years of age conscribed for a period of two years, and

(2) Volunteers from the age of eighteen years whose number shall be determined by legislative process.

168. The military service of the indigenous nationalities of the Republic shall be determined by a special law.

169. The supreme direction of the People's Revolutionary Army shall be vested in the Government of the Far Eastern Republic.

170. The formation and organization of the People's Revolutionary Army is determined by legislative process.

171. In the interest of the defence of the Republic the Government shall have the right to mobilize all or part of the citizens capable of carrying arms. Such mobilization shall be effected by legislative process.

172. The maintenance of citizens on military service, the welfare of their families and also the social welfare of citizens who have been rendered incapable during military service and of the families of those who died in the defence of the Republic shall be determined by law.

173. Each citizen during military service shall enjoy his civil rights and shall be under the same civil obligations as all other citizens of the Republic.

ARTICLE VII.

Public Education.

174. The Republic shall undertake the task of providing for all citizens and in the first instance for the workers a broad education.

175. The school is separated from the Church. Religious teachings, and religious services shall be forbidden in all Government, public and private schools following a general curriculum.

176. Education shall be compulsory and free for all children of school age, the cost being borne by the State ; and the social

welfare of all children of school age shall also be provided for by the State.

177. Co-education of the two sexes shall be established in all schools of the Republic.

178. The education and instruction in all the schools of the Republic shall form one system, united by one common aim and based on labour principles of education.

179. All nationalities of the Republic shall have the right to establish their own national language schools.

ARTICLE VIII.

The Arms and the Flag of the Republic.

The State Arms.

180. The State arms shall be as follows : on a red shield is a pine garland in the middle of which on a ground of daybreak is the rising sun and a five-pointed silver star (in the upper ground), crossed over a wheatsheaf are an anchor and a pick-axe with its point downwards ; on the right side of the garland on a red band is the letter " D " on the left " V " and below amid the branches is the letter " R." [1]

The State Flag.

181. The State flag shall be as follows : on a red ground whose length is one and half times its width, occupying the upper quarter next to the staff shall be a dark blue quadrangle, with the following red letters arranged in a triangle : D. V. R.

ARTICLE IX.

The Revision of the Constitution.

182. The revision, modification, supplementing or annulment of this Constitution wholly or in part, may be initiated by :

(1) One-third of all the members of the National Assembly in session ;

(2) The Provincial Assembly of Delegates ;

(3) The Government ;

(4) Ten thousand of the citizens possessing electoral rights for the National Assembly.

[1] D.V.R., i.e. Dalne Vostochnaya Republika, which is the Russian name for the Far Eastern Republic.

183. The modification, supplementing or annulment of the Constitution, wholly or in part shall be effected only by virtue of a law, passed by the National Assembly with a quorum of two-thirds of its members and with a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of the members present.

ARTICLE X.

The First National Assembly and the Government.

184. The order and time for the election of first National Assembly and Government shall be determined by the Constituent Assembly.

The President of the Constituent Assembly:			SHILOV.
Senior Assistant	,,	,,	BERODAVKIN.
Assistants	,,	,,	KLARK.
			LECHOV.
			MANSVETOV.
			DAMBIKOV.
			FEDOTOV.
Senior Secretary	,,	,,	SUCHOVEI.
			BEREDIN.
			YATZENKE.
Assistant Secretaries	,,	,,	NIKIFEROV.
			KIRGISOV.
			BAROVINSKY.

SUMMARY OF TERMS FOR CONCESSIONS FOR GOLD-MINING

The production of gold on the goldfields of the Far Eastern Republic is permitted to companies, individuals, associations of workers and co-operative societies, who lease such right from the Government, on the following terms:

1. The lessee must begin production within the time limit set by the Mining Department—between one and two years—depending upon the methods to be employed and the nature of the ground. For failure without reasonable cause to begin production within the time prescribed, the lease shall be forfeited to the Republic.

> Note.—Former owners and lessees of gold mines which are not operating must begin development work within a time set by the local mining regulations.

2. Placer rights are granted for a term of years not to exceed thirty-six, the length of the term to depend upon the nature and the richness of the ground, but to be fixed in the concession contract.

3. Beginning with the year 1923, a minimum production will be set by the mining department for each year. This will be determined by the methods of production, the nature of the ground and, where there is data available, by the previous production of the particular field. Until 1923, a minimum will be set according to the time and labour expended.

4. For the right of exploitation, the dues shall be paid to the Republic as follows:

(*a*) A percentage of the production according to the provisions of the following paragraph.

(*b*) A flat rental per deciatin of the area of the field.

5. The scale of percentage royalty is as follows:

(*a*) Twelve per cent. from individual pick work.

(*b*) Eight per cent. from mines worked by associations of workmen.

(*c*) Five per cent. on dredged gold or gold produced by the amalgamation process.

(*d*) Three per cent. on piece gold produced chemically.

The rental rate on area is one gold rouble per annum per deciatin. This rate is in force from the date of publication of these regulations.

6. The royalty payments are to be deposited in the Government bank by the 1st day of May and the 31st day of December. The land tax must be so deposited by July 1 annually. If payments are not made at the times fixed, two months is allowed (presumably under penalty) in which to make them. Upon the expiration of that time without payment, the works become the property of the Republic.

7. As a rule, the development of goldfields should be under modern scientific methods. Exceptions can be made in favour of more primitive and wasteful methods on conditions prescribed by the local Mining Department.

8. Assignment or transfer of concessions is permitted only with the consent of the Mining Department. Attempted transfers without such consent work a forfeiture of the contract.

9. At the expiration of the term of the concession, the property reverts to the Republic. All buildings and hydrotechnical construction are included in this reversion. Movable properties may be taken away within one year from the expiration of the term, otherwise they also become the property of the Republic without compensation. During the term, the lessee must not sell, or remove, without the consent of the Mining Department, any of the improvements which will become the property of the Government at the expiration of his term.

10. In the event of failure to pay the rental prescribed, the field and all improvements become the property of the Republic.

11. A lessee of a goldfield is permitted to buy gold from the miners of his own field, but not from those of other fields. The amount of gold so purchased must be entered in the miner's account book. Violations of this rule will be treated as cases of theft.

12. The lessee may use free of charge necessary materials such as lime, stone, sand, etc., but may not sell such materials. The production of other minerals beside gold is allowed only

with permission of the Mining Department upon terms to be fixed.

13. The lessee may use free of charge the necessary lumber provided it is on his field. Otherwise lumber so used must be paid for to the Government.

14. In addition to the area of the goldfield itself, a sufficient area is allowed for the use of technical apparatus.

15. The lessee of a field which is being exploited mechanically has the right to absorb neighbouring fields which are being worked by hand labour upon compensation to the lessees of the hand labour fields, to be fixed under the supervision of the Mining Department.

16. The management of the work is entirely in the hands of the lessee, subject only to the general provisions of law.

17. Reports and accounts must be submitted to the Mining Department in the Ministry of Industry when demanded and in the form prescribed.

18. On December 1 of each year, the lessee must submit an estimate of his production for the following year.

19. Not later than March 1 of each year, an account of the production for the previous year must be submitted to the Mining Department.

20. An incorrect statement is punishable as a crime and by forfeiture of the property.

21. Labour conditions and wages are subject to the general laws covering those subjects.

22. The lessee must furnish free of charge to an agent of the Mining Department housing, with the necessary furniture, fuel and water, and must furnish horses for business use at the rates current in the locality.

23. For the violation of articles 7, 12, 18, 19, or 22 of these conditions or for buying gold from the miners of other fields, the lessee is subject to a fine according to a fine table prepared by the Ministry of Industry.

24. Prospecting for gold is allowed according to the above conditions until further notice.

25. Modifications of the above regulations are allowed in certain cases but such modifications must receive the approval of the Government of the Republic.

STATISTICS ON POPULATION

SIBERIA—	
1915	10,377,900
1921 (estimated)	12,000,000
FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC—	
1921 (estimated)	2,000,000
VLADIVOSTOK—	
1900	38,000
1911	91,464
1921 (estimated)	150,000
BLAGOVESCHENSK—	
1900	37,368
1913	62,500
1921 (estimated)	75,000
CHITA—	
1900	11,480
1913	79,200
1921 (estimated)	90,000
HABAROVSK—	
1900	15,082
1913	51,300
1921 (estimated)	60,000
NIKOLSK-USSURISKI—	
1900	20,000
1911	47,411
1921 (estimated)	50,000

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